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The scenery was marvelous — a hardly inhabited 
country — mountains 4000 feet high standing on the 
ocean-cliff — streams in every canyon  — and the 
immense sombre redwood trees, towering straight up, 
with trunks thirty feet or more in circumference. 
Here in Carmel we have gigantic pine-trees; but 
they are pygmies compared with those redwoods.
— Robinson Jeffers to dr. Lyman Stookey, De­
cember 15, 1915
I am as attached to this rock as if I were a feudal 
serf with an iron collar.
— Robinson Jeffers to Donald Friede, March 1928
Foreword
This book does not claim to do justice to the vast and manifold literary 
production of the California poet who, in his lifetim e (1887—1962), learnt both the 
glory of popular success (with Roan Stallion  or Medea) which he never looked 
for and the bitterness of ostracism (with The Double Axe) which he faced with 
indifferent dignity. What attracts us to Robinson Jeffers is less a technical 
skillfulness or mastery of poetic craft and more a depth of philosophical reflection.
We approach Robinson Jeffers as a “regional” poet, but “regionalism” does 
not speak of this or that particular geographic area (although in case of Jeffers 
the topographical location is of primary importance, and if there has been 
a California poet then Jeffers is definitely one), but it signals a wider and more 
fundamental problem of links and conditions upon which man enters into 
a meaningful relationship with his environment.
The question which w e are tracing in Jeffers’s poetry deals with the essential 
and inevitable “regioning” of man who exists authentically only as a being-in-and- 
-with-the-world. It is the story of man’s duty to face the earth and landscape 
as well as the consequences of the evasion or forgetfulness of this obligation that 
w e try to read in the poetry of the author of Roan Stallion.
What is at stake in this attempt at the “poetic ecology” is a rethinking of the 
tradition of humanism or, at least, its central m otive of man as the “measure 
of all things”. Jeffers, and in this respect his thought take a desisively Nietzschean  
turn, does not privilege man by accepting human part of the world’s history as 
central or most lasting but tries to reinforce the “geological” perspective for which  
man’s history is but a thread in the tapestry of the cosmic process of becoming. 
It is this insistence upon becoming which opens in Jeffers a necessity of the 
reflection upon the Eternal Return and the profoundly temporal character of 
man’s existence.
In the temporal mode of his regioning, however, man is accompanied by 
things and the rethinking of humanism must imply a re-vision of the status of the 
thing. If, as the analyses w ill hopefully demonstrate, the way towards authentic 
being goes through the unconcealment of what Heidegger calls „Nothing” (Nichts)
and what Jeffers describes as “dark peace”, then it is things which in their enduring 
existence always loyal to their nature w ill turn out to be instructors and shep­
herds of men. Jeffer’s fascination with stones and masonry stemms precisely from 
his belief that it is indispensible for man to rediscover his thiry^y nature.
It is about these three elements — earth, tim e and things ■— that this book 
on Jeffers’s poetry would like to be a meditation on.
V
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations have been used to mark appropriate volumes 
of Robinson Jeffers’s poetry:
AP — The Alpine Christ and Other Poems, with Commentary and Notes 
by William Everson (Cayucos Books, 1974)
BAS — Be Angry at the Sun (New York: Random House, 1941)
BE -— The Beginning and the End and Other Poems (New York: Random
House, 1963)
BSW — Brides of the South Wind: Poems 1917—1922, with Comments and Notes 
by William Everson (Cayucos Books, 1974)
CM — Cawdor/Medea  (A New Directions Book, 1970)
DA — The Double Axe and Other Poems (New York: Liveright, 1977)
DJ — Dear Judas and Other Poems (New York: Liveright, 1977)
H — Hungerfield  (New York: Random House, 1951)
SP — The Selected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers (Random House, 1959)
WPS — The Women at Point Sur  (The Blue Oak Press, 1975)
All the quotations from Jeffers’s letters come from The Selected Letters of 
Robinson Jeffers 1897—1962, ed. A. N. Ridgeway (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1968).

1. Landscape
There are  th ree dom inating figures of the earth  in Je ffe rs’s work, 
and the geography of the poet’s im agination finds three favourite loca­
tions: California, Ire land  and Greece. Before considering the m eanning 
of these localities one, however, has to ponder over the significance of 
the term  “e a rth ” which foregrounds all more specific topographies. We 
are asking, then, how the poet’s geography reveals his Being which, 
necessarily, is always located in a certain topography. The issues a t the 
junction of geography, topography and ontology, in a word — ontography, 
will become the center of our a ttention in this book. Ontography, in turn , 
can be briefly  described as a study of m an’s Being in a given topo­
graphical locale, and a necessary consideration of the tem poral dimension 
of this relationship. Thus, following John M uir, a classic of the Am erican 
conservationist thinking, we act on the streng th  of the conviction th a t 
“man becomes in teresting considered in his relations to the spirit of this 
rock and w a te r”1, and we are probing into “the hum an p art of the 
m ountain’s destiny”2.
We can look at na tu re  e ither from  a point of view of one involved 
in change and modifications usually  subsum ed under the term  of “pro­
gress”, or from  a point of view of certain  disinterestedness m easured 
in the lack of com m itm ent. In the firs t case the perspective is only 
a tem porary  stance to be soon transform ed in an active participation: 
a point of view is only a place from  which we estim ate our fu tu re  in te r­
vention in natu re  and thus, necessarily, it has to be abandoned. The 
quicker we move from  estim ation to action the higher is the usability
1 John Muir: to Yosemite and Beyond. Writings from the Years 1863 to 1875, 
ed. R. Engberg and D. Wesling (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1S30), p. 129.
2 Ibidem, p. 162.
of a given point of view. The landscape is seen already as planned for 
the fu tu re  actions, as already “used up”, realized in its complete usability. 
Thus, it loses its identity; it is not necessarily personalized (although 
such a possibility is clearly indicated by Poe’s The Domain of Arnheim) 
bu t certain ly  it is “hum anized” by action, projected into the fu tu re  in 
which hum an authorship will m odify and authorize, sign and countersign 
changes. In o ther words, the landscape is no longer seen as w hat it is, 
bu t as w hat it will be, w here “i t” loses its separateness and secludedness 
and becomes a conglom erate of na tu re  and hum an action (Pope’s “nature  
m ethodiz’d” or Addison’s “regulating natu re  w ithout reform ing her too 
m uch”).
Such a stance necessarily implies the lack of anonym ity on e a rth ’s 
part; it cannot ju st be a configuration of forms, bu t it has to reveal, to 
m ake known its a ttraction and values. These values (be they of industrial 
or pleasurable character) cannot be unique, cannot be exhausted in a mo­
m ent of appreciation but have to be renew able, reproducible and thus 
extendable over a long period of tim e The earth  seen from  this perspec­
tive is no longer a source bu t a resource, i.e. a re-source, a source which 
has to replenish w hat has been used up. G etting used up is a vocation 
of nature , although — paradoxically — this vocation in surreptitiously  
supported by  the nostalgia for the inexhaustib ility  of nature. The earth  
is then no more, bu t no less, than  equipm ent which ought to serve as 
long as possible. The m yth of the ideal equipm ent is the m yth of the 
everlasting serviceability. As M artin Heidegger notices in the essay on 
The Origin of the W ork of Art:
The production of equipment is finished when a material has been so formed 
as to be ready for use. For equipment to be ready means that it is dismissed 
beyond itself, to be used up in serviceability.3
The dismissal “beyond itse lf” is precisely the h ea rt of equipm ent, as it 
im plies an act of closing a thing in its serviceability. The earth  is closed 
not in itself bu t “beyond itse lf”, in its functions, and thus an im portant 
break is introduced into the tem poral s truc tu re  of earth . It loses its 
tem poral continuity  and is em ptied 'out in the sheer fu ture. The economy 
of investm ent is the economy of fu tu re  gains; the economy of equipm ent 
is based on its fu tu re  usability in the service of a set of transcendental 
values (signifieds, the “beyond itse lf”).
W hat strikes us in the other, “d isin terested”, approach is the stubborn 
subsistence of the point of view which appears as essential for disclosing 
a necessary distance betw een the view er and the viewed. It is from  
this distance th a t earth  becomes a landscape, i.e. a vision of earth  in 
which I become aw are of m yself and earth  as taking part in a more
3 M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York, 
1971), p. 64.
pow erful universal game. I rela te  to the earth  in m y disinterestedness 
in the presence of a th ird  p a rty  which, on the  one hand, m akes earth  
as a neu tra l reserve of m y fu tu re  actions disappear but, on the other 
hand, due to a sudden in tervention of distance it creates the space w here 
my vision can occur. Thus, m y appreciating a landscape cannot be m eas­
ured w ith  a degree of concentration w ith  which I react to the landscape 
which opens before me not as a certain  fu tu rity  bu t as an unspecified 
presence of the now. In o ther words, the earth  as landscape “happens 
here for the first tim e and such a work is a t all ra th e r than  is no t”4.
Last week w e drove by mail stage some forty miles 
south of Carmel — “down the coast”, they say here
— into the valley of the Big Sur River. [...] We had 
a delightful drive, and returned the next day. The 
scenery was marvelous — a hardly inhabited country
— mountains 4000 feet high standing on the ocean 
cliff -— streams in every canyon and the immense 
sombre redwood trees, towering straight up, with  
trunks thirty feet or more in circumference.
— R. J. to Dr Stookey, Dec. 15, 1915
As E. F. H irsch w rites in his rem arks upon Heidegger’s existential ana­
lysis:
I may think of nature as a source of livelihood, but I may also enjoy nature 
without having any practical interest. In all these cases world discloses 
nature as “landscape”.5
Landscape reveals earth  which is w ithout history  (“H appens for the first 
tim e”) and thus w ithout a sense of direction or, rather, w ith all possible 
directions p resen t in it. Landscape m ust inevitably  open a sphere of 
ontological reflection as bringing us to the aw areness of the difference 
betw een w hat is and is not. But also, as H irsch claims, it is the “w orld” 
th a t discloses n a tu re  as landscape, which sta tem ent locks us in the uneasy 
triangle of “w orld”, “n a tu re ” and “landscape”. We shall try  to bring 
these differences to the  fore by means of another quatation.
In the 14th chapter of the firs t book of Tristram  Shandy  the p ro ta­
gonist refers us to his m other’s m arriage settlem ent in order to explain 
the aura of unhappiness a ttached  to his life. He tries, then, to take 
a historical approach according to which a line of chronologically arranged 
facts can alw ays in te rp re t and explain aw ay the present m om ent. B ut 
this a ttem pt a t introducing a “stra igh t” relationship betw een the cause
4 Ibidem, p. 65.
5 E. F. Hirsch, “The Problem of Speech in Being and Time”, in Heidegger’s 
Existential Analytic, ed. F. Ellison (Mouton, 1978), p. 168.
and effect, the past and present, is bound to fail. A n a tu ra l and visual 
m etaphor comes back in this context:
Could a historiographer drive on his history, as a muleteer drives on his 
mule, —straightforward; — for instance, from Rome all the way to Loretto, 
without ever once turning his head aside either to the right or to the left, 
— he might venture to foretell you to an hour when he should get to his 
journey’s end: —but the thing is, morally speaking, impossible: For, if he 
is a man of the least spirit he w ill have fifty deviations from a straight 
line to make with this or that party as he goes along, which he can no ways 
avoid. He w ill have views and prospects to himself perpetually soliciting 
his eye, which he can no more help standing still to look at than he can fly...6
N either history  nor landscape can be grasped by m eans of the linear 
progressing; w hat is more, such an attem pt would be openly trans- 
gressive against ethics (“m orally  speaking”) and hum anity  (“if he is a man 
of the least sp irit”). The topography is not a m atter of simple m easuring 
of distances and predictability , bu t it brings about intricate problem atics 
of relationships betw een m an and earth . This laison could be best cha­
racterized, in m oral term s again, as “responding” or “listening” to some­
thing which lies beyond myself. S terne uses the phrase “perpetual soli­
citing” which emphasizes both somehow atem poral character of this 
relationship and its dialogical essence. This dialogue is not presented 
to me as w hat I can choose to accept or reject. “Perpetual soliciting” 
has nothing to do w ith  m y volitional structure; it grabs me, appropriates 
m y being and determ ines m y existential horizon. “Perpetual soliciting” 
is w hat I cannot resist (“views... which he can no more help standing still 
to look at than he can fly ”).
Donegal was beautiful, with its mountains and seas. 
Two or three times I thought angrily that it was 
more beautiful than our own coast mountains, though 
not so strong, nor so much in earnest. But Fair Head, 
which w e revisited today, is the most im pressive pro­
montory of them all. It is a pity that no people 
—not even the Irish! — is equal to its landscape. 
Except in Homer’s Iliad and two or three other 
poems. With love from all four of us, Affectionately, 
Robin.
— R. J. to A. Bender, Sept. 4, 1937
A t the same tim e, S te rne’s passage is firm ly  incribed in the m etaphor 
of travelling, and here “perpetual soliciting” resu lts  in a sudden cessation 
of m ovem ent: the m om ent when I respond to the soliciting view is 
a m om ent of stillness (“standing still”) which, apparently , runs against
6 L. Sterne, Tristram Shandy  (Penguin Books, 1967), p. 64.
m y intentions. “A pparen tly” because as coming and appropriating me 
from  and into the domain w here I have no access, it m ust be prior and 
m ore pow erful than  all p articu la r intentions. This is a situation where 
the w orld opens before m e (in th a t I can see it) bu t also in me (as it 
m ust incorporate myself). The w orld reveals itself, or — as Heidegger 
puts it  — “the w orld w orlds” :
The world worlds,  and is more fully in being than the tangible and percep­
tible realm in which w e believe ourselves to be at home. World is never 
an object that stands before us and be seen. World is the ever non-objective 
to which w e are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing 
and curse keep us transported into Being.7
The w orld as the “ever non-objective” is S te rne’s “perpetual soliciting” 
which w ork is to bring to contact “m e” and the “external rea lity ” 
in such a w ay so as to b lu r and erase the dividing lines betw een the two 
categories. In o ther words, in D errida’s w ake we could say th a t Inside 
and Outside ceases to be separate categories and can be used only 
sous rature, and thus w ritten  down as Inside "is” Outside.
The w orld is a sudden stillness which is solicited by a view and in 
w hich I can see m y decisions (e.g. travel from  “Rome to L oretto”) 
as orchestrated  w ith  decisions which are not m ine (“fifty  deviations from  
the stra igh t line”). The w orld is w hat happens when I realize th a t my 
in tentions (“stra igh t fo rw ard”) m ust comply w ith  decisions which are 
not only not m ine but, basically, non-hum an. The w orld occurs when 
the s tra igh t line sees itself fundam entally  rooted in “crooked pa ths” ; 
in S te rne’s term s: the w orld is a stra igh t line which actualizes itself 
as “fifty  deviations from  a stra igh t line” (see Deleuze’s and G uatta ri’s 
analysis of droite and strie in Rhizome). However, this conjunction of 
decisions is based upon w hat trespasses all decisions. W as not the decision 
of the m uleteer to travel from  Rome to Loretto as quickly as possible, 
and is not his decision thw arted  by the “perpetual soliciting” of views? 
The question, however, is not w hether the decision was thw arted  or not, 
b u t to see th a t any decision can be understood only on the ground of 
w hat defies decision. A stra ight line defends itself as a tension betw een 
“fifty  deviations”. The point of destination will, finally, be reached and 
the trip  w ill even be fast and seem ingly perform ed along the straightest 
of lines, nevertheless it necessarily has to be founded upon w hat darkly  
detours us from  the destination as otherwise, S terne fla tly  concludes, 
we would be deproved of “the least of sp irit”. W hat we can plan and 
m aster (a trip  from  Rome to Loretto) is rooted in w hat defies our 
m astery. In S terne the m om ent of g reatest c larity  (when I experience 
the stillness evoked by the world) is also the tim e of g reatest obscurity 
(the traveller cannot resist the soliciting of the view, even if he w ants
7 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 44.
to, in the same w ay as he would not be able to fly no m atte r how strong 
his will to do so m ight be).
There is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that 
comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered 
insecure. What is, is never of our making or even merely the product 
of our minds, as it might all too easily seem.8
If the w orld is a te rrito ry  w here m y decisions come to term s w ith  the 
non-hum an, there  is also a realm  where the non-hum an operates w ithout 
any in tervention on m y part. In the w orld m y decisions are absent, as 
w hat is designated as “I” or “m ine” has not been outlined yet. We have 
then, as it can be in terp re ted  from  S terne’s passage, th ree spheres of 
movem ent:
' 1) Human, all too hum an (as we m ight say borrow ing the phrase from 
Nietzsche) w here nothing exists except m an’s volitional structure, and 
thus na tu re  is seen as left a t m an’s disposal and, thus exhausting itself 
in m an’s projects. No “w orld” can exist in this real as
...man exalts himself to the posture of the lords of the earth. In this way the 
impression arises that everything man encounters exists only in so far as 
it is his construct.9
This is S terne’s travelling stra igh t forw ard “w ithout ever once turning... 
head [so as to] foretell... to an hour... [the] journey’s end” . The mood 
of menschlich all zum enschlich  dom inated a large section of the 17 and 
18 century  landscape poetry  which heard  geography speak the language 
of politics and economy. S ir John Denham  proceeds in his tone setting 
poem Cooper’s Hill (1642) from  presenting the Thames as a “profuse 
K ing” who
Visits the world, and in his flying towers 
Brings home to us, and makes both Indies ours,
to generalize the purpose of his activity  in term s of economy and physical 
attractiveness,
So that to us no thing, no place is strange,
While his fair bosom is the world’s exchange.10
D enham ’s “no place is strange” is a w ar cry  of this stance tow ard the 
w orld w here appropriation (both economic and sexual) is the m otivation 
of m an’s operations.
2) Hum an and non-hum an, w here the “w orld” comes to the fore, i.e. 
w here natu re  is view ed not as the standing reserve (Heidegger’s Bestand),
8 Ibidem, p. 53.
9 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New  
York, 1877), p. 27.
10 Poetry of the Landscape and the Night, ed. Ch. Peake (Columbia S. C.: Uni­
versity of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 31.
but as the fold which surrounds man who him self is no more than ano­
ther fold of the m atter. In this experience of the world we become aware 
of it as tex ture, th a t is to say as physicality of figures which solicit 
m y attention. We should note im m ediately, however, th a t the notion of 
“w orld” is very  different from  aestheticism  or m ystical sense of unity  w ith  
nature, as I rem ain a t the same tim e both d istant (a “d istan t” view) 
and close to it. The “w orld” is necessarily a m atte r of difference which 
is the source of the stillness which we tried  to describe below.
...its [nature’s] hourly changes, day and night, in the great comings and 
goings of seasons. The gravity of the mountains, the hardness of their 
primeval rock, the slow and deliberate growth of fir trees, the brilliant, 
simple splendor of the meadows in bloom, the rush of the mountain brook 
in the long autumn night, the stern simplicity of the flatlands covered with  
snow — all this m oves and flows through and penetrates daily existence 
up there, and not in forced moments of “aesthetic” immersion or artificial 
empathy, but only when one’s own existence stands in its work.11
I
George Crabbe in his A ldeborough poem The Village (1783) w ill w arn 
against the “artificial em pathy” of the pastoral convention claiming tha t 
he will
...paint the cot 
As truth w ill paint it, and as bards will not.
The reality  of the w orld is uncovered precisely by the analysis of m an’s 
toil in conduction w ith  the work of n a tu ra l rhythm s:
...when amid such pleasing scenes I trace 
The poor laborious natives of the place,
And see the midday—sun, with fervid ray,
On their bare heads and dewy temples play.12
W hereas Denham  spoke of the appropriation of the w orld thus question­
ing the very idea of “m y place” (im perialism  is a large scale w ar against 
“the native” : local ■ inhabitan ts are colonized and, therefore, estranged 
from  their land, for the im perialist the “native place” is bu t a space 
w here he collects objects from  “som ewhere else”), Crabbe insistently  
draw s our a tten tion  to the “natives” who reveal their existence in their 
work.
The m oral dilem m a of conquest and commerce which, on the one 
hand, as Thomson pu t it, allows England to “extend your Reign from  
shore to shore”, bu t — on the o ther — stim ulate b ru ta l colonization 
helps us to see th a t the domain of hum an and non-hum an is the most 
appropriate realm  for the ethical reflection. Unlike the all-too-hum an 
eulogizing over m an’s progress and sa lu tary  activity  which defies ethics
11 M. Heidegger, “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?”, trans. T. J. Sheehan, 
in Listening, No. 12 (Fall 1977), p. 122.
12 Poetry of Landscape..., p. 146.
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as non-problem atic, and unlike the prehum an which transcends ethics 
as non-essential, the hum an and non-hum an looks at the w orld as at 
a complex netw ork of relationships w here the hum an being is also 
involved in the “w ork” of land.
The concept of “w ork” reveals the principal am biguity of early  capi­
ta list colonization: it describes the exploitative labour of native slaves, 
bu t also perta ins to the m ute “labouring” of earth  hiding n a tu ra l reso­
urces. Thus, the ontological problem  of placing “one’s own existence in 
its [nature’s] w ork” m ust necessarily induce its m oral aspect: once we 
have en tered  the w ork of na tu re , we inevitably  have to face the other 
type of w ork — the labour of “w retched slaves”. If one fails to come 
to term s w ith  the la tte r, it  is due to the inauthenticity  of his ontological 
placem ent. It is the non-hum an character of n a tu re ’s “w ork” th a t allows 
us to fu lly  notice and reflect upon the (ethically) “non-hum an” tra it 
of im perialism  as an activity  deproved of ontological grounding. This 
seems to be w hat John  D yer m editates upon in a passage from  The Fleece:
On Guinea’s sultry strand, the drapery light 
Of Manchester or Norwich is bestowed 
For clear transparent gums and ducitile wax.
And snow-white ivory; yet the valued trade,
Along this barbarius coast, in telling wounds 
The generous heart, the sale of wretched slaves;
Slaves by their tribes condemned, exchangin death 
For life-long servitude; severe exchange!
These till our fertile colonies, which yield 
The sugar-cane and the Tobago-leaf,
And various new productions, that invite
Increasing navies to their crowded wharfs.13 (Iv. 11. 189—200)
3) P rehum an, w here both m yself and the w orld are prepared  as 
d ifferen t figures, w here we are being fixed in the tru th  of the figure. 
It is the prehum an which, closed for m an’s inspection, brings everything 
to the outline. If in the realm  of “hum an, all too hum an” things are 
locked up in their usability, in the prehum an they  rem ain in the stage 
of preparation for obtaining a shape. The prehum an, as the not ready, 
is w hat fram es (Ge-stell) the figure (Gestalt) which no longer lies before 
m an as ready m ade to use (vor-gestellt) bu t is only rising tow ards the 
figure. This is a realm  of w hat Heidegger calls “ea rth ” orchestrating 
it  w ith  the “w orld”:
...as the world opens itself the earth comes to rise up. It stands forth as that 
which bears all, as that which is sheltered in its own law  and always wrapped 
up in itself. World demands its decisiveness and its measure and lets being 
attain to the Open of their paths. Earth, bearing and jutting, strives to keep 
itself closed and to entrust everything to its law.14
13 The Poetical Works of Mark Akenside and John Dyer  (London, 1855).
14 M. Heidegger, Poetry.,., p. 63.
Jam es Thomson in The Seasons (1726) w ondered a t the location of this 
never fu lly  accessible pow er and the sources of its energy. Thom son’s 
m editation, which w ants to penetrate  into the realm  w here earth  prepares 
its work, takes characteristically  —  as if no answ er w ere possible — the 
form  of a list of questions.
Ye too, ye Winds! that now begin to blow,
With boisterous Sweep, I raise my Voice to you.
Where are your Stores, ye powerful Beings! say,
Where your aerial Magazines reserv’d 
To swell the brooding Terrors of the Storm?
In what far-distant Region of the Sky
Hush’d in deep Silence, sleep you when’tis calm?15
Thom son’s phrase “aerial M agazines” particu larly  well describes the 
prehum an which operates, on the one hand, on the level of the non- 
-hum an, im m aterial and evanescent (“aerial”), bu t sim ultaneously it has 
to m ake use of the reperto ry  of hum an images (“Magazines”). Like D er­
rid a ’s collosus the prehum an is both hum an and too large to be restrained  
by the exlusively hum an reference.16
r
The feeling of deep earnestness and nobility in na­
tural objects and in the universe: -— these are human 
qualities... but it seems to me I would not impute 
them into objects unless there were something in 
not-man that corresponds to these qualities in man.
— RJ to B. Miller, Febr. 1938
In  S terne’s passage the prehum an is th is pow er which prepares, ju ts  
forw ard the form s the trave lle r is unable to resist. W hat constitutes 
a part of the world, w here m y decisions tw ist w ith  the non-hum an, 
is a resu lt of a long process of outlining and standing out of form s before 
they  m ade them selves visible (the proxim ity  of “ju t” and “jo t” emphasizes 
the iden tity  of rising to form  and outlining). Not only figuratively, we 
can say tha t the prehum an is the geology of the hum an and non-hum an.
W hen Hirsch claims th a t the “w orld” discloses “n a tu re ” as “landscape” 
he sum m arizes the m ovem ent th a t necessarily and incessantly takes 
place betw een the th ree  realms. The “w orld”, the te rrito ry  w here hum an 
and nonhum an m eet, opens “n a tu re ”, i.e. the prehum an which defies my 
decisions, bu t this disclosing can only happen as a certain outline, as 
som ething th a t separating — combines. The hidden forces of “n a tu re ” 
(Heidegger’s “e a rth ”) can only be m ade visible a t the m om ent of their 
least involvem ent in the  sphere of hum an conscious plans and designs,
15 Poetry of Landscape..., p. 105.
16 See J. Derrida, La verite en peinture (Paris, 1978), pp. 136—168.
i.e. a t the  m om ent of outlining. “Landscape” is precisely this place in the 
h istory  of rea lity  w here I grasp the em erging of things, their transition 
from  “e a rth ” to the purely  hum an. “Landscape” belongs then to the 
“w orld” :
It is a basic design, an outline sketch, that draws the basic features of the 
rise of the lighting of beings.17
Hence, inevitably, landscape belongs to the sphere of cu lture subjected 
to hum an understanding and cognition. This understanding, however, 
is conditioned by distance. O nly as a between, as difference can landscape 
be com prehended. Significantly, w hen Spengler w ants to explain the 
phenom enon of cu ltu re  he has recourse to both detachm ent and land­
scape. I t  is only w hen we stand  in “detachm ent from  the objects consi­
dered” (die D istanz vom  Gegenstände) th a t we are able
...to view  the whole fact of Man from an immense distance, to regard the 
individual cultures... as one regards the range of mountain peaks along 
a horizon.18
This is a frequen t experience of Je ffe rs’s protagonists who by adopting 
D istanz gain such a point of view from  which the landscape is understood 
as a contour th a t rem oves m an from  the safe position of self-identity. 
Landscape is w hat takes me fu rth e r  aw ay from  myself. As we have 
a lready  noted, landscape is accessible only through distance which is dif­
ference, not a m ere diversity  of form s b u t a difference w ith  the oppo­
sition: I see the varie ty  of shapes and, a t the same tim e, perceive myself 
as opposed to them  which, in tu rn , redefines m y identity  opposing me 
to myself. Bruce Fergusson on his w ay back from  the dance m editates 
upon the coast m ountains:
The mountains, those were real persons, head beyond 
head, ridge, peak and dome 
High dark on the grey sky;... (BAS, 41)
I t  is this em ergence of distance w hich in tervenes not only betw een m an 
and earth  b u t also in ternally  w ith in  the  s tructu re  of self rem oving me 
from  m yself th a t constitutes the central experience of landscape. I know 
w hat landscape is when there  is the haunting  and silent presence of the 
O ther which claims for itself m y person-ality  (m ountains are “real per­
sons”).
This in ternal location of distance in terested  Nietzsche who believed 
th a t w ithout a necessary in tervention  of distance w ith in  the hum an self 
(D istanz-Erw eiterung innerhalb der Seele selbst) no overcoming of the 
p resen t hum an paradigm  was possible. Following Nietzsche we can argue
17 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 63.
18 O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Ch. F. Atkinson, Vol. 1 (Lon­
don, 1928), p. 94.
th a t landscape, as shown in Je ffe rs’s texts, is not only the silent presence 
of the O ther, b u t also th a t th is presence changes the sta tus of m y 
hum anity  (it is as Nietzsche calls it Selbst-Ü berw indung des M enschen19)
Think of me as one of those friedly natural objects 
like a tree outside the window, that hasn’t much 
means of communication but all it has is w ell in­
tended.
— RJ to W. Bynner, October 1931
19 F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bose, aph. 257.
2. Landscape & Time
. The experience of landscape occurs w hen we, safely sheltered by the 
“folds” of “w orld” (the sphere of the hum an purpose imposed upon the 
ponhum an), feel a penetrating  presence of the prehum an. Landscape, 
jn  short, is a sudden unfolding, stretching out of the folds of “w orld”. 
J t is a m inim al m anifestation of the prehum an as disclosed in, and by, 
outline. A lthough not all the traditions of painting recognize this fact, 
nevertheless landscape seems to be set up upon w hat is no t only non- 
-hum an but, first of all, upon w hat is prehum an. I t is in the sense of this 
uncovering of the prehum an th a t Robinson Jeffers can be described as 
a poet of landscape.
To see landscape is to, necessarily, face the lim it of hum anity; land­
scape is disclosed from  the point w here hum anity  of the view er reaches 
its “end”. This end is usually  the end of language w hich fails us when 
we try  to render the experience of landscape. Reverend Barclay, a m ad 
protagonist of W om en at Point Sur, knows th a t to deal w ith  landscape 
m eans to go beyond the lim itations of semiotic representation. His cons­
tan t reflection is
...I am out of maps,
Breaking strange waves. (WPS, 46)
B ut it is also the end of the earth ; the end signifies a position of certain 
ex trem ity . W hen landscape eventually  form s itself as a figure of our 
perception, earth  stops being w hat it  usually  is, a set of well-known 
form s, and appears as uncanny. In o ther words, we are able to detect 
a certain  excess of life which no longer fills particu la r shapes, no longer 
m atches them  perfectly , b u t is seen as an overflow, an excess which — 
although difficult to nam e — becomes unexpectedly apparent. The ex­
perience of landscape is then the figuration of the  collosal, i.e. of tha t
which, on the one hand, is definitely  too uncanny to be represented, bu t 
w hich —  on the o ther hand — has to com m unicate (that is, represent) 
its uncanniness, m onstrosity, grandeur. We can say of landscape w hat 
K ant holds to be true  about the colossos, th a t it is alm ost too big for 
any representation ( für allé D arstellung beinahe zu gross ist)1.
Landscape can be experienced only from  the point which we have 
described as the “end” . There are two aspects of this term inus:
1) it is the end in the sense of the final m ovem ent of w ithdraw al; 
we cannot move fu rth e r  back because a n ex t step would bring us to the 
nothingness of earth  and, thus, would p reven t us from  seeing anything. 
This m eaning of “end” corresponds to the phrase “travel to the end 
of the w orld” as descriptive of the following experience:
He was standing on a ledge of smooth, finished metal. Not a dozen yards 
from his feet, the ledge dropped sharply away; he hardly dared approach 
the brink, but even from where he stood he could see no bottom to the 
chasm before him. And the gulf extended out of sight into the glare on 
either side of him.2
2) “end” also signifies the end of the earth  as a body of raw  m aterials 
left a t the disposal of m an, the earth  “seen to the poin t”. Both these 
elem ents (the colossal and seeing free of pragm atic purposes) operate 
in the early  section of The W om en at Point Sur:
...Onorio Vasquez 
Never sees anything to the point. What he sees:
The ocean like sleek gray stone perfectly joined 
To the heads and bays, a woman walking upon it,
The curling scud of thes strom around her ankles,
Naked and strong, het thighs the height of the mountain, 
walking and weeping,
The heavy face hidden in the hands, the lips drinking 
the tears in the hollow hands and the hair 
Streaming north. (WPS, 11)
Landscape m arked in our perception as the experience of “end” spells 
the term ination of the earth  (in the colloquial sense) and the appearing 
of “e a rth ” (in the Heideggerian sense), the transition  betw een the two 
represented by  the colossal.
I gazing at the boundaries of granite and spray, the established 
sea-marks, felt behind me 
Mountain and plain, the immense breadth of the continent, before 
me the mass and doubled stretch of water. (SP, 87)
For Jeffers the earth  ends in the m ost literal sense, as his voice takes 
root in California, the  “continent’s end”. But the end is also the between:
1 J. Derrida, La vérité..., p. 143.
2 F. Pohl, “The Tunnel under the World”, in Science Fiction Omnibus, ed. 
B. Aldiss (Penguin Books, 1973), s. 367.
...“The ocean”, he said 
“On one side, the hills on the other, witnessing
The terrible horror, the sacrifice, the marriage of God.” (WPS, 78)
)
The one who sees and uncovers landscape is not sim ply placed before 
a view, b u t he has to be aw are of the m ovem ent th a t has brought him  
to this particu lar placing w here the view  presents itself to him. In o ther 
words, seeing landscape m ust be necessarily rooted in the mood of all 
previous landscapes (“fe lt behind me... the im m ense b read th  of the 
continent”). Landscape is, then, w hat I have before me and behind me, 
b u t this position of betw een cannot be in terp re ted  sim ply as a point 
w here the past opposes the fu ture . The betw een is w here the past 
comes to term s w ith  the fu ture , i.e. w here the  dialogue im plying the 
necessity of presence takes place. Hence in “Poin t Joe” m an is located 
“betw een the solemn presences of land and ocean” (SP, 79). The between 
is then  the experience of the having been in which present becomes the 
cutting edge of the past moving tow ards the fu ture . The p resen t m om ent 
is a gift of the past offered to the fu tu re , and m an is view ed as a me­
diator in th is exchange. In an early  poem “To the Rock th a t W ill Be 
a Cornerstone of the House” we read:
Lend me the stone strength of the past and I w ill lend you
The wings of the future, for I have them. (BSW, 107)
The having been can only p a rtly  be m ade visual, and thus “seeing” 
is m erely an in troductory  phase initiating us into the m ystery  of land­
scape In “C ontinent’s End” Jeffers stubbornly  fixes his glance upon 
a sign, a m ark, a dem arcating line which are signals for the emergence 
of “e a rth ” always felt not seen. V isuality is possible to the degree to
which we deal w ith  figures, recognizable outlines, while “ea rth ” defies
figures and thus escapes sight. V isuality is preoccupied w ith  the “estab­
lished sea-m arks”, while w hat stretches “behind m e” and “before m e” 
is e ither “im m ense” or “doubled”.
“F e lt” in the experience of having been does not have an emotional 
colouring; it does not connote m an’s subjugation to desire, but, just the 
opposite, it introduces the elem ent of the prehum an which is, as we 
have said, an essential factor in the emergence of landscape. W hat started  
as the “im m ense” and “doubled” regresses fu trh e r tow ards w hat is in­
articu late and formless. The experience of landscape organizes itself 
along three stages: visual boundary, felt im m ensity (the colossal), onto­
logical indescribability (w hat I see reveals Being of another order which 
defies m y form ulations or figurations).
The tides are in your veins, w e still mirror the stars, life is your 
child, but there is in me 
Older and harder than life  and more impartial, the eye that 
watched before there was an ocean. (SP, 87)
The having been refers then to w hat preceded m an and is still preserved 
in  his ontological structure . To see landscape is to discover the essential 
process of preservation in m an of w hat is “larger and h a rd e r” than  man. 
Landscape is an act of overcom ing the hum an history  on behalf of geolo­
gical m em ory which, necessarily, is m uch m ore volum inous than  hum an. 
“E arth” disclosed as landscape translates the hum an into the geological. 
This game of disclosing, however, is very  subtle; it is no t exploitative 
uncovering, not setting  som ething up for m y disposal (because it breaks 
w ith  the past in the nam e of the future), b u t it is a m ovem ent which 
un in te rrup ted ly  brings back the  past and gathers i t  in the present. The 
experience of landscape im plies then  both care and sheltering (“life is 
your child”), bu t on the  o ther hand it also reaches out tow ards w hat 
preceded it and w hich is a denial of m atern ity  and desire (“harder... 
im partial”). Landscape is disclosed in three movements: hum an (“child”), 
non-hum an (“tides, s ta rs”), and prehum an (“older and harder than  life... 
before there  w as an ocean”).
However, w hat is felt, w hat goes beyond seeing, will eventually  come 
back to the realm  of vision. Landscape inaugurates itself to the eye, 
then  w ithdraw s tow ards the fe lt in order to reem erge as a visual pheno­
menon. This process implies a certain purification of vision: “I (eye) 
gazing at the boundaries of gran ite  and sp ray” becomes “the eye tha t 
w atched before there  was an ocean”. The firs t eye belongs to “w orld”, 
it is the organ through which an individual subject perceives the world 
and constructs the netw ork of his purposes; the eye which m ediates 
betw een the hum an and the non-hum an, the individuated eye of an I.
The o ther eye is “o lder” than  “life” and thus free of the individuation 
processes. Reverend Barclay longing for “one pow er which fills and 
form s” will claim th a t “there  is no distinction of persons” (WPS, 49). 
The abrogation of the individuation process m ust inevitably question 
the function of outline and figuration. I t is here w here we can refe r to 
B lake’s fam ous aphorism  “if the doors of perception w ere cleansed, 
everything would appear to m an as it is, th a t is to say, in fin ite”. We 
can do so, however, w ith  a careful reading of the last word. B lake’s 
in fin ity  is profoundly illum inated by his theo ry  of line and, paradoxically, 
signifies a sudden revelation of the object in the glory of its contour. 
Infin ity  is the epiphany of shape and form.
...outline is the basis not only of a sublime romantic classicism but also 
a religious salvation. Only the divine imagination can transcend the limiting 
categories of reason and perceive the holiness of everything that lives, but 
its perceptions need to be articulated in clear, specific, and carefully outlined 
forms, if they are to survive in a sceptical world.3
3 A. Kostellanetz Mellor, Blake’s Human Form Divine (Berkeley, 1974), p. 236.
For Jeffers, infin ity  is a retrogressive m ovem ent “beyond belief” (SP, 
581), w here “they have made no words for i t” (SP, 139), and has nothing 
to do w ith  e ither salvation or im agination. Je ffe rs’s purification of “the 
doors of perception” deals critically  w ith  the illusion of shapes and 
outlines and amplifies the necessity of the unconcealm ent of the p re­
hum an.
As the eye fails through age or disease
And the world grows a little dark it begins to have human 
figures in it.
A stone on the mountain has a man’s face 
[...]
The eye’s tricks are strange, the mind has to be quick 
and resolute or you’ll believe in them  
And be gabbling with ghosts. For take note that 
They are always human: to see the human figure in all 
things is man’s disease;
To see the inhuman God is our health. (BE, 66)
Landscape as the having been resides precisely in the m om ent when 
the inarticu lacy  of w hat is “older and harder than life” reaches the edge 
of articulateness, touches upon the contour.
The fascination w ith  the earth  betrays a Rom antic bend of Je ffe rs’s 
w riting. A sim ilar emphasis on the hidden treasure  deposited under the 
crust of earth  rings in Novalis’s apotheosis of the m iner who is content 
to know w here the m etal pow ers are  found, bu t who
...takes more delight in their peculiar structures and habitat than in their 
possession. They have no charm for him any more once they are turned 
into commercial articles, and he had rather looked for them within the 
strongholds of the earth... than to follow their call into the world...4
However, w here Je ffe rs  parts  w ith  Rom anticism  is the strongly emotional 
context of the rom antic philosophy. W hile for Novalis the geological 
experience evokes “hearty  affection” and a feeling of “blood kinship 
of all m ankind”5, for Je ffe rs  the same experience im plies a change in 
our emotional structure . In the act of seeing landscape we reach the 
prehum an, and thus subdue hum an passions and desires and, on the 
semiotic lavel, we overcome the m erely hum an system  of representation. 
The w orld has ended, bu t it has not become com pletely inarticulate. 
Its h istory  continues in signs d ifferen t from  hum an.
The lighthouse rock apexed, and the lesser morro 
Flanked on the south; these two alone breaking the level 
Opposite the straight sea-wall of the ended world. (WPS, 55)
4 Novalis, Henry von Ofterdingen, trans. P. Hilty and F. Ungar (New York,
1964), p. 69.
5 Ibidem,p. 70.
Thus, the experience of living at the “continent’s end” so frequently  
rendered in Je ffe rs’s poems and geographically embodied in his life-long 
residence in California is a  characteristic featu re  of any disclosing of 
ea rth  as landscape. The w ord “continent” retains in Jeffers its adjectival 
sense of controlling one’s passions and desires: we see landscape from  
the “rock-edge of the continent” in the having been of world, and also 
in the m ovem ent betw een passion and im partiality . W hat is begun 
as a decision (I w an t to look a t w hat is in fron t of me) or soliciting 
(like in S terne’s passage), quickly evolves into a previsual sensation 
(“fe lt”), and eventually  tu rn s  out to be dying out of desire (im partiality). 
I t  is precisely this in terp lay  of decision, i.e. m astery, and indecision that 
constitu tes the  n a tu re  of landscape. As Heidegger pu ts it,
...the world is the clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions 
with which decisions comply. Every decision, however, based itself on some­
thing not mastered, something concealed, confusing; else it would never 
be a decision.6
You should incluse in your meditation the grass 
or weeds in that cemetary, the texture of the sto­
nes; and the faces of buildings or mountains, the 
color of a girl’s skin, the colors and shapes and 
motions of things, —to give the poem body as well 
as soul.
— RJ to (?) Wechsler, 29 May, 1935
6 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 55.
3. Gathering Sticks
As we have seen the experience of the having been involves natu re  
in  geological ra th e r than  biological term s. Je ffe rs’s phrase from  “Con­
tin e n t’s End” in which he alluded to the “insolent quieteness of stone” 
itse lf rests upon the  geological reference to rocks. Thus, in seeing land­
scape I see it alw ays as bringing me to the point w here I m yself am 
also revealed as participating in the geological perception of forms.
...it is not w e who presuppose the unconcealedness of beings; rather, the 
unconcealedness of beings ...puts us into such a condition of being that 
in our representation w e always remain installed within and in attendence 
upon unconcealedness.1
Heidegger’s rhetoric is at the same tim e spatial (“installed w ith in”) and 
ethical (“in a ttendance”) which emphasizes the general line of his thought 
in  its  constant m ovem ent betw een the m ateria lity  of objects and their 
Ontological foundations, betw een dwelling (“The w ay in which you are 
and I am, the m anner in which we hum ans are on the earth , is buan, 
¡dwelling”2) and building (“Building accomplishes its na tu re  in the raising 
of locations by the joining of their spaces”3).
The spatiality  of rhetoric implies 
a necessity of particu lar locations not 
only in geographical term s (and 
these abound in Je ffe rs’s work, to 
m ention only the m ost im portant 
like Point Joe, V entana Creek, Big 
Sur, M onterey, Mill Creek), bu t also
I spend a couple of hours every 
afternoon at stonemasonry, having 
still much to build about the place; 
or bringing up stone from the 
beach, violent exercise.
— RJ to Dr. L. Stookey, 21 Au­
gust, 1920
1 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 52.
2 Ibidem, p. 147.
3 Ibidem, p. 160.
in term s of m etaphors w ithin individual poems. In “Point Jo e” the land­
scape presents itself as, in part, an arch itectural structure:
...and beyond
the desolate
Sea-meadows rose the warped wind-bitten van of pines, a 
fog-bank vaulted  
Forest and all....
[millions of flowersts] whose light suffused upward into the fog 
flooded its vault... (SP, 78)
Thus, a t the m om ent of disclosure, we find ourselves “installed in” the 
the  w orld as in a cathedral (“vau lts”), seem ingly sheltered against the 
assaults of the elem ents (“van of pines”). “Seem ingly”, because this 
location is no t a place of rest bu t of m ovem ent (“we w andered through 
a w eird coun try”, “one o ther moved th ere”), of hum an unrest and 
inquisitiveness. “E arth”, in trud ing  into the world, radically  preserves its 
righ t to self-enclosure which defies hum an in terference and exploration. 
Hence, unobservedly, the arch itectu ral m ixes w ith  the acquatic and 
m arine:
Point Joe has teeth and has torn ships...
I saw the spars and planks of shipwreck on the rocks (SP, 78)
The same transition  betw een the two set of m etaphors occurs in an early  
section of Tam ar:
... He returned another way, from the headland 
over Wildcat Canyon,
Saw the immense water possessing all the west and saw Point Lobos 
Gemmed in it, and the barn-roofs and the house-roof 
Like ships’ keels in the cypress tops... (SP, 7)
The m etaphors underscore the im possibility of e ither true  dwelling or 
genuine building. The arch itecture  of landscape in “Poin t Joe” tu rns 
out to be deadly, and in Tam ar the  house is a “little  box” :
...the withered house 
Of an old man and a withered woman and idiot woman. No 
wonder if w e go mad, no wonder. (SP, 8)
If the surfaces of arch itectu re  rem ain misleading, the ground is a source 
of illum ination. In the geological m etaphysics of Je ffe rs  it is the floor 
of the cathedral w hich acquires significance denied to the sophisticated 
vaulting. The n a tu ra l arch itecture calls for a glance dow nw ard ra ther 
than  upw ard: the ligh t which usually  en ters a building from  above 
in Je ffe rs’s im aginary structu re  radiates from  below:
...we wandered
Through a weird country where the light beat up from the  
earthward... (SP, 78)
I t is the solidity of the ground is the essence of Je ffe rs’s architecture; 
like in an Egyptian pyram id the earth  becomes not only grounds on 
w hich a s truc tu re  is erected, bu t it is a realm  w here a building takes 
place. The place taken by the building is as im portant as its walls, and 
like in the Egyptian arch itecture it is “la cinquiem  face de la pyram ide 
si im portan t dans sa signification sym bolique”.4
In Jeffers th is im portance takes on a lum inous character: the ground 
radiates light. B ut it is no t shining which will in terest us here; it is the 
essential m ovem ent of the head th a t calls for atten tive reading. If light 
shines from  the earth , then, the fundam ental direction of m an’s look 
is downward. In “Poin t Joe” this m ovem ent is augm ented and becomes 
not only a glance bu t a physical gesture of the whole body. The view er 
sees “an old Chinam an gathering seeweed from  the sea-rocks”. I t  is upon 
th is tender action of a bent hum an body th a t Jeffers focuses his attention. 
The Chinam an is the only o ther hum an presence on the beach, and thus 
he has to come to the fore as a displaced being throw n among elem ents 
which bare his existential qualities.
To submit to this displacement means: to transform our accustomed 
ties to world and to earth and henceforth to restrain all usual 
doing and prizing, knowing and looking, in order to stay within the 
truth that is happening in the work.5
The displacem ent is m anifested on several levels:
—  existentially , m an is alienated from  his usual, m an-m ade, environ­
ment;
— nationally, the Chinam an is shown as estranged from  his native soil;
—  phenomenologically, man gets a view of him self not as a consumer 
of food, bu t as a gatherer, collector of nourishm ent which brings him  
closer to earth  than to the realm  of hum an culture w here food is 
usually  provided bu t no t gathered.
The m an bends down tow ards earth  in the m ovem ent of gathering, 
and in th is gesture he counteracts the m ovem ent of ligh t which “beat/s/ 
up from  earthw ard”. Bending tow ards earth  m an is coming closer to the 
source of light. A t the same time, the very  w ord “g a th e r” introduces 
a particu lar relationship of nearness betw een m an and earth . G athering 
implies th a t the gathered and the gatherer come from  necessarily dif­
feren t realm s, bu t through the very  action, a gesture of collecting, they 
are  placed in the im m ediate vicinity of each other. To “gather” means 
to bring to certain  closeness something previously d istant which, how­
ever, does not lose its in tegrity  and separateness. G athering is then a name 
for a certain  harm ony betw een the gathered and the gatherer, the
4 C. P aren t, “La P yram ide a l ’E nverse” in Le Monde (Avril 14—15, 1985).
5 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 66.
harm ony w here “clearcut form s still continue to exist individually, not 
fused into an all-em bracing atm osphere”6.
This harm ony holds not only betw een the gathered and the gatherer, 
bu t it also calls fo rth  o ther elem ents of the w orld thus losing the 
character of the subject-object type of relationship. In H eidegger’s essay 
on “Building, Dwelling, T hinking” we read tha t
With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the 
other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream  
and bank and land into each other’s neighbourhood. The bridge 
gathers the earth as landscape around the stream. Thus it guides 
and attends the stream through the meadows... The bridge gathers 
to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals.7
Sim ilarly, the gathering  in “Point Joe” is a gesture of ritua l bowing 
to and before earth  in which o ther elem ents are invoked. “Seaweed”, 
a p lan t growing in the sea calls for the generative power of soil; “sea- 
-rocks” revealed m om entarily  b y  the ocean bring us to the neighbourhood 
of the darkness of w aters, as well as induce a delicate but essential 
am biguity as to the proverbial bareness of rock which, in this case, 
tu rns out to be nourishing and productive.
G athering takes place among the  elem ents, i.e. it is a gesture in 
which one elem ent necessarily invokes another. In “Poin t Jo e” the sea 
is shown as neighbouring w ith  the land, and w ater touches the sky:
...and old Chinaman gathering seaweed 
from the sea-rocks,
He brought it in his basket and spread it flat to dry on the 
edge of the meadow.
It is this “edge” which is particu larly  significant in this context. It m arks 
the territo ry  of transition  w here two adjacent areas are made separate, 
bu t also it dem arcates the space w here they  come into a relationship. 
The edge introduces a necessary distance, a m nim al but essential dif­
ference between two beings or spaces but, a t the same time, it illum ines 
them  by he light of the same. This sameness does not im ply identity; 
it  is to be understood as a horizon common to all beings. The same 
in which stands the seaweed is the land and the sea, the sky and w ater, 
and it is impossible not to address these elem ents when looking at the 
p lan t drying on the beach. In this respect the same is nothing else but 
the power of Logos in terp re ted  by Heidegger as Saying which has nothing 
to do w ith  a linguistic expression b u t which
6 L. Spitzer, Essays on English and American Literature,  ed. A. Hatcher 
(Princeton, 1962), p. 15.
7 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., pp. 152—153.
...refers to the cosmic “owning” which gathers beings together to abide in
themselves and with other beings as a cosmos.8
i
Hence, the same, horizon or Logos is the very  antithesis of privacy 
which has been so devastatingly  criticized by Nietzsche:
All is now private: this is Nietzsche’s conclusion about modern tim es: All 
is done purely with reference to self and without horizons.9
G athering, which overcomes the privacy of self and which seems to be 
the equivalent of such G reek term s like H eraclitus’s logos, Parm enides’s 
moira and A naxim ander’s chreon, brings things to the edge, i.e. it opens
an unlim ited view forw ard and backward. Man as the one who gathers
exists on the edge, on the thin line betw een the w ater and land, past and 
present:
Man gleaning food between the solemn presences of land and 
ocean,
On shores where better men have shipwrecked, under fog and 
among flowers,
Equals the mountains in his past and future;...
In  these lines m an’s gesture tow ards earth  becomes more than gathering. 
“G leaning” is collecting to which two im portant m om ents have been 
added: first, it is a gathering which comes after the crop has been col­
lected; second, it is picking up w hat was left by others. The economy 
of gleaning is the stra tegy  of utm ost, care: nothing can be lost, every 
tiny  particle  has to be sheltered. Man as a ga therer has lost the air 
of producer bu t preserved th a t of a clever consumer; man as a gleaner 
sees him self as a late comer to the feast, a pro tector of crum bs and 
sticks which cannot be wasted. Thus, to “glean” m eans to “bend” (like 
in the act of gathering), bu t it also im plies coming la te r than others. 
The difference betw een gathering and gleaning is the difference of hum i­
lity. “The poor are allowed to en ter and glean upon ano ther’s ground 
a fte r the harvest w ithout being guilty  of trespass”10.
I t is th is belatedness and poverty  of m an th a t draw s Je ffe rs’s attention: 
as a gleaner m an is coming only afte r others have already  come, he 
en ters “betw een the solemn presences of land and ocean” .
Nourishing, a v ital occupation of man, is located then in the most 
ontologically vulnerable area of “betw een” or edge. Food is gleaned 
betw een the solemn presences of elem ents because in this gesture there 
resides the significance of gathering: gleaning is gathering as it brings 
the sm allest particles to the presence of the elem ents. One of the
8 M. E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self. The Development of Heidegger’s 
Concept of Authenticity  (Athens—London: Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 242.
9 T. B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Ber­
keley, 1975), p. 181.
19 Blackstone 1768, OED, 4, 210.
traditional m eanings of “glean” was to “gather or collect into one recep­
tacle, one m ass” as testified by a  line from  Shakespeare’s H enry Viii: 
“Yes, th a t goodnesse of gleaning all the lands w ealth  into one”11.
B ut as Je ffe rs  says m an also gleans food “betw een the solemn p re­
sences” of m ountains and ocean. H ere we read two im portan t thoughts; 
first, th a t true  nourishm ent m ust be appropriated by its elem ental p re ­
sence (unlike the tradition of m odern eating which, purposefully, tries 
to erase the traces of the “elem ental” from  foodstuffs tu rned  into 
a commodity); second, th a t m an gleans food as a betw een, as w hat 
introduces a gap into the same, into w hat is “harder and older than  life”. 
Man is a wound, a cleavage th a t separates land and ocean and prevents 
elem ents from  a full participation in the Same. M an’s present being 
introduces a difference betw een “land” and “ocean” ; it is m an’s conscio­
usness th a t both necessitates the fissure and determ ines the possibility 
of the cure. As Je ffe rs  claims in the H eraclitean language;
Before there was any water there were tides of fire, both our
tones [the poet’s and the ocean’s] flow  from the older fountain. (SP, 88)
Man is w hat, through the am biguity  of its tim e, introduces difference 
into the domain of the Same. Glean, on the  one hand, emphasizes the 
sheltering aspect of hum an existence which can take place only in the 
present (and also in the presence of the other), bu t sim ultaneously the 
verb suggests the pastness of the situation as “gleaning” is only a finish­
ing touch added w hen the m ain w ork is over. Man is then a belated 
newcom er to the Same.
Man appears on “shores w here b e tte r men have shipw recked, under 
fog and among flow ers”. The present perfect construction brings us 
again to the vicinity of gathering: these deaths do not belong to the 
past b u t can be called forth , b rought to the open of, w hat we m ay call, 
the geological presence. Men who have shipw recked are “b e tte r” because 
they  already  belong to the geological presence which has to be revived 
despite the im perfections of the pu rely  hum an presence. W hat we refer 
to in th is essay as the geological presence is also the “fire” , the “older 
fountain”, and hence can also be described as pre-sense.
Man, however, is no t only “betw een” b u t also “u nder” and “among”. 
W hile the firs t prepositional phrase, as it has been dem onstrated, dis­
plays m an as a difference bearer/barer, the o ther two serve as ancillary 
descriptions: under suggests coveredness from  the top, among — from  
the sides. Man as a between does not p resen t him self in an easy w ay bu t 
has to be unconcealed from  the  under and among. The m om ent when 
this happens is the gleaning of food, w hen m an under fog and among 
flowers bends tow ards earth  picking up w hat was left on the ground.
41 OED, 4, 210.
3 T h e  D a r k  G lo r y
We should no t le t it  go unnoticed th a t food appears a t least twice in the 
poem. As hum an nourishm ent i t  is gleaned, collected and sheltered 
in hum ility; as a  dram a of geological form s it is grasped and torn to 
pieces, claimed w ith  deadly ferocity. It is only the la tte r  which is dis­
cussed in term s of aesthetic categories:
Point Joe has teeth and has torn ships; it has fierce and 
solitary beauty...
The culinary m etaphor in “Poin t Jo e” oscillates betw een tearing (a savage 
destruction g ratu ituously  leaving unconsum m ed rem ains of the feast) 
and gleaning (a sheltering activ ity  of salvaging the ungathered  rem nants). 
The la tte r  takes place in the face of serious danger: m an gathers food 
in the “solem n” presences of land and ocean which, although disclosing 
the sphere of the Same (“fire”, “older fountain”), are m ortally  dangerous 
to man. G leaning is perform ed alw ays in the shadow of tearing. As 
Jeffers pu ts it in the final lines of “A t the B irth  of an Age” :
The long river
Dreams in the sunset fire
Shuddering and shining. (SP, 560)
Displacem ent is, as we have seen, a necessary beginning for the revaluing 
of m an’s relationship w ith  the world. Now th is estrangem ent from  the 
fam iliar is augm ented by  depicting na tu re  not as a place of refuge 
b u t as the domain of “shuddering” and “tearing” .
Boulders blunted like an old bear’s teeth break up from the 
headland. (SP, 175)
If Hölderlin speaks of the “blessed n a tu re ” and of the “fullness of the 
living universe which feeds and satisfies m y starving being w ith  its 
intoxication”12, he uses the culinary  rhetoric to dem onstrate a Rom antic 
dom ination of m an over the universe which satisfies m an’s hunger w ith 
its Dionysian quality  (“intoxication”). This rhetoric  of satisfaction is 
absent from  Je ffe rs’s poems. Man is no t only the ea ter but, firs t of all, 
the one who is eaten, “to rn ” by “the  tee th ” of na tu re . W hile Hölderlin 
places his emphasis, a t least in Hyperion, on the fullness of na tu re  
which thus can bestow its excessive value to a man, in Jeffers neither 
m an nor na tu re  are in a position to im p art anything to each other.
M an’s gleaning takes place in the  shadow of tearing, and it is this 
violence w ithdraw ing m an from  his hab ita t which Heidegger ascribes 
to the domain of the “holy” (das Heilige) th a t  m akes “gleaning” w hat 
i t  is. Gleaning, we shelter w hat has been left against the original 
violence (“A w ithered old Chinam an came regularly  to pull edible seaweed
12 Hölderlin, Hyperion or the Hermit in Greece, trans. W. R. Trask (New York
1965). p. 22.
from  the rocks”13) which has already rem oved us from  our place. Heideg- 35
ger calls the “holy” das Entsetzliche  and, as a critic comments, he does so
Because the holy expels all experience from its habituation and withdraws 
it from its habitat... it is ent-setzend, that is, according to the etymology 
of the German word, de-ranging or dislodging. In this sense the holy as 
“entsetzlich” is also the terrible.14
Two questions need to be asked now. W hat is the  m eaning of our shelter­
ing gesture? W hat is i t  th a t tea rs  us to death, us who stand  betw een 
the  tearing  pow ers and salvage food from  rocks and sea? Heidegger 
a t th is m om ent w ithdraw s into silence as “nothing mediated... is ever 
capable im m ediately of a tta in ing  the im m ediate”15. Besides, as Heidegger 
him self w arns us the “t ” question “comes too soon and is too crude.
For ... w ithout cause and w ithout scruple, we accept it  as an established 
fact th a t one can and m ay ask about this “I t” exclusively in term s of 
w hat “I t”? or who “I t”16. L et us rely , then, on a w rite r’s rendition 
of “I t” . On the th ird  of F ebruary  1798 D orothy W orsdw orth, a superb  
m aster of poetic th inking in prose, noted in he r journal:
A mild morning, the windows open at breakfast, the redbreasts singing 
in the garden. Walked with Coleridge over the hills. The sea at first 
obscured by vapour; that vapour afterwards slid in one mighty mass along 
the sea-shore; the islands and one point of land clear beyond it. The distant 
country (which was purple in  the clear dull air), overhung by struggling 
clouds that sailed over it, appeared like the darker clouds, which are often 
seen at a great distance apparently motionless, w hile the nearer ones pass 
quickly over them, driven by the lower winds. I never saw such a union 
of earth, sky, and sea. The clouds beneath our feet spread themselves to the  
water, and the clouds of the sky almost joined them. Gathered sticks in the  
wood: a perfect stillness. The redbreasts sang upon the leafless boughs.
Of a great number of sheep in the field, only one standing. Returned to 
dinner at five o’clock. The moonlight still and warm as a summer’s night 
at nine o’clock.17
We notice im m ediately th a t the passage opens and closes w ith  precise 
tem poral designations, bu t the tim e in question is indicated not only 
by a clock but, firs t of all, by food. N ourishm ent is the beginning and
13 Una Robinson Jeffers in Melba Berry Bennett, The Stone Mason of Tor 
House. The Life and Work of Robinson Jeffers (The Ward Ritchie Press, 1966), 
p. 87.
14 A. Schuwer, “Nature and the Holy: On Heidegger’s Interpretation of HÖ1- 
derlin’s Hymn ‘Wie wenn am Feiertage’ ”, in Radical Phenomenology. Essays in 
Honor of Martin Heidegger, ed. J. Sallis (Humanties Press, 1978), p. 235.
15 M. Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (Frankfurt: Kloster­
mann, 1971), p. 63.
16 M. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, trans. F. D. Wieck and J. G. Gray 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 188.
17 Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. M. Moorman (Oxford University Press,
1977), p. 5.
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end of hum an tim e which w ithout it becomes barren  and unhospitable. 
It is also food th a t institu tes hum an dwelling, i.e. th a t is the basis 
of departu re  and retu rn : the house is a sheltering place only w hen the 
beginning of the day is accompanied by breakfast and at the re tu rn  
home the table is laid for the evening meal.
There is no welcome where no .meal, no food and drink can be offered. 
There is no stay here for the mortals, in the sense of dwelling at home.18
B ut the dwelling in which m ortals gather a t the table is never a place
of only seclusion and separateness; sheltering, it  also opens up to include
the world: “the windows open at b reakfast...”, “The m oonlight still and 
w arm ...”. W hat fills the fram ew ork of food signifying hum an tim e and 
hum an dwelling is, however, m ore than hum an: w hen a t home, the 
perspective opens into “the d istant coun try” . We cannot ignore the fact 
th a t D orothy W ordsw orth’s landscape, like Je ffe rs’s, is locked in between 
“the solemn presences” of land and sea and, again like Jeffers, she speaks 
from  “under fog” w hereas the sea is “obscured by vapour” . N either 
for Je ffe rs  nor for Dorothy is this fog a sign of the lack of clarity. It 
does not constitute an im penetrable veil bu t functions as w hat has to be 
taken into necessary consideration if the c larity  is to be achieved. Thus, 
m an em erges from  “under fog”, and “vapour slid along the shore” to make
us aw are of the possibility of vision, in o ther words, fog is in terp re ted
as a problem  posed to our sight and understanding.
C haracteristically , it  is not considered 
to be a featu re  of w hat Heidegger 
calls “dream y rom anticism ”, bu t in
a very  m atter of fact w ay it is ren ­
dered precisely as a problem , i.e. as 
a thought provoking phenomenon.
W ith th is qualification we are co­
m ing back to the culinary  rhetoric.
In H eidegger’s Was heisst Denken?  
we read:
There is no welcom e where no meal, no food and drink can be offered. 
There is no stay here for mortals, in the sense of dwelling at home. If 
mortals are to be made welcom e and to stay, there must be water from 
the rock, wheat from the field... This frequent turn of phrase [there is] was 
mentioned when w e tried to characterize what gives food for thought before 
all else — what is most thought-provoking. It gives us food for thought.19
Fog is, then, food for thought, and it is precisely as a resu lt of 
a reflection th a t the landscape is ‘tran sla ted ’ from  the  language of the
I think it is the business of a wri­
ter of poetry, not to express his 
own gospel, but to present images, 
emotions, ideas, and let the reader 
find his good in them if he can. 
Not to form a way of thought but 
perhaps to activate thoughts.
— RJ to F. I. Carpenter, Nov. 18, 
1933
18 M. Heidegger, What Is Called..., p. 190.
19 Ibidem, p. 189.
visual into the language of philosophy. “I never saw such a union of 
earth , sky, and sea” is D orothy’s equivalent of H eidegger’s gatheredness. 
The very  verb  reappears in the following sentence: the m ost appropriate 
response, and the only w ay of tuning oneself to the un ity  is a sheltering 
gesture of the hum an body. Man bending tow ards earth  to receive its 
gift is introduced into silence. The perfection of this stillness consists 
in th a t it  is a te rrito ry  w here m ovem ent (of the body) does not oppose 
the im m obility of a thing (sticks), and silence is augm ented by a song 
of a bird.
Je ffe rs’s “gathering  seeweed from  the sea-rocks” and D orothy’s “ga­
thering sticks in the wood” poetically call forth  presences more pow erful 
than  m an’s and are both figures of thought subm erging m an in the 
inexhaustible richness of nature. In o ther words, while loyal to the 
w orld (to every th ing  which we do to perpetuate  our understanding 
of reality , to bring it to light) they  disclose w hat cannot be fu lly  dis­
closed, w hat resists light and understanding, i.e. earth . D orothy W ords­
w orth ’s earth  is experienced as an u ltim ate seriousness of everyday 
life rea lity  of food and walks; for Jeffers, solem nity is only a passing 
phenomenon itself; “solemn presences of land and ocean” eventually  
tu rn  out to be m anifestations of “n a tu re ” in which solem nity is only 
another name of laughter:
..that glow from the 
earth was only 
A trick of nature’s...
N ature is a sequence of form s which reveal them selves as real and 
apparen t (“tricky”) a t the same time: a trick  is constituted precisely 
by  a th ing which is and is not w hat it presents itself to be. Light, 
seem ingly radiated  by the earth  is u ltim ately  a “trick” because earth  
is w hat opposes light in a sense th a t it never lets light penetrate  its 
interior. N ature, underly ing land, ocean and man, the It we have been 
talk ing about, plays the role of physis  which Heidegger describes in 
A n Introduction to M etaphysics:
...physis originally encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well 
as the plant, the animal as well as man ...Physis means the power that 
emerges and the enduring realm under its sway.20
L et us tu rn  now tow ards the two questions which we asked not long ago: 
“w hat is the m eaning of our sheltering gesture?” and “w hat tears us into 
fragm ents?”. The answ er to the firs t one is th a t by bending tow ards 
earth  we can balance dom ination and hum ility  and, carefully looking 
a t seeweeds or sticks, we realize not only their usefulness bu t their
20 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim (New  
York, 1961). p. 12.
“graceful” subtlety . Tearing comes in a t the m om ent when this expe­
rience becomes foregrounded in the aw areness th a t the subtle ty  is a p lay  
of appearing which extends unto the whole rea lity  (“a thousand graceful 
subtleties"). A “trick ” sum m arizes a tragedy of semiotics: it signifies 
a  “deceptive appearance”, bu t it is precisely because the appearance has 
em erged th a t we can talk  about it being “deceptive”.
Je ffe rs’s poem  deals then  w ith  the belatedness or im possibility of 
tru th : only w hen a form  has appeared and was recognized as true  can 
w e claim  th a t it  is deceptive and fraudulent. Only w hen the dress has 
been pu t on (to trick  =  to dress or to deck, to adorn), and the outline 
thoroughly sketched (to trick  =  to sketch or draw  in outline) and adm it­
ted  and perceived as real can we suddenly notice the nakedness (of the 
king) and deceptiveness (of the rank; in hera ld ry  a “trick ” is a sketch 
in pen and ink of a coat of arm s). B ut th is  recognition m ust alw ays come 
too late: the  naked king does not stop being a king, a false aristocrat 
preserves his title, a ship learns the sharpness of the tee th  of Point Joe 
w hen shattered  to pieces by the rocks. Tearing is described as a “trick 
of n a tu re ’s, and it is this phrase which is a correlate of Heidegger’s 
physis  because, like th is old Greek concept, it signifies “gleaning” (shelter­
ing, bringing to light) which alw ays rests upon w hat is hidden and dark.
Physis is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby 
the hidden is first made to stand.21
21 Ibidem, p. 12.
4. Romanticism & the Minimal
Difference
T h e r e  is  n o t h i n g  w e  p h i l o s o p h e r s  l i k e  b e t t e r  
t h a n  t o  b e  m i s t a k e n  f o r  a r t i s t s .
—  F . N ie t z s c h e  i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  G . B r a n d e i s ,  
M a y  4, 1888
We have seen th a t while rom anticism  m ay be tem pted by the idea 
of ind ifferen t un ity  in which individual objects dissolve and become one 
w ith  the universe, Jeffers constantly  w rites and th inks from  between 
changeable form s of rea lity  whose will to change is called “n a tu re ” .
the a lternative readings of the betw een have been specified by Derrida:
...it is between different things that one can think difference. But this 
difference-between may be understood in two ways: as another difference 
or as an access to nondifference.1
Je ffe rs’s “n a tu re” w ith  its quality  of trickery  functions as a th ird  essen­
tia l term  in his philosophical anthropology. F irst is world which com­
prises the rea lity  of environm ental setting in relation w ith  productions 
of hum an mind. We could claim th a t world, even w hen relying on 
n a tu ra l foundations, is less “n a tu ra lis t” and more “constructiv ist” , i.e. 
it is the sphere w here the natu ra l is spoken of w ith  regard  to the 
hum an. As Nietzsche puts it:
What you have called the “world” that is something which should first 
be created by you: it should reflect your reason, your image, your w ill and 
your love.2
The study  of relationships betw een m an and w orld is fundam ental for 
Je ffe rs’s philosophy. Thurso 's Landing (in itself a story  of a failed
1 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore, 1974), p. 223.
2 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Penguin 
Books, 1961), p. 75.
technological in tervention of w orld into m an’s life) opens w ith a scene 
in which w orld is placed litera lly  on the w ay tow ards man:
The coast-road was being straightened and repaired again.
And the man: “I wish they’d let the poor old road be. I don’t 
like improvement.” “Why not?”. “They bring in the world;
We’re well without it.” (SP, 266)
The road on w hich w orld is approaching m an is evidently  a path  
of destruction:
... At
the far end of those loops of road 
Is what w ill come and destroy it, a rich and vulgar and bewildered 
civilization dying at the core,
A world that is feverishly preparing new wars... (SP, 581)
“Civilization” is the m ost advanced stage of world, its most protruded 
point; it is a calling th a t comes from  world. Civilization is w orld sent 
fo rth  as an agent or em m issary to operate in the territo ry  tha t has, 
so far, been foreign to world. Thus, the im agery of the world/civilization 
intrusion is th a t of expansion, annihilation of distance and individuality:
... a strangely
Missionary world, road-builder, wind-rider, educator, pronter and 
picture-maker and broadcaster.
I
Secularization of the “mission” results in political im perialism  (“a world 
of heavier ty rann ies”) and in a dom ination of the inauthentic ity  of bu­
siness. The ecclesiastical connotation of “mission” is ironically continued 
by the biblical m etaphor of love as an economic transaction: world is 
“like a drunken whore... of fled charm s”.
The m ovem ent from  a restric ted
concept of “im provem ent" to the all- 
-inclusive “civilization” is more than 
a point in Je ffe rs’s artistic  biogra­
phy. I t m arks also the end of certain 
aesthetics of landscape which has 
dom inated hum an relationships w ith 
na tu re  for nearly  150 years. 
Rom anticism  begins not as a h istory  of na tu re  bu t as a theory of 
hum an in tervention into nature, i.e. actions previously perform ed w ithout 
an eye on theory  now find justification in w ritings of poets and critics. 
A t the beginning of the English rom antic theory  of landscape stands 
the sta tem ent which, for Jeffers, announces the Apocalypse of nature. 
In 1810 Uvedal Price publishes his m onum ental th ree volum e study 
Essays on the Picturesque as Compared w ith  the Sublim e and the Beauti­
fu l and on the Use of S tudying  Pictures for the Purpose of Im proving
I don’t think industrial civilization 
is worth the distortion of human 
nature and the meanness and the 
loss of contact with the earth, that 
it entails.
•— RJ to J. Rorty, April 1932
Real Landscape which begins w ith  a com plaint th a t na tu re  is given 
prio rity  over the intrusion of the  m an m ade theory:
Formerly the decorations near the house were infinitely more magnificent... 
but the embellishments of what are called the grounds... were much less 
attended to; and... the park, with all its timber and thickets, was left in 
a state of picturesque neglect.3
P rice’s thought concentrates on w hat we have called world by establishing 
a link betw een painting and reality , i.e. by consciously ascribing to a rt 
(human intervention) the  sta tus of experim ental reality . World is w hat 
evolves w hen earth  is trea ted  as a reference:
...with respect to the art of improving, we may look upon pictures as a set 
of experim ents of the different ways in which trees, buildings, water. 
&c. may be disposed, grouped, and accompanied, in the most beautiful and 
striking manner...4
The language of im provem ent is a rhetoric of grouping, and its economy 
is th a t of conciseness: a picture is valuable as it brings together w hat 
Is na tu ra lly  dispersed, if it  is a short and m odified version of reality. 
Im provem ent consists in subjugating n a tu re  to a system  of organized 
events, and the im prover who “presupposes every thing to succeed as 
he chooses” works “by carefully  collecting and cherishing the accidental 
beauties of w ild natu re; by judiciously arranging them , and skilfully 
combining them  w ith  each other, and the em bellishm ents of a rt.”5
The em bellishm ents are designed to tu rn  natu re  into a spectacle of 
ideas, and world defies understanding in the nam e of the pleasure of 
the eye. Sim ultaneously, a v ital p a rt of the spectacle centers round 
various strategies the purpose of which is to give to world a pretence 
of naturalness. Thus, a r t  has to rem ain concealed, and world rem ains 
a tour de force of the secret skill:
How best to bid the verdant Landscape rise,
To please the fancy, and delight the eyes;
Its various parts in harmony to join 
With arts clandestine, and concealed design;
To adorn, arrange; — to separate, and select 
With secret skill...6
For a rom antic theorist landscape is constituted by a series of disguises 
which create the illusion of nature. Thus, the rom antic landscape results 
from  a netw ork of pretences, and its m echanism  is th a t of concealment:
3 U. Price, Essays on the Picturesque..., London 1810, p. 1.
4 Ibidem, p. 5.
5 P. Knight, The Landscape. A Didactic Poem in Three Books (London, 1795), 
p. 46.
6 Ibidem, p. 36.
a hidden design (as a hidden sexual vice) m ust rem ain concealed through 
effects of chance and use:
For as the cunning nymph, with giddy care 
And wanton wiles, conceals her study’d air;
And each acquired grace of fashion tries 
To hide in nature’s negligent disguise;
While with unseen design and cover’d art
She charms the sense, and plays around the heart;
So every pleasing object more w ill please,
As less observer its intention sees:
But thinks it form’d for use, and placed by chance
Within the lim its of his transient glance.7
On the o ther hand, Je ffe rs  reveals the s truc tu re  of world precisely as
a  hidden design, a contrivance, a w ell-planned sexual in trigue from
w hich only innocence or distance can pro tect man:
...and old drunken whore, pathetically eager to impose 
the seduction of her fled charms 
On all that through ignorance or isolation might have escaped 
them. (SP, 581)
Sim ilarly  in Tamar, world represented first by  M onterey then by France 
is  also a figure of drunkeness and prostitution. R eturning from  M onterey 
young Cauldwell observes a landscape:
A night the half-moon was like a dancing-girl,
No, like a drunkard’s last half-dollar... (SP, 3)
L ater in tex t Tam ar synonimizes betw een world and sexual promiscuity:
Agh, you can’t wait 
To get to France to crawl into strange beds.
But Monterey to-night. You — what a beast,
You like them dirty. (SP, 54)
W orld is, in short, w hat arches over earth  and separates m an from  it.
Je ffe rs’s rejection and critique of world is, in part, understandable 
in the ligh t of the Am erican tradition  of view ing landscape, a tradition 
th a t could not accept European psychological aesthetics focusing on m an’s 
im pact upon reality. As Van Zandt pu ts it, any doctrine which “stressed 
the im portance of hum an a rt  and artifice in landscape... encountered 
a severe Am erican opposition.”8
It is w ith  earth, the second term  of Je ffe rs’s triad, th a t the problem s 
of landscape come to the fore. The tradition of rom anticism  w ith  which 
Jeffe rs  was certain ly  fam iliar (the early  volum e of Je ffe rs’s poems 
Californians is described as “shaded by his preoccupation w ith  Sw inburne,
7 Ibidem, p. 55.
8 R. Van Zandt, The Catskill Mountains House (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1966), p. 86.
Coleridge, Shakespeare, and particu larly  W ordsw orth and Shelley”9) 
accentuates the original character of landscape. This originality is, how­
ever, carefully created and consists in a regressive m ovem ent towards 
th e  m om ent of creation. The purpose of a landscape pain ter is to catch 
n a tu ra l scenery not so m uch in its pu rity  but, firs t of all, in its anciency: 
to see a land not as un-created  b u t as ju st created. The assum ption is tha t 
the  originality  of the n a tu ra l phenom ena was, no more and no less, 
a m om ent of m inim al difference. The in tim ate closeness of the natu ra l 
rea lity  is cu t open by a sharp  aw areness of the in terpreta tive, secon­
dary, delayed character of nature. In the 19th century  W ordsw orth has 
to travel m any m iles to see w hat he considers ancient na tu re  which, 
however, is already m arked by  the “ancient arch itec tu re”. The regressive 
m ovem ent tow ards the m inim al difference is unthinkable w ithout the 
presence of man. Since, as M arianne Thalm ann puts it in her book on 
G erm an Romanticism, “m ountains and forests no longer appear before 
their windows, b u t instead there  are roofs, towers, portals, m arket stalls, 
and sentinel boxes” the artists  had to “imagine na tu re  fragm entarily  
and allogically” fabricating rea lity  originating “in the sanctuary  of our 
inner self.”10 The supposedly original sphere of na tu ra l phenom ena tu rns 
out to be a system  of signs and, thus, locks itself for ever in the realm  
of trace, secondariness and belatedness.
W ordsw orth in his Guide to the Lakes  (1810) complaining of a sudden 
invasion of m an upon na tu re  which was “instan tly  defaced by the in ­
trusion” does not try  to counteract it by suggesting a m an-free land­
scape but, in keeping w ith the regressive m ovem ent theory, a ttem pts 
to recapture the vision of land in w hich m an-m ade innovations have 
ju st been outlined. N ature is then  caught a t the m om ent w hen the 
present is re in terp re ted  by the ancient, by th a t which was closer to the 
origin although never identical w ith  it.
...why should the genius that directed architecture of these vales have 
deserted them? For the bridges, churches, mansions, cottages and their 
richly fringed and flat-roofed outhouses... have been substituted structures, 
in which baldness only seems to have been studied, or plans of the most 
vulgar utility.11
The rom antic trave lle r departs from  the urban  territo ry  of a decisive 
difference, of a strongly m arked in terruption , and arrives a t the realm  
w here in terrup tion  is a p lay  of forms, and a difference has been m ini- 
m alized b u t by no m eans dispensed w ith. The distinction betw een “un ­
practised m inds” and artistic soul is the contrast betw een a strong, vulgar
9 M. Berry Bennett, The Stone Mason..:, p. 79.
10 M. Thalmann, The Literary Sign Language of German Romanticism, trans. 
H. A. Basilius (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972), p. 32.
11 W. Wordsworth, A Guide to the Lakes (London: Henry Frowde, 1906), p. 65
44 difference and its subtle variety . In o ther words, stress is placed not 
on “dem arcation” bu t “gradation” :
...unpractised minds rece iv e ... impressions only from objects that are divided 
from each other by strong lines of demarcation... a new habit of pleasure 
w ill be formed opposite to this, arising out of the perception of the fine 
gradations by which in Nature one thing passes away into another, and the 
boundaries that constitute individuality disappear in one instance only to be 
revived elsewhere under a more alluring form.12
In Europe the regressive m ovem ent tow ards the m inim al difference 
included m an and his in terventions in the continuum  of nature , and thus 
tu rned  natu re  again, despite the promise of originality, into world, 
a sphere w here na tu re  is converted into a m eaning, a new reality  in 
which w hat is exists as related  to a “m e”. M eaning is a degree of 
relatedness of the  ex ternal rea lity  to the ego. From  this perspective 
we can understand  b e tte r  Novalis’s description of the a rtis t as a “crypto­
grapher” or H erder’s belief in a rt bringing m an to the light of know ­
ledge:
Will sich der unkorperlichste Philosoph das Feinste in seiner Natur, den 
Gedanken einer Seele denken: er wird Lichstrahl! Da geht er auf, da blitzt 
er in die Seele: alle Weisheit und Wissenschaft wird nur Klarheit, Helle, 
Erlauchtung...13
If it is hum an activity  th a t constitutes the province of the minimal 
difference in Europe, in America the outlining of forms, articulation of 
difference is pushed fu rth e r backward. Consistently in Locke’s adage 
“At the beginning all w orld was Am erica” the difference generating role 
in the country w here “the key word is still w ilderness”14 is ascribed 
to God.
Dear to the heart of every true romantic was the over-riding belief in the 
transcendental world of nature — the belief that the visible landscape of the 
earth was an emanation of God... without the need of human intervention 
for its own self-contained glory.15
As how ever the self-defeating rhetoric of Van Z andt’s statem ent makes 
it  clear “self-contained glory” is fundam entally  incom patible w ith  the 
sta tus of an “em anation” which, as generated  and secondary, is — at 
m ost — a rem iniscence of its origin. N ature has to be redeem ed by 
world, by a sign, by the ancient which category is another term  for the
12 Ibidem, pp. 72—73.
13 J. G. Herder, Werke, ed. Suphan, Vol. 6, p. 139.
14 R. Van Zandt, The Catskill..., p. 52.
15 J. Appleton, The Experience of Landscape, (London: John Wiley, 1975), 
p. 41.
m inim al difference. Phrases like Van Z andt’s “transcendental w orld of 
na tu re” are particu larly  illum inating since they  place the significance 
of na tu re  outside it  e ither in the domain of hum an im agination (“The 
a rtist is concerned w ith  things im agined”16) or divine creation (“Some 
apprehensions of the process of landscape-m aking by the instrum enta­
lities of the C reator is necessary... to conduct the process of landscape 
painting by the feeble instrum entalities of m an”17). In both positions, 
however, na tu re  is seen as a sign, articulation, inscription of the invisible 
hand, i.e. as a m ediation or necessary sacrifice on the  p a rt of the Whole 
which makes itself m anifest only  in fragm ents. Transcendentalized natu re  
becomes world (hence incidental correctness of Van Z andt’s phrase). 
As a following citation from  Novalis shows clearly  world is a resu lt 
of a seroiotization of na tu re , of in terp reting  it as a message, communi­
cation or revelation:
Alles, war wir erfahren ist eine Mitteilung. So ist die Welt in der Tat eine
Mitteilung-Offenbarung des Geistes... Der Sinn der Welt ist verloren gegangen.
Wir sind beim Buchstaben stehen geblieben.18
Landscape is then  world, unthinkable w ithout hum an or divine in te r­
vention, w ith  a definite although indefinable sense of transcendence. To 
th is reading of the external reality  Jeffers opposes the concept of earth. 
In the already discussed poem „The Coast Road” the ominous approaching 
of world is locked betw een two responses. One comes from  m an and 
as such is necessarily rooted in  a certain  mood (“In having a mood, 
Dasein is alw ays disclosed moodwise as tha t en tity  to which it has been 
delivered over in its Being”19). The observer
...shakes his fist and makes the gesture of wringing a chicken’s 
neck, scowls and rides higher. (SP, 581)
The other counter-charge is announced in m oral term s as “consolation” 
and comes from  n a tu ra l forms.
Where is our consolation?
Beautiful beyond belief 
The heights glimmer in the sliding cloud, the great bronze gorge — 
cut sides of the mountain tower up invincibly,
Not the least hurt by this ribbon of road curved on their sea-foot.
16 M. Thalmann, The Literary Sign Language..., p. 32.
17 Louis Noble quoted by B. Novak, Nature and Culture. American Landscape 
Painting 1825—75 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), p. 73.
18 Novalis, Schriften, ed. Kluckholm, vol. 2, p. 378.
19 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Basil 
Blackwell, 1962), p. 173.
Against the  acceptance on the p a rt of n a tu ra l phenom ena, the road 
is no m ore than  an incision. It is th is ab ility  to rem ain a forever un ­
touched surface upon which world articu lates itself which we call here  
earth. I t  should be noticed th a t earth  rem ains untouched not because 
of the impeccable smoothness of its surface; ju s t the opposite, it is world* 
m an’s im agination projected as reality , th a t  speaks in categories of 
smoothness. M ark, a crippled visionary from  “Thurso’s Landing”, pictures 
a woman as velvety  gloss:
...because the seer was virgin,
Knowing only pictures of women, he saw smooth w hite 
What’s rough in nature;... (SP, 317)
The domain of earth  is “to rn ” and “cu t”, bu t these wounds have n o t 
been inflicted by world: they resu lt from  m ovem ents and shifts w ithin 
earth  which, are, in Je ffe rs’s texts, frequen tly  represented as catastrophes, 
disasters and wounds. In  “N ight w ithout S leep” we read:
Cataracts of rock
Rain down the mountain from cliff to cliff and torment the 
stream bed... The laurels are wounded,
I feel the flesh of the mountain m ove on its bones in the wet 
darkness.
...These wounds w ill heal in their time; so 
w ill humanity’s. (SP, 609)
W hat we have, a fte r Heidegger, called earth  is then  to be understood 
lite ra lly  as a configuration of geological and biological form ations b u t 
also figuratively  as a certain  im penetrable an ineffable depth  over the 
surface of which world erects its system  of abstract references. A pro­
blem  which Jeffe rs  diagnoses in his philosophy is the ever dim inishing 
contact betw een world and earth. If, in Heidegger’s in terp re ta tion , world 
is “picturable as supported by the ea rth  as the finite articulation of 
e a rth ”, and earth  is construed “as the solid and supportive earth , the 
fundam ent of w orld”20, Jeffers stresses a division betw een the two realms. 
Like in Heidegger, earth  rem ains a ground for world, bu t the la tte r 
is showing com plete forgetfulness as to the  n a tu re  of its foundation. The 
story  of world in Je ffe rs  a narration  of forgetfulness and a growing 
discrepancy betw een earth  and world.
..We have gathered vast populations incapable 
of free survival, insulated 
From the strong earth... (SP, 588)
20 J. P. Fell, Heidegger and Sartre. An Essay on Being and Place (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 196.
I t  is easier to understand  now w hy in  “The A nsw er” man is described 
as “dissevered from  earth  and s ta rs” . (SP, 594)
My wife, Una Jeffers, died three years ago; ...she was 
in many ways a mediator between me and the 
w orld ... I still live in the same place, and open my 
eyes every morning on the same rocks and ocean, 
ever new  under the restless weather and flighty sea- 
-fowl. Recreations: stone masonry, dog-walking, inter­
vention in dog-fights, and the art of being a grana- 
-father.
— RJ to J. Ennis, 1953
5. Earth, World & the Trick
of Nature
M an’s estrangem ent from  ea rth  is a fam iliar them e found in such 
m odernist w rite rs  like D. H. Law rence or Oswald Spengler. Spengler 
realizes th a t we are  the dw ellers of the Steinkoloss W eltstadt which 
separates us from  earth  “by the pavem ent underfoot”1, and only w ith 
the  g reatest difficulty  could we reconstruct the experience of the 
“strong e a rth ” :
Let the reader try to merge him self in the soul of the peasant. He has 
sat on his glebe from primeval times, or has fastened his clutch in it, to
adhere to it with his blood. He is rooted in it as the descendant of his
forebears and as the forebear of future descendants. His house, his property, 
means here not the temporary connection of person and thing for a brief 
span of years, but an enduring and inward union of eternal land and 
eternal blood.1
Spengler tries to render w hat Jeffers negatively described as “insulation” . 
Thus, a peasant is linked w ith  his soil, glebe (Scholle) not tem porarily, 
b u t this laison allows for the genuine tem poralization of m an’s existence.
If world is forgetful of time, earth  is perm eated with tim e, and the
saturation  is m ade complete by reference to blood which is this union 
(Verbundensein) is never exclusively hum an. Earth  is w hat transform s, 
through the continuity  of tim e, peasan t’s blood into “e te rnal” blood.
Tem poral continuity  (the circle of generations, w hat Spengler calls 
Kreislauf, Zeugung, G eburt und Tod), spatial nearness (“he has sat on 
his glebe”) both reappear in N ietzsche’s principle of “faithfulness to 
e a rth ” :
1 O. Spengler, The Decline of the West,  vol. 2, p. 92.
2 Ibidem, vol. 2, p. 104.
Remain loyal to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue. Let 
your bestowing love and your knowledge serve the meaning of earth.3
Nietzsche’s command is placed in the context of loving care: m an is to 
serve the earth  w ith  his bestow ing love (schenkende Liebe). Sim ilarly, 
Spengler’s description m akes use of the rhetoric of emotion: m an has 
“fastened his clutch in i t”, i.e. m an clings to earth  no t in despair bu t 
in the endurance of love. The Germ an original hears a neighbouring 
voice of love in the phrase w hich suggests th a t a peasant “von Urzeiten 
her auf seiner Scholle s itz t”, as Scholle is no t only a neu tra l noun for 
“glebe” (describing it ra th e r  as “lum p” or “clod” than  a vast area of 
productive land), b u t it also functions in such em otionally charged 
phrases like “an der Scholle hangen” expressive of our loving relation­
ship w ith the earth . There is a peal of love in the earth  (scholl is 3 p e r­
son sg praet, of schallen  — to peal or ring) and it is our closeness of this 
sound th a t transform s world into earth. W hen M ark sees as “sm ooth” 
w hat in  na tu re  is “rough” he draw s our a ttention not only to the am bi­
guities of “rough” (oscillating betw een violence and unevenness) bu t also 
to the intricacies of the phrase “in n a tu re ” . I t  declares th a t roughness 
appears “in n a tu re ”, i.e. in the ex ternal rea lity  of geological and biolo­
gical forms, bu t also — m ore im portan tly  —  th a t roughness is the 
essence, the na tu re  of object. We can see then  th a t na tu re  is fa r from  
serenity  and balance and consists in the essential, fundam ental conflict. 
I t  is precisely m an’s smoothing, m itigating policies th a t introduce a gap 
beween world and earth. In term s of the type of landscape the contrast 
is visualizable as a juxtaposition of the fla t and h illy  scenery.
Walking in the flat Oxforshire fields
Where the eye can find no rock to rest on but little flints 
Speckle the soil... (SP, 483)
It is the m ountains which reveal the fulness of earth  in which rough­
ness, violence and unevenness, unreadiness of shapes (which are “rough” 
in a sense of being decisive bu t unfinished by the completedness of the 
process of culture) unconceals earth  as body. The experience of earth  
is the tactile experience of tex ture. Thus, w alking through fla t lands
...I remembered impatiently 
How the long bronze mountain of my own coast,
Where color is no account and pathos ridiculous, the sculpture 
is all,
Breaks the arrows of the setting sun
Over the enormous mounded eyeball of ocean. (SP, 483)
Unlike world which is made m anifest by e ither abstractions or ines­
sential additions
3 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,  “Prologue 3—5”.
4 T h e  D a r k  G lo r y
Sports and gallantries, the stage, the arts, the antic of dancers 
The exuberant voices of music (SP, 163),
earth  bodies fo rth  rough, unready, unprepared shapes as facts, i.e. as 
som ething th a t is not sim ply there  bu t which calls for our attention. 
For Jeffers, world operates on the level alienated from  the fundam ental 
necessities of essences or grounds. The economy of world is th a t of abun­
dance:
„We must adjust our economies to the new abundance...”
Of what? Toys: motors, music-boxes
Paper, fine clothes, leisure, diversion. (SP, 569)
The very  reference to toys qualifies world as in-essential, the sphere 
w here clothes are not related  to physiology (body) bu t aesthetics of orna­
m ent (“fine”), and tim e is com partm entalized into w orking periods and 
spells of excitem ents (“leisure”). I t  is a diagnosis which Spengler would 
have found difficult not to endorse. In the chapter on “The Soul of the 
C ity” we read:
Tension, when it has become intellectual, knows no form of recreation but 
that which is specific to the world-city — namely, detente, relaxation, dis­
traction. Genuine play, foie de vivre, pleasure, inebriation, are products of the 
cosmic beat and as such no longer comprehensible in their essence. But 
the relief of the hard, intensive brain-work by its opposite — conscious 
and practised fooling — of intellectual tension by the bodily tension of sport, 
of bodily tension by the sexual straining after "pleasure” and the spiritual 
straining after the “excitem ent” of betting and competitions, of the pure 
logic of the day’s work by a consciously enjoyed mysticism — all this is 
common to the world-cities of all the civilizations. Cinema, Expressionism, 
Theosophy, boxing contests, nigger dances, poker and racing — one can find 
it all in Rome.4
The rhetoric of the Spengler passage is, like Je ffe rs’s, a rhetoric of 
in terruption . The vision of history  is necessarily presented  in term s of 
a series of discontinuities and polarities, extrem es which do not enter 
into a p lay  b u t solem nly justify  each other. Thus, b rain-w ork (Denkarbeit) 
can be considered as radically d ifferent from  fooling (Trottelei), intellect 
from  sports, etc. Hence, like diversion  — a key w ord for Je ffe rs’s world 
—  distraction  synthesizes Spengler’s W eltstadt. “D iversion” signifies 
a general disorientation, a turning aside from  a certain  direction, a mis­
placing of one’s purpose w ith  a strong overtone of inattentiveness. “To 
d ivert” m eans to m isleadingly refocus som ebody’s attention, or to purpose­
fu lly  draw  one’s a tten tion  off from  the operation. We see then th a t 
Je ffe rs’s “diversion” m aps out a state of m isplaced attention or false 
a tten tion  which w orld generates in its inhabitants.
Sim ilarly, Spengler’s Zerstreuung  (distraction) emphasizes the ill—
4 O. Spengler, The Decline..., vol. 2. p. 103.
intended in terruptedness of a process of enjoym ent tu rned  into harm less 
and inauthentic  game of pretences, b u t sim ultaneously opens new m ean­
ings which also lu rk  behind Jeffe rs’s philosophy. Thus, Zerstreuung  
purports a notion of dispersion and dissipation, misfocusing of vision 
(like in Zerstreeungslinse  —  diverging lense), and through a phonetic 
sim ilarity  w ith  Zerstörung  brings to the fore the im agery of destruction, 
frustration , ru in  and demolision.
If w orld connotes distraction, dispersion, forcible discruption and 
pulling asunder, ea rth  signifies gathering collectedness, pulling together 
and attention. In “The W ind-Struck M usic” the Spenglerian telluric 
rhetoric of soil is combined w ith  the sartorial im agery of roughness, 
unevennes, tex tu re. Having fallen in “a deep-cut gu lly” chasing a heifer, 
old Tom Birnam  —  who adm its he has not “an ounce of poetry” in his 
body —  reflects on his life:
He [Ed Stlies] saw the 
earth banks, the sparse w hite grass,
The strong dark sea a thousand feet down below, red with reflections 
of clouds. He said “My God,
Tom, are you hurt?”. Who answered slowly, “No, Ed.
I am only lying here thinking o’ my four sons” ■— biting the words 
Carefully between his lips — “big handsome men, at present lolling 
in bed in their... silk... pyjamas...
And why the devil I keep on working?” (SP, 585)
The fall is a profound one: from  w eakness to streng th  (“strong sea”), 
from  the inebriation of labour disclaim ing poetry  to a sudden revelation 
of the  poetic na tu re  of existence (a union of “earth  banks”, “strong sea” 
and the cloudy sky), from  smooth surface to tex tu re  (rough working 
a ttire  vs. “silk pyjam as”).
I t is this tex tu ra l quality  th a t m akes Spengler’s K reislauf possible: 
the voice of generations speaks repetitively  from  inside the folds of 
m atte r constituting the m ain substance of meaning. For Jeffers, m eaning 
is no t only radically  “n a tu ra lis t” bu t also based on the m echanism  of 
repetition whose m easure is no t the ability  to create bu t to affirm  w hat 
has already happened. The m eaning of earth is not novelty, bu t recu r­
rence modelled on the Nietzschean amor fati.
...This old man died last winter, having 
lived eighty-one years under open sky,
Concerned with cattle, horses and hunting, no thought nor emo­
tion that all his ancestors since the ice-age 
Could not have comprehended. (SP, 586)
Like the continuity  of generations w hich establishes the voice of earth  
speaking through the body of each individual, also the physical identity
of hum an body is described in term s of organic forms. Old Mrs Fraser, 
tendered in sickness by Fayne, acquieres a topographical dimension: 
h e r breasts and chest are
... white upland 
Between the blond mountains of falling flesh 
That had fed Lance.
Lance’s mother 
Wished for that green winteroil again; Fayne rubbed it 
On the white plain and the roots of the great soft udders. (SP, 412)
)
M other’s body as the orig inary  landscape (the thought no t unknown 
to  Spengler who spoke of b irth  as of “the firs t comprehension of dep th” 
in which “culture is born out of its m other-landscape”5) is extended from 
a  m erely hum an reference a cosmic m otherhood. Lance F raser in “Give 
Your H eart to the H aw ks” emerges not only from  his m other’s womb 
b u t also from  the earth.
...then far and high, like a tiny horn on the hill 
against the green-saffron heaven 
Lance grew into sight, the man and the horse and the evening 
peace..
He was
like this mountain coast,
A ll beautiful, with chances of brutal violence; precipitous, dark- 
natured, beautiful; without humor, without ever 
A glimmer of gayety; blind grey headland and arid mountain, 
and trailing from his shoulders the infinite ocean. (SP, 406)
The rhetorical bearing is evident: the m an is like nature . B ut the whole 
passage is m uch m ore than  a simile; it  no t only depicts m an in likeness 
to na tu re  but, firs t of all, brings m an and n a tu re  to a common area. 
This domain is more than  Heidegger’s “nearness” : m an not only approxi­
m ates natu re , b u t grows out of it.
“Lance grew  into sight” : this phrase emphasizes a connection, the 
fundam ental relatedness from  which m an begins to appear. “To grow 
into  sigh t” signifies th a t only this can be seen which appears in the 
v icinity  of o ther objects, th is which collects and gathers o ther outlines. 
There is no real appearance unless it  is a gathering of beings in a com­
mon te rrito ry  (“the m an and the horse and the evening peace”); no 
appearance can take place w ithout recalling the presence of the sky 
(“green-saffron heaven”). Such an appearance locates m an on the hori­
zon, i.e. w here he occurs together w ith  non-hum an. Only on the line 
of horizon can m an live w ith  the infinite ocean trailing  from  his shoul­
ders.
5 Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 174.
But, for Jeffers, life does not ex­
haust itself in a dialectic tension 
betw een w orld and earth . The for­
m er is no t only ornam entation (“fine 
clothes”), inessentiality  (“toys”), and 
excess (“we love our luxuries”). We 
would not be doing justice to this 
notion w ere we to in te rp re t it m ainly 
as the dom ain of pleasure-principle. 
World is also life alienated into
..battleships and destroyers, and great fleet of war­
planes ...all the proud instruments 
of man imposing his w ill upon weaker men... (SP, 590)G
1Sim ilarly, earth  is fa r  from  a pastoral setting  providing m an w ith  indis- 
pensible symbols. The rom antic w ish to tre a t n a tu re  as an a lphabet 
ascribed to  m an a privileged position of the reader, the addressee of the 
message. In  Je ffe rs  earth  speaks the language which is not directed to 
m an e ither in tim e
Each hundred years 
One of the enormous stones w ill move an inch in the dark.
Each double century one of the oaks on the crown of the mound 
Above us breaks in a wind... (SP, 470),
or sense
This
ebb of vitality feels the ignoble and cruel 
Incidents, not the vast abstract order. (SP, 608)
Even the m ethaphor of m otherhood and b irth  is questioned and sus­
pended or, a t best, relegated to the long d istan t past:
The long migrations meet across you and it is nothing to you, 
you have forgotten us, mother. (SP, 87)
World does not res t quietly  on earth, bu t both are disturbed by a pro­
cess which, in “Poin t Joe” Jeffers describes in the  following way:
...that glow from the 
earth was only 
A trick of nature’s... (SP, 79)
Three lines above i t  he speaks of “solemn presences of land and sea” 
thus locking us in an uneasy situation betw een solem nity and p layfu l­
ness, earth and nature. We realize then th a t earth is not the final stage
6 One may refer here to Nietzsche’s remark from the Notebook: “Truth 
turns into a power when w e have first isolated it as an abstraction”, in  
F. Nietzsche: Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 
Early 1870’s, trans. D. Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 59.
Think of me as one of those 
friedly natural objects like a tree 
outside the window, that hasn’t 
much means of communication but 
all it has is w ell intended.
— RJ to W. Bynner, October 
1931.
in the in terp re ta tion  of reality , w hat is more, it  cannot be taken fo r 
gran ted  in its seriousness. W hat is a t stake here is the issue of tru th . 
N either world nor earth  seem  to house tru th  since they  offer only 
a contrastive reading of reality .
From  w hat follows in “Po in t Joe” it becomes obvious th a t earth 
is largely  a playing field of illusions since we are admonished to “forgive 
natu re  a thousand graceful subtle ties”. But it is no t only earth w here 
the tendency to dissim ilate is m anifest; the sam e holds for world whose 
seriousness is also called into question. Com m enting upon the inexorable 
fate  of civilization Jeffers discovers in world a pow er to deceive:
You have seen through the trick to the beauty;
If w e all saw through it, the trick would hardly entice us and 
the earth
Be the poorer by many beautiful agonies. (SP, 566)
Illusion has a dom inating pow er of a ttraction  and seduces m an into 
beau ty  and life. To live im plies a concession on the p a rt of man to 
recognize the pow er of un tru th , as i t  is only through the u n tru th  of 
delusion th a t we can achieve the tru th  of life.
W ith such a sta tem ent we are brought to the vicinity of Nietzsche. 
In  Human, A ll-too-H um an  Nietzsche alm ost litera lly  anticipates Je ffe rs’s 
philosophy of the existential irrep lacib ility  of erro r and deception:
What w e now call the world is the result of errors and fantasies which, 
in the total development of organic being, gradually emerged and interbred 
with one another, and have been bequethed to us as the accumulated treasury 
of the entire past.7
This is a sign of recognition of u n tru th  th a t can harldy  be over­
estim ated: to lice is to acknowledge illusion as a necessary condition of 
w hat is. Hence, as Gilíes Deleuze puts it in his profound exposition 
of N ietsche’s thought, “If someone wills the tru th  it is no t in the nam e 
of w hat the w orld is, b u t in the  nam e of w hat the w orld is n o t”8. Thus, 
w hen Jeffe rs  considers tru th  “his e rran d ” he does it, significantly 
enough, in the context of a dream . A fter the  cloud-inspired vision of 
the final extinction of m an is dispersed tru th  comes to the fore as 
a dream  opposing another dream.
“What a pity our kindest dreams 
Are complete liars” ,and I turned from the glowing West toward 
the cold twilight. “To be truth-bound, the neutral 
Detested by all the dreaming factions, is my errand here.” (SP, 591)
7 Quoted by A. Danto, Nietzsche as a Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 
1965), p. 74.
8 G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Ch. Tomlinson (Press, London- 
The Athlone Press, 1983), p. 96.
But the dream  of tru th , the dream  beyond the calam ities of hum an 
presence, rem ains nevertheless a dream , and w hat claims to be “n eu tra l” 
is bu t another “dream ing faction”. No life is possible outside deception 
present both in w orld and earth, outside illusion which underlies both 
territo ries like a tectonically uncertain  s tra tum  th a t causes incessant 
m ovem ent of the ground. Nietzsche puts it very  concisely in his notes:
Illusion is a necessity of life  for a sensate being.9
In a  sketch of his lecture “On the Pathos of T ru th ” he am plifies deception 
w ith  a m etaphor of a dream:
Truth! Rapturuous illusion of a god! What does truth matter to men!... 
And where has it gone! A vanished dream which has been erased from 
mankind’s countenance by other dreams! It was hardly the first!10
Jeffers, like N ietzsche’s th inker, is locked in a series of dream s despite 
his am bitions of prophesying tru th  (“tru th -bound”):
“Wake him up!” Shouts the philosopher in the pathos of truth. Yet w hile 
he believes himself to be shaking the sleeper, the philosopher himself is 
sinking into a still deeper magical slumber.11
This sta tus of beau ty  is equally  ambiguous. On the one hand, one has 
to see through the “trick ” to see it, on the o ther —  beau ty  is also im plied 
in life which has ju st been defined as a “trick”. Trick is then a stra tegy  
underly ing both  world and earth, and its  operation consists in the 
evocation of a series of nontru ths, illusions, deceptions w hich have to be, 
in the final analysis, accepted as a foundation of existence. On the one 
hand,
Joy is a trick in the air (SP, 262), 
bu t it is th is deception th a t m akes the hum an difference:
...“I am neither mountain nor bird 
Nor star; and I seek joy.” (SP, 170)
Jeffe rs  locates Dasein’s fu lfilm ent in the dom ain of a trick, b u t it is 
im portan t th a t w hat he calls “n a tu re ” also uses the same m echanism  
(“n a tu re ’s trick ”). Thus, in “trick ” we have to hear this foundational 
sense. “Trick” is not so m uch an overcoming, a sublation, an A ufhebung  
of e ither w orld or earth , bu t it is their m ute definition according to 
which neither of them  can be regarded as a province of tru th . “Trick” 
is, as we read, in OED, “a particu lar habit, a w ay of acting, a characte­
ristic quality, tra it, practice or custom, the system  upon which a thing 
is constructed” . A trick, which Nietzsche calls in a le tte r  to Franz O ver­
9 Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks..., p. 56.
10 Ibidem, p. 65.
:i Ibidem, p. 65—66.
beck “a coquetry on n a tu re ’s p a r t”12, is a movable foundation an unan­
chored beginning
a mighty genius of construction who succeeds in piling up an infinitely 
complicated dome ...upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running 
water.18
12 Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. C. Middleton (University 
of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 258.
13 Philosophy and Truth..., p. 85.
V
6. Perspective
“T rick” belies stability  and connotes a constant m ovem ent. Thus, 
a study  of a trick  m ust be a study  of certain  radical dynam ism  which, 
in case of Jeffers, is no t lim ited to the in terp lay  of w orld and earth , 
bu t leaves its traces upon the character of vision. “Apology for Bad 
D ream s” opens w ith  a long distance vista:
In the purple light, heavy with redwood, the slopes drop seaward,
Headlong convexities of forest, drawn in together to the steep 
ravine. Below, on the sea-cliff,
A lonely clearing; a little  field of corn by the streamside; a 
roof under spared trees. Then the ocean 
Like a great stone someone has cut to a sharp edge and polished 
to shining. Beyond it, the fountain 
And furnace of incredible light flowing up from the sunk sun.
In the little clearing a woman 
Is punishing a horse; she had tied the halter to a sapling at 
the edge of wood, but when the great whip  
Clung to the flanks the creature kicked so hard she feared he 
would snap the halter; she called from the house 
The young man her son; who fetched a chain tie-rope, they 
working together 
Noosed the small rusty links round the horse’s tongue 
And tied him by the swollen tongue to the tree.
Seen from this height they are shrunk to insect size. (SP, 174)
The look is th a t of an a tten tive eye which sees not only “slopes” and 
“ocean” but also “a roof under spared trees”, and a w hip clinging to 
horse’s flanks. The eye sees m ore than  it is offered: a young m an 
participating in the cerem ony is the w om an’s son. I t is the eye that 
sees everything and which penetrates into fam ily relationships and 
quoates the prophets (“W hat said the prophet? I create good: and I
create evil.”). I t  is the eye th a t knows; the eye of God. Robert Brophy 
notices the am biguity of the deictic pronoun in the phrase “seen from  
this heigh t” and, quoting other exam ples from  Je ffe rs’s texts, sugessts 
th a t “the poet seems to be looking down as though he w ere God or 
looking for God’s perspective.”1
The vision begins as a definite and dram atic m ovem ent downw ards 
(“drop”, “steep rav ine”), y e t it soon regains the  balance as the light 
“flows up from  the sunk sun”. It is betw een these two m ovem ents, half 
w ay up and half w ay down, th a t the vision has focused itself. “A lonely 
clearing”, “a little  clearing”: it is the place w here vision becomes lucid, 
w here light not so m uch fights darkness bu t reveals it, w here w ilderness 
dialogues w ith  planned productiv ity  (“little  field of corn”), and where 
the house does not dom inate b u t is sheltered by the trees. The clearing 
m arks also certain  fragility: i t  is “lonely” and “little ” w hereas everything 
else form s a  un ity  and a gathering. The slopes are “draw n in together”, 
hills “darken together”, the ocean is like a (one) “great stone”. The 
clearing is also “little” vis-a-vis the splendour of na tu ra l phenom ena 
as Je ffe rs’s perspectivism  focuses on a detail which, on the one hand, 
is cen trally  located (between the m ountains and ocean) but, on the 
o ther hand, is reduced alm ost to illegibility in term s of actual signifi­
cance.
Thus, even if we agree w ith B rophy’s description of Je ffe rs’s version 
of tragedy as “an exhibition of the essential elem ents by the burning 
aw ay through pain and ru in  of inertia  and the unessential”2, we would 
have to add tha t the sense of tragedy, for Jeffers, seems to lie in precisely 
am plifying and foregrounding of the elem ents which are notoriously 
unim portan t and m arginal. Hence, to the degree to which it deals w ith  
hum an protagonists tragedy is a dram a of the unessential which is 
evident in the w ay Jeffers looks a t his characters. In “M ara” Ferguson
...looking down the long cataract of rock-set ridges and 
their blue shadows pouring to sea level 
From the new-risen sun, saw Fawn and Allen  
Small, clear and distant, riding up from the w est 
Along the lip of the canyon... (BSA, 16)
Sim ilarly, in “Thurso’s Landing” perspective is a mode of no t only seeing 
b u t also com m enting upon reality. H eight is the place from  which tru th  
is revealed. From  the m ountain top w hat is below is revealed in its 
pretence:
Nearly straight down,
At the edge of the wood, in the pool of the blue shade in the 
cleft hill
1 R. J. Brophy, Robinson Jeffers. Myth, Ritual and,. Symbol in His Narrative  
Poems (Archon Books, 1976), p. 281.
2 Ibidem, p. 260.
The two men were seen, one burdened, like mites in a bowl; and 
Helen with a kind of triumph: “Look down there:
What size Reave Thurso is really... (SP, 271)
Needless to say, th is baring of deception is deceptive itself since w hat 
is seen below is reduced by  distance and height; thus, a perspectivism  
of vision stands in a perfect agreem ent w ith  a perspectivism  of tru th
as trick. The visual perspective which translates hum an beings into
insect or “fain t specks of hum an ity” (SP, 386) becomes an ideological 
perspective tu rn ing  Je ffe rs’s poetry  into a  philosophical fable which 
d isrupts illusion by translating  a m etaphor into a literal meaning, and 
the  volatility  of philosophy into “heaviness” of visuality. I t  is from  
am biguity  of the term  W eltanschauung  th a t philosophical fable spins 
the fabric of its stories. As M ax Friedlander puts it:
The word Weltanschauung  with its double meaning (philosophy and world 
view  or outlook) establishes the bridge from visual experience to metaphysical 
dogma and points out how dependent the history of looking, and hence the 
history of art, are on the life of the mind and its permutations.3
The insect m etaphor is no t sim ply a critique of m an b u t a transvaluation 
of his position in  the world. In th is perspectival vision m an loses his 
dom inating role and is in terp re ted  as a being-w ith-o ther-creatures ra th e r 
th an  a being-above-other-creatures. The m ost concise form ula translating  
visual perspectivism  into philosophy is to be found in “At the B irth  
of an Age” w here m an’s being-w ith is again foregrounded in the insect 
im agery:
Life is too little to love, too little to hate.
Temperately share the house 
With beetle and louse. (SP, 557)
In Je ffe rs’s philosophical evolution the order of gradation is reversed:
i
For often I have heard the hard rocks I handled 
Groan, because lichen and time and water dissolve them,
And they have to travel down the strange falling scale 
Of soil and plants and the flesh of beasts to become 
The bodies of men... (SP, 366)
If m an m arks the low bottom  of Je ffe rs’s perspectivism  then, a t  the same 
tim e, it is w ith  m an th a t the m ovem ent of recurrence begins. W hat dif­
feren tia tes m an from  other beings is his aw areness no t so m uch of 
him self bu t of his nostalgia: m an is view ed as a creature  th a t from  
w ithin a difference dream s a dream  of the Same. This, however, implies 
a m ore general vision which inaugurates a m ovem ent upw ard. Fayne 
and Lance, reduced to insects (“They rode like flies upon the face of 
a w all”, SP, 450) begin climbing the hills, and while their domestic
3 M. Friedlander, Landscape. Portrait. Still Life, trans. R. F.C. Hull and B. Cas­
sirer (Oxford, 1949), p. 151.
valley disappears they are transform ed again into anim als, this time 
embodied in a bird. Man becomes a being-for-him self only afte r he has 
been painfully  m ade aw are of his status as a being-w ith-others.
We have come out of the world and are free, more hawk than 
human, w e’ve given our hearts to the hawks to keep 
In the high air. (SP, 451)
In Je ffe rs’s perspectival vision m an is a “m ite” dream ing of an eagle, and 
in “M ara” m an is directly  shown as an insect parasite of a bird:
I shot an eagle once,
And looked at the gorgeous corpse, ruffled the plumes 
And saw the lice under them: w e the w hite lice 
On this eagle world. (BAS, 15)
I t is here th a t the difference betw een Nietzsche and Jeffers comes into 
play. A lthough both begin by reducing m an in size (“In this book you 
will discover ‘a sub terranean  m an’ a t work, one who tunnels and mines 
and underm ines... [man is],..a solitary mole [Maulwurf]”*) and lead to 
his transform ation in a bird  (“like the eagle staring  long, long into 
abysses... Thus eagle-like, panther-like, are the poet’s desires”5), Nietzsche 
believes in the u ltim ate possibility of the indestructible character of 
living on a hight:
When the air grows clear,
When the dews comfort 
Rains down upon the earth.6
If we w anted to rem ain in the circle of the anim al m etaphor we would 
say th a t w hereas in Nietzsche Übermensch  overcomes the “w orm ” and 
“the m onkey” (“Ih r h ab t den Weg vom  W urm e zum  M enschen gem acht 
und vieles ist in euch noch W urm , Einst w art ih r Affen...”7), m an’s fate 
in Je ffe rs  is to be “content” (as Bruce Ferguson says in “M ara”) w ith 
his anim al status. For Nietzsche the m onkey is a degraded form  of 
kleinen  Mensch, for Jeffers klein  Mensch is redeem ed by the awareness 
of and the contentm ent in his apishness.
The form  of new  existence takes in  N ietzsche’s thought the appear­
ance of a leap. The poet is “soaring, hovering about” like an eagle8; 
in Je ffe rs  a leap is alw ays transform ed into a fall. Lance is standing 
on the ledge of the rock
* F. Nietzsche, Daybreak , trans. R. I. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p. 1.
5 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke..., p. 310.
6 Ibidem, p. 308.
7 F. Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra  (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner, 1930), p. 8.
8 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 308.
looking down
The straight vast depth, towards the beauty of the ocean
She could not call to him  
Before he leaped and went down. He was falling erect 
With his feet under him for a long time... (SP, 456)
Thus, the u ltim ate  destiny of N ietzsche’s perspectivism  is Icaricism: to 
achieve a sum m it in order to be re tu rned  to earth  which tu rns out 
to be the final reality  of the m yth of soaring. In Je ffe rs’s rendering 
of the m yth, however, Icarus is less a m editation upon the abilities 
and lim itations of man, and more a beginning of the reversed evolution: 
a fte r the fall man reaches the level of being-w ith-other-objects and 
can regress through plants and soil till, a fte r m illenia, he becomes 
a “hard  rock”.
Perspectivism  is, then, not a question of repose but m ovement. Like 
in N ietzsche’s Zarathustra, the sum m it is necessarily grounded in the 
experience of abyss:
I stand before my highest mountain and my longest wondering: Therefore I 
must first descend deeper than I have ever descended.9
I t  is the birds (and Icarus is bu t a poor hum an im itation of the  ornito- 
logical form), “the jew el-eyed haw k and the tall blue heron, the black 
corm orants... the red- 
-shafted  woodpecker”
(SP, 259) th a t rep re­
sent the full pow er of 
perspectivism . Unlike 
Icaricism, the orno- 
thological im agery does 
not bring about a fall, 
bu t it is completed by 
perching, and its me­
taphor is not one of 
death  but of m arriage 
and endurance: a falcon 
perched on a rock is
married to the massive 
mysticism of stone. (SP, 563)
Flying, in its freedom  from  the terrestria l bond, is then an intensified 
form  of climbing which allows us to overcome the lim itations and live 
in “the high a ir”. In the act of clim bing/flying m an distances him self
The birds make a fine part of our lives here... 
song-sparrows and phoebes, red and gold finches, 
bluebirds, and buntings; the swallows are the only 
ones that go off in winter, and seaward of the 
house are always gulls and a solemn convocation 
of cormorants on the rock, pelicans at least half 
the year, and lately miles and miles of thousands 
of shearwaters... The great blue herons... and the 
night herons, the various hawks — I was for­
getting the meadow larks!
— RJ to B. Christy', Nov. 1925
9 Ibidem, p. 174—175.
from  his hum an form  but, a t the same time, rem ains painfully  aw are 
of the inaccessibility of the “inhum an beau ty”. Thus, climbing and flying 
become m etaphors of the tragedy of the hum an existence. Ascending 
m eans intensified perception of “inhum an beau ty” combined w ith  acute 
self-criticism:
...the higher I climb, the more I despise him who climbs...
How ashamed I am of my climbing and stumbling! How I scorn 
my violent panting! How I hate the man who can fly!10
Flying is a domain of unlim ited perspectivism  and opens, as such, the
cosmic vista. In “Caw dor” the dead eagle
Unwound the ever-widened spirals of flight 
As a star light... (SP, 185)
and, through w hat Nietzsche in Human, A ll-too-H um an  calls Vogel- 
um blick, provides us the vision of universe and cosmic life. But such 
a perspective is also a perspective of certain  knowledge and, as Jean  
G ranier pu ts it,
Each appearance is an apparition... and there is nothing to look for beyond 
these manifestations... By affirming the perspectivism of knowledge, Nietz­
sche in fact defends an ontological pluralism; the essence of Being is to show 
itself, and to show itself according to an infinity of viewpoints.11
W hat G ranier calls the “ontological p luralism ” can be in terp reted  as 
a vision of rea lity  as a succession of appearances, i.e. signifiers. The 
w orld m eans som ething to the degree to which I am aw are of the
m ovem ent of “apparitions”, this however can happen only w hen I rela te
them  to som ething th a t can be exem pt from  the “ever-w idened spirals 
of fligh t” . As we have seen in our analysis, ne ither earth  nor world 
nor “trick of n a tu re ” can play such a role, as all of them  are subject 
to “tricks” and m ask changing. W hat rem ains then is, as the w onder­
fu lly  ambiguous phrase of G ran ier’s “there  is nothing to look for beyond 
these m anifestations” holds it, a nothing. Perspectivism  in philosophy 
tries  to nam e in a series of m etaphors th is nothing th a t preceded all 
the m etaphors and on the streng th  of which m etaphors m ake th e ir 
appearance.
This is w hat Heidegger describes as “horizon” and, in an attem pt 
to nam e it, ends up in a phrase of u ltim ate indecision: the horizon is 
“not a being...but still ‘som ething’” (“Ein N ichts...nicht e in ’Seindes, aber
10 Ibidem, p. 70.
11 In The New Nietzsche. Contemporary Styles of Interpretation, ed. D. B. A lli­
son (New York: Delta Books. 1977), p. 191.
gleichwohl ‘E tw as’”12). Horizon is w hat a critic’s com m entary holds 
to be “the condition of possibility of the revelation of beings”13.
Thus, a perspectival vision will inevitably try  to understand m an 
from  a point of view located somewhere outside lim itations of m an’s 
position but, a t the same tim e, will constantly  find itself confined by 
the horizon. Jeffers, like Heidegger, seems to th ink of horizon not as 
something beyond which we can penetrate, bu t as “something which 
we can ne ither widen or go beyond, but which provides the lim its for 
certain intellectual activities perform ed ‘w ith in ’ it”14. M an’s perception 
and knowledge is then restric ted  to parts and fragm ents, and the notion
of to ta lity  is rem oved outside its bracket. Robert Zaller righ tly  locates
such a re-vision of perception and episteme at “the core of Je ffe rs’s poetic 
stra tegy” :
The part would not define the whole; man was perhaps an instructive 
anomaly, but to take his history for the world’s drama or even a firm  
clue to its purpose was folly. Knowledge of the world, and of man himself, 
could come only from a perspective outside man.15
The knowledge tha t man is try ing  to gain cannot forget m an’s subjecti­
vity. Man entangled in him self and his projections cannot see objects 
clearly separated from  his own structure. A Spenglerian postulate of 
the “detachm ent from  objects considered” also pu t forw ard by Nietz­
sche (it has to be added tha t Spengler paranthetically  scolds Nietzsche 
for being “far from  possessing enough of it h im self”16) can only partly  
be actualized. Nietzsche realizes the difficulty of the extrem e philoso­
phical perspectivism , and he finds recourse in the anim alistic imagery:
...if each of us had a different kind of sense perception — if w e could only 
perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm, now as a plant... then... 
nature would be grasped only as a creation which is subjective in the 
highest degree.17
Perspectivism  is m onstrous not only because of its anim alistic im agery 
but, first of all, because it dem onstrates th a t m an’s subjectivity  is no t 
the only possible. A t the same time, perspectivism  is inscribed, so to 
speak, in its perspective: it cannot m aster all the possible points of view, 
cannot bring together all dispersed visions into one vision of totality. 
The nothing of the horizon inevitably makes its appearance, and the
12 M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik  (Bonn: Cohen, 1929), 
p. 114.
13 J. M. Demske, Being, Man and Death, A K ey to Heidegger (The University 
of Kentucky Press, 1970), p. 81.
14 Translators’ comment, in M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 1.
15 R. Zaller, The Cliffs of Solitude. A Reading of Robinson Jeffers (California 
University Press, 1983), p. 87.
16 O. Spengler, The Decline..., vol. 1, p. 93.
17 Philosophy and Truth..., p. 87.
only eye th a t can go beyond its lim its and dream  to the end the dream  
of wholeness is a dead eye. In “Caw dor”, the dead eagle, its spirit, 
a destilate of “the acquiline desire” climbs the height “and desert space 
of unbreathable a ir”
Where meteors make green fire and die, the ocean dropping 
westward to the girdle of the pearls of dawn 
And the hinder edge of the night sliding toward Asia; it saw  
far under eastward the April-delighted  
Continent; and tim e relaxing about it now, abstracted from being, 
it saw the eagles destroyed,
Mean generations of gulls and crows taking their world: turn 
for turn in the air, as on earth 
The w hite faces drove out the brown... It 
neither wondered nor cared, and it saw  
Growth and decay alternate for ever, and the tides returning. (SP, 186)
The situation of the one living “in the unbreathable a ir” is in teresting 
from  several points of view. F irst of all,those who dwell, in Nietzsche’s 
term inology” in “pure m ountain a ir”, m ust see them selves “vis-à-vis 
people still inhabiting the haze of the valleys”18, and this is the way 
in which the dead eagle sees
...the mountain — dividing 
Canyon of its captivity (that was to Cawdor 
Almost his world) like an old crack in a wall,
Violet-shadowed and gold-lighted... (SP, 186)
Second, the vision involves stepping outside time, a t least tim e under­
stood in its everyday life sense. To be abstracted  from  being entails 
“tim e relax ing” its hold over entities. In such a situation, life becomes 
the “archetype body of life”, w here the notion of archetype suggests 
both recurrence and alienation from  chronology. Third, paradoxically, 
such a perspective revealing “the great L ife” is in a profound sense 
life’s antinom y; the cosmic vision spreads before a dead animal, and the 
archetypal pa tte rn  of life in Jeffers is a model of blindness:
...the eyes
Were spouts of blood; the eyes were gushed out; dark blood 
Ran from the ruinous eye-pits to the hook of the beak 
And rained on the waste spaces of empty heaven. (SP, 187)
At the center of vision lies darkness and, in Paul de M an’s rhetoric, 
we could say th a t blindness is bu t another nam e for insight. The fu l­
film ent of the dream  of perspectivism  m ust necessarily underm ine its 
very  foundations: we can go beyond the horizon of subjectivity  only 
w hen neither life nor sight are possible. Reverend Barclay gathers the 
antinom ies of knowledge together in the story of his life crisis, and
18 Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 168.
The 'Women at Point Sur can be looked upon as a narrative which begins 
w ith  a rejection of the “haze of the valley”, goes through a bizarre 
experience of tim e to wind up  in a tragedy of m an attem pting to tran s­
cend the horizon. For Dr. Barclay, who “outgrew  his profession”, the 
hum an predicam ent is determ ined by the lack of appropriate knowledge 
on the one hand, hum an weakness on the other. A dm onishing his 
parishioners, he claims th a t
no man
Down all the blind milleniums has known anything, no, 
not a scrap, not a dust-grain: I am calling you to 
that
Blind adventure, I call you to take despair by the throat:
I know you are fools and soft, woman-brained,
I have lived among you, I have held my mouth not to  , 
despise you... (WPS, 21)
The second stage is m arked by B arclay’s estrangem ent from  time. Like 
the eagle in “Caw dor”, having seen “towers of m illennial inexhaustible 
life” Barclay realizes
...I shall be young still 
A thousand years from  this day, nothing can weary me. (WPS, 90)
Finally , the vision of the “inexhaustible life” results in the claim  to 
knowledge, a new  episteme which rem ains in touch w ith  the original 
tru th :
...And knowledge he [God] gave me, that
stands against the fountain and touches the stir of
currents
Before they are streams; the intent moves in his depth 
And is born cauled in clear flam e to be stars
And new structures of suns, and vermin on the planets... (WPS, 90)
S The Dark Glory
7. Man
Ratcliff Squires defines the dilem m a of Je ffe rs’s w riting  by inscribing 
the poet in the old controversy betw een the “unrestrained, self-cônsciôùs 
m ethods of rom anticism ” and his “antirom antic ideal” arguing that, 
eventually, Je ffe rs  dem onstrates w hat m ay be called a “classicism th a t 
has succum bed to the rom antic im agination”1. On the o ther hand, we 
shall try  to show th a t if Je ffe rs’s im agination can be labeled as “ro­
m antic” it  is because there  is a m arked tendency tow ard the dissolution 
of an individual being which, however, is anchored in the very  con­
stitu tion of the hum an self.
L ike Nietzsche, Je ffe rs  seem s to view  rom anticism  as a m ovem ent 
tow ard self-annihilation e ither by “repose, quietness* calm  seas, and 
deliverance from  them selves through a r t  or knowledge, or else in toxi­
cation (Rausch), spasm, bew ilderm ent and m adness (W ahnsinn )”2. In both 
th inkers, however, th is tendency is counterbalanced by  the will to per­
petuation (der W ille zum  Verewigen) which could be the
...tyrannical w ill of a sorely-suffering, struggling, or tortured being, who 
would like to stamp his roost personal, individual, and narrow characte- 
ristics...as an obligatory law...on others.’
The predicam ent of the hum an self (rom antic or not) seems to lie 
som ew here betw een self-erasure or forgetfulness and rem em brance, 
betw een “the self annihilation” and “the w ill to perpetuation”. In Je f­
fers’s “Inscription for a G ravestone” we read:
1 R. Squires, The Loyalties of Robinson Jeffers  (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 131—132.
2 F. Nietzsche, Joyful W isdom, trans. T. Common and F. Ungar (New York: 
1960), p. 332.
> Ibidem, p. 335.
I admired the beauty t ) '
While I was human, now I am part of the beauty. (SP, 480)
The problem  seems to be defined by the change of accentuation: Je f­
fers tends to shift the em phasis from  “hum an” upon “ego” thus m aking 
it possible to qualify the notions like “self”, “ego”, or “iden tity” w ith  
o ther descrip tions. The ego is now  rendered as, firs t of all, non-hum an 
or pre-hum an. The shift from  hum an to non-hum an is a move betw een 
two structu res of tem porality , from  “I was (hum an)” to “I am  p a rt of 
the (non-hum an) beau ty”. The lasting effect of th is m odification is 
emphasized by the P resen t P erfec t Tense of the initial line “I have only 
become inhum an”.
Now we can see b e tte r  w hy Jeffers was so fascinated by landscape 
which opened for him  a new  possibility in redefining the hum an self, 
the possibility which could still justify  the existence of hum anity  despite 
the fall and collapse of the  renaissance m yth  of anthropocentric un i­
verse. In a late  poem Jeffers convinces us th a t his perspectival vision 
reducing m an to the size of insect was only a technical vehicle b u t 
a constant philosophical practise aim ing a t saving w hatever can still 
be salvaged from  the grandiose construction of hum anity:
I cannot walk the mountains as I used to do 
But my subject is what it used to be: my love, my loved subject 
Mountain and ocean, rock, water and beasts and trees 
Are the protagonists, the human people are only symbolic 
interpreters- 
So let them live or die. They may in fact 
Die rather quickly, if the great manners of death dreamed up 
In the laboratories work well. (BE, 50)
Hum an self is then view ed as a “symbolic in te rp re te r”, is conceived 
of as a constant herm eneutic process of coming to term s w ith  the ex­
ternal reality . It is self-indulgence, the inw ardness of vision, th a t brings 
about false assum ptions and inauthentic  am bitions inflating hum an 
individual. Such m echanism s distorting and m isreading hum an position 
in the universe are p a rt and parcel of “n a tu re ’s trick”, and the dilemm a 
of man seems to reside in the fact th a t the hum an being has constantly  
to resist its own visions and projections.
The eye’s tricks are strange, the mind has to be quick 
and resolute or you’ll believe in them  
And be gabbling with ghosts. For take note that 
They are always human: to see the human figure in all 
things in man’s disease;
To see the inhuman God is our health. (BE, 66)
Hence, the  landscape of the hum an self is m odelled upon p a rtly  anim al 
past (“the anim al-stinking ghost-ridden darkness, the hum an soul”,
BE, 10), and partly  upon geological formations:
...¥his villainous king of beasts, this de- , .
formed ape? — He has mind 
And imagination, he might go far
And end in horror. The hawks are more heroic but man 
has a steeper mind,
Huge pits of darkness, high peaks of light,
You may calculate a comet’s orbit or the dive of a hawk, 
not a man’s mind. (BE, 10)
■ i
In The Tow er Beyond Tragedy  
Orestes, who has overcome hum a­
nity , inscribes the hum an form  in 
the circle of the nonhum an. The 
philosophy of ego is then  developed 
in two steps firs t step dislodges 
m an from  his privileged position by 
setting  him  against non-hum an 
form s (animals, m inerals), the second move undoes the previous jux tapo­
sition by calling fo rth  pow ers which preceded the articulation of particu lar 
life forms. The firs t stage m arks the end of both the knowledge of m yself 
in tim e and  the recognition of m y being as fu lly  determ ined by time. 
The hum an ego is discernible ne ither in itself (self-knowledge) no r in 
o ther form s (em pirical knowledge).
...I remembered 
The knife in  the stalk of my humanity; I drew and it broke;
I entered the life  of the brown forest 
And the great life  of the ancient peaks, the patience of stone,
I fe lt  the changes in  the veins 
In the throat of the mountain, a grain in many centuries, w e have 
our own time, not yours; and I was the stream  
Draining the mountain wood; and I the stag drinking; and I was 
the stars,
Boiling with light, wandering alone, each one the lord of his own 
summit; and I was the darkness 
Outside the stars, I included them, they w ere a part o f  me... (SP, 139)
The m ovem ent tow ards the non-hum an involves a series of changing 
identities lim ited how ever to e ither biological or geological form ations. 
The purpose of such a sequence is inheren tly  ethical: to cure m an’s 
self-centeredness.
What a pleasure it is  to m ix one’s mind with geological 
Time, or w ith astronomical relax it.
There is nothing lik e astronomy to pull the stuff out of man.
His stupid dreams and red-rooster importance: let him  
count the star-swirls. (BE, 18)
W hat is a t stake in the transition  from  the hum an to non-hum an is 
a gathering of w hat can be saved from  the hum an self and re-nam ing
It’s true without exaggeration that 
I wouldn’t drive over to Monterey 
to meet William Shakespeare; this 
doesn’t imply lack of admiration, 
or anything more foolish than con­
tentment at home.
— RJ to A. Bender, June 1927
it w ith  o ther term s (animalistic, geological, astronomical). As a resu lt 
of such a stra tegy  m an regains the support of things
...the beauty of transhuman things,
Without which w e are all lost. (BE, 80)
The second stage takes us to the  realm  of the  pre-hum an, i.e. to the  
domain w here both hum an and non-hum an are questioned in the  m ute 
gesture of silence. Orestes tries to describe th is location as “the darkness 
outside the s ta rs”, bu t the pre-hum an is necessarily pre-linguistic. To 
go beyond things (i.e. beyond the  non-hum an) m ust m ean leaving behind 
all m an-m ade denom inations as well as erasing all kinds of tem poral 
categories.
...they have not made words 
for it, to go beyond things, beyond hours and ages,
And be all things in all time, in their returns and passages,
in the motionless and timeless center, ; -
In the w hite of the fire...how can I express the excellence  
I have found, that has no color but clearness... (SP, 139)
Sim ilarly, this atem poral s truc tu re  of the pre-hum an is responsible 
for the bracketing of the spatial categories:
I wander in the air 
Touch you and Asia 
At the same moment... (SP, 480)
The way tow ards the pre-hum an leads through a necessary and radical 
break w ith hum anity. This transition is not an act of abstract reflection 
but active participation: “I en tered  the life of the brow n forest”. The 
participation Jeffers is talking about inevitably invites he problem atics, 
of desire: to participate is to take part, vo luntarily  or not, in an event 
th a t poses itself before me as a challenge. I t  is w ith  the question of 
desire th a t Orestes approaches E lectra in the final scene of The Tow er 
Beyond Tragedy  w here he presents his vision of m en trapped  in the 
m ortal snare of desire:
...the net of desire 
Had every nerve drawn to the center,, so that they writhed like a 
full draught of fishes, all matted 
In the one mesh... (SP, 138)
The center which appears in this quotation is not the “motionless and 
tim eless cen ter” of w hich Orestes speaks la te r  in his invective: The 
malaise of desire which is the inheren t featu re  of m an is a disease of 
dissipation. On the one hand, desire recognizes the difference betw een 
the subject and object, betw een the subjectiv ity  of self and objectivity  
of the Same. This is a traditional C artesian line of th inking according 
to which .
...the Self belongs to the subjective, the Same to the objective 
...the Self is the core of the experiencing subject which per­
sists through the m ultiplicity of that experience. The Same is 
the substance of the object...It is the principle of the iden­
tity of the object.4
On the o ther hand, however, desire aims a t w hat cannot be achieved: 
a t overcoming the difference by appropriating the other, dom inating it. 
This paradox of desire inheren t in the civilized m an did no t escape 
Rousseau’s attention. According to the philosopher a prim itive man 
knows nothing of
...the ardent impetuous passion which defies all dangers, over­
throws all obstacles and, in its fury, seems suited to destroy 
the human race which it is meant to preserve.5
Desire “overthrow s all obstacles”, i.e. it  rem oves the o ther from  my 
perspecive by opening h im /her to the never-ending p lay  of appropri­
ation.
A t the end of desire there  seems to be only m ore self, as the m e­
chanism  of desire allows me to appropriate the o ther in order to look 
a t myself.
..the man pursued the woman, the woman 
clung to the man, warriors and kings 
Strained at each other in the darkness, all loved or fought
inward,
each one of the lost people 
Sought the eyes of another that another should praise him;
sought
nerver his own but another’s... (SP, 138)
If desire is the extension of self through the act of seem ingly total 
appropriation of the o ther then the m etaphor of a ne t shows its use­
fulness: the ego is the ne t of desire which ensnares the o ther thus 
becoming a center which a ttrac ts and draw s all the “nerves”. The n a r­
rative of desire is a story of a false center which, unlike the “motionless 
cen ter”, dispenses darkness. Orestes repeatedly  accuses E lectra of her 
preference for darkness over w hat he chooses to call “the w hite of the 
f ire” :
...I saw a vision of us move in the dark
Didn’t I say this would be dark to you? (SP, 138)
If the vision of hum anity  is circum scribed by darkness, then  the light 
of a new  perspective m ust necessarily be a transvaluation  of and a trans-
4 J. Stambaugh, Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return  (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 71.
5 J. J. Rousseau, Oeuvres com plètes (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pleiade, 1959—
1970), vol. 3, p. 157; English translation in R, Grimley, Jean Jacques Rousseau
Sussex; The Harvester Press, 1985, p. зо.
gression against hum anity. Orestes claims he has been aw akened beca­
use he • : ,
...will not waste inward 
Upon humanity, having found a fairer object. (SP, 137)
The attack upon inw ardness is an assault against m an a s  the origin Of 
sense and order, w hereas the  hum an being shows him self as a false, 
dark center pulsating w ith  throbs of desire. Thus, the  ligh t w hich is 
to replace the darkness of inw ardness is an explosion w hich allows 
us to see as an active force w hat has previously been m erely  assim ilable 
as a “stream ”, “stag”, or “s ta rs”. The explosion is, on th e  one hand, 
a revelation of astronom ical processes beyond description:
...there
is no way to express that explosion; all that exists 
Roars into flame, the tortured fragments rush away , from 
each other into all the sky, new universes 
Jewel the black breast of night; and far off the outer neb­
ulae like charging spearmen again  
Invade emptiness. (BE, 3)
' •   “  '  ■ - ■ ... > r : - ■••• '.
On the o ther hand, however, it is also an unconcealm ent of God “whp 
does not care and will never cease” (BE, 4). From  the hum an we are  
carried to the non-hum an (animal, m ineral, cosmic, forms) only to con­
tinue tow ards the pre-hum an which defies all the qualifications except 
the one fam iliar from  m ystical texts: “the m otionless and tim eless cen­
ter. To reappear on the o ther side of hum anity  signifies the  recognition 
of m an’s participation in the “universal aw areness” (WPS, 107) w here 
ou r hum anity  “slipped off lie on the rock like a skin, like a cast sh ir t” 
(WPS, 107).
Je ffe rs  realizes th a t the pre-hum an transcends the restrictions of 
language, hence his “g reat explosion”
...is probably only a metaphor — I know  
not — of faceless violence, thé root of all things. (BE, 4)
In the same way, the vanities of hum an desire are  transmuted,Jjp become 
free of its m an-appointed destinations and fulfilm ents:
...I and my love are one; no desire but 
fulfilled; no passion but peace, • ■
The pure flam e and the white, fierer than any passion... (SP, 13ft) ,,~
To reach the pre-hum aii is to understand  the àction of physis, to grasp
the generation of form s which in itself is formless, to discern
That there is one power, you may call it  God tp the vulgar,
Exists from eternity into eternity, all the protean phe­
nomena, all forms, all faces of things,
And all the negligible lightnings of consciousness,
Are made of that power... (WPS, 100)
I a  th is  domain where, as R everend Barclay obsessively repeats in 7th 
Canto of W om en at Point Sur, “there is no distinction of persons” hum an 
desire becomes “fie rer than  any passion” as it participates in the “never 
done” process of; exchanging energies betw een the  sun and the earth. 
In  an earl,y poem “M oral B eauty” Jeffers gives us a more extensive 
explanation of w hat Orestes concisely described as “falling in  love 
outw ard” :
And you, live planet, you
That pasture us all, and while our days endure 
Endure us all, and welcom e home at length;
Brown opulent breast men plow  
A baby’s way, with kneading fingers’ strength 
And flowerlike lips its mother’s; you most pure 
Bride of the powerful fountains of the sun,
Gur father, whose insupportable desire 
Burns on the godlike body nor ever is done 
Flooding with creative fire 
The giantess veins: is passion mighty as yours 
Not of its nature a strict law? (AC, 10)
A m ovem ent tow ards the pre-hum an is inevitably a drive tow ards the 
law  exceeding the restrictions of the m an-m ade regulations and hum an 
tru th  w hich is shown as an unrecognized error. The hum an tru th  fails 
because it is an extrapolation of a p a rt over the whole, a domination 
of' a form  over the formless. Hence, we can justifiedly  speak of the 
im perialism  of the hum an tru th :
...when they look backward they see only a man 
standing at the beginning,
Or forward, a man at- the end; or if upward, men in the shining 
bitter sky striding and feasting,
Whom you call Gods... (SP, 138)
But this transvaluation of the hum an form  does not resu lt in its sub­
jugation to o ther forms; Je ffe rs’s anthropology carefully  avoids the 
danger of in stitu ting  new  gods and new hierarchies. W hat the poet 
aims a t is the unm aking of both the hum an and non-hum an form s and, 
as we have seen several times, words which are seen as “m ade” cannot 
do justice to th is process. W ords are bom  out of dispersion: th is D etridean 
reflection holds not only because it refers to the  necessity of mediation 
betw een separated individuals but, firs t of all, because language always 
reflects the incom m unicability of its own form s scattered over the space 
of discourse. Language never sim ply says things, bu t it sa tu rates them  
w ith  various possible m eanings and counterm eanings. The tone of disco­
urse is in the very  act of speaking taken over by under- and overtones. 
Thus, Orestes claims th a t his m ystical vision has
...no undertone 
nor silvery second murmur 
That rings in love’s voice... (SP, 139)
The motionless and tim eless center paralyzes th is tendency of language 
tow ards m ultivocality  and self-perpetuation. Once the sta te  of un ity  
has been achieved, once the dispersion has been liquidated, there  is no 
need for language which adds its own duplicity  to the scatteredness 
of the hum an society. So fa r th is anthropology seem s to endorse Bro- 
p hy ’s synthesis of Irestes’ philosophy as ano ther reading of the m ythical, 
and m ystical nostalgia:
The “motionless and tim eless” center is the objects of all mystics. By it 
one leaves the circumference of life, exchanging the exterior for the interior, 
multiplicity for unity, space for spacelessness, tim e for timelessness. At the 
center one learns identity with the supreme principle of the universe... 
It is a place of the coming together of opposites and therefore neutralization... 
There is perfect unity, instantaneous communication... simultaneous and total 
possession... where one is permeated by indifference, seeking no end but 
contemplation...6
However, the m ystical nostalgia does not appear to be as complete as 
the critic would wish it to be. Its surface is scratched and fissured 
by the pen, the  stylus of language and desire. Man subjugated to the 
form lessness of the pre-hum an ceaselessly em erges from  the eternal 
recurrence of changeable form s a t the sharp  point of his desire and, 
as there  is no w ay o u t of the net of desire, the dispersion can be reduced, 
bu t it  can never be to tally  elim inated. In the phenom enology of hum an 
desire we see the same m ovem ent tow ards the m inim al difference 
(appropriation of the other) which we have detected previously in 
o ther areas of Je ffe rs’s thought.
Thus, un ity  is never “perfec t”, as Brophy claims, because it is always 
m arred  by the notions like “desire”, “fu lfillm ent” w hich concepts also 
m arkedly disagree w ith  B rophy’s qualification of O restes’s speech as 
describing the place of “neu tralization”. Significantly, the relationship 
outside/inside is certain ly  refashioned, b u t not so m uch as a trium ph of 
the in terior over the exterior, b u t as a redefinition of both notions. 
Orsetes begins by “entering  the life of the brown forest”, i.e. by beco­
ming a p a rt of the outside only to la te r reverse this movem ent. A long 
enum eration “I was the stream ... the stag... the stars...” still leaves us 
uncertain  as to the relationship betw een the in terior and exterior, and 
only a t the close of the sentence does Orestes speak of “including them ”, 
things becoming “a p a rt of” him. The redefinition of inside and outside 
does not then  rem ove the gap betw een the two categories but, rather, 
reinstates it by m aking it problem atic. The m ain stress is laid not so 
m uch upon how to accomodate the w orld w ithin m an’s ego as Brophy 
suggests but, just the  opposite — how to avoid th is danger of inw ard­
ness.
6 R. J. Brophy, Robinson Jeffers..., p. 147.
Orestes has fallen in  love out­
w ard, having found “a fairer 
object” he “will not w aste in ­
w ard upon hum anity” . The 
question which silently  asks 
itself among the lines of Je f­
fers’s poetry  is to w hat ex ten t 
m an can succeed in overcoming 
his own form  of tru th , to  w hat 
ex ten t this tru th  of hum an 
form  can be recognized as 
fettering  and immobilizing the 
p a tte rn  of recurrence which existence has established as its m ain m e­
chanism. The answ er th a t the w ay leads through the expansion of ego 
is certain ly  false; bu t a hastened conclusion th a t the annihilation of self 
is sa lu tary  is equally  unjustified. Man lives on the border line between 
inside and outside, and thus is inevitably caught in the play of desire, 
contrast betw een the sexes, center and m arginality , focus and periphery. 
In  a passage from  “M argrave” Jeffers puts in the lim elight these problem s 
as essentially hum an bu t also, more im portantly , comm ents upon the 
necessary m arginality  of the pow er of existence itself which mocks the 
notion of “cen ter” as a purely  hum an invention. Existence, physis, is 
a force which defies classifications and divisions:
...We that have the honor and hardship 
of being human 
Are one flesh with the beasts, and the beasts with the 
plants
One streaming sap, and certainly the plants and algae 
and the earth they spring from  
Are one flesh with the stars. The classifications 
Are mostly a kind of memoria technica, use it but don’t 
be fooled. (BE, 25)
The very  problem atics of form  and form lessness is possible only on the 
ground of hum an consciousness as an already articu lated  form:
But man is conscious,
He brings the world to focus in a feeling brain,
In a net of nerves catches the splendor of things,
Breaks the somnambulism of nature... (SP, 365)
The m aking of m an’s consciousness is inheren tly  linked w ith  the question 
of the relationship betw een inside and outside. The first step in reflection 
is a traditionally  hum anist attitude:
A ll the w aste time of picking quarrels 
and looking for praise ...making war, po­
litics ...making laws and making love 
...—writing books!— of course all these 
things are necessary, but don’t you think 
too much human energy goes back in 
to humanity; and the farmers who sub­
due the earth, the scientists who widen  
horizons, even the merely contemplative 
person admiring mountains have chosen 
a better way? They live outward.
— RJ to G. West, January 22, 1926
The earth was the world and man was its measure... (SP, 365)
Then comes a controversy betw een the insignificance of m an in  the 
universe and m an’s consciousness which perpetuates its entaglem ent in 
the inside/outside cleft. Hence the fact tha t
...the earth is a particle of dust by a sand-grain sun, lost in a nameless cove 
of the shores of a continent (SP, 365),
and the discovery of Copernicus
...who first 
pushed man
Out of his insane self-im portance and the world’s navel, 
and taught him his place (DA, 72),
is countered by M argrave’s contention th a t
...the more developed the brain the greater 
the agony. (SP, 369)
As we can see, m an is locked in a paradoxical situation: the more he 
tries to lose his subjectiv ity  the more conscious he becomes, bu t this 
tu rns him  back tow ards his subjective being. If m an “brings the w orld 
to focus” , i.e. form s a place w here things meet, gives them  the sharpest 
outline and ad justs them  to his vision, then such a focusing conscious­
ness is false as by perform ing all th ree  operations it alienates things 
from  existence, sees them  as estragend from  physis, gives them  particu lar 
differences where, as Barclay claimed, there  are no distinctions of 
persons.
Focusing is also rooted in the visual. W hile m an brings to focus, 
exercises an au thoritarian  act of grouping in order to know, to see, 
na tu re  is “som nam bulist”, its eyes are closed, its m ovem ents do not 
differentiate  betw een w aking and dream ing states, inside and outside. 
Jeffers attem pts a t creating a model of cognition in which hum an lone­
liness would be cured by participation, in o ther words as a poet of 
solitude he tries  to alleviate the griefs of hum an condition by organizing 
the knowing subject in such a w ay so th a t it could join n a tu re  in its 
somnambulism. W hat is a t stake in Je ffe rs’s philosophy is not so much 
m aking b u t the unm aking of m an who is to be redeem ed by the 
nonhum an.
Solitude that unmakes me one of men 
In snow-w hite hands brings singular recompense,
Evening m e with kindlier natures when
On the needled pinewood the cold dews condense
...even in humanity beauty and good
Show, from the mountainside of solitude. (BSW, 84)
This process of “evening w ith  k indlier n a tu res” is disturbed by the 
appearance of consciousness which Jeffers describes in a slightly  D erri-
dean w ay as “som ething else” (BSW, 87). Consciousness is shown to Be 
an excessive feature of being, a luxu ry  fu tile from  the point of view 
of the economy of existence.
Then what is this unreasonable excess,
Our needless quality, this unrequiered
Exception in the world, this consciousness? (BSW, 87)
Consciousness is also a late  comer to the realm  of creation, as it is 
a product of “the o ther god” who approaches “all visible th ings” and 
singles m an out saying
“I crown or damn, I have different fire to add.
These forms shall feel, ache, love, grieve and be glad.” (BSW, 87)
If Je ffe rs’s philosophy deserves the nam e of inhum anism  we could 
claim  th a t it does only because precisely it preserves and shelters the 
dearest of all hum anist beliefs th a t m an is the m easure of all things. 
But w hile the traditional hum anism  would hold it as m an’s glory, Je f­
fers suggests th a t it is “hard ly  his advantage” (SP, 365), and the other, 
consciousness bringing god is “the troub ler of m en” (BSW, 88). Man 
as the m easure of the  universe necessarily reduces all knowledge to his 
form; m an is a t the beginning and end of m an’s episteme thus inflating 
the ego as a false center hopelessly involved in “the net of desire” .
Hum anism  is a philosophy of m an’s ineradicable loneliness. In ­
hum anism  tries to th ink  of m an and universe as tw isted together in 
a difficult partnership . It is inhum anism  th a t unearthes the inherent 
loneliness deeply em bedded in hum anism  bu t which hum anism  always 
concealed under the guise of the cen trality  of m an’s position. In short, 
inhum anism  is an advanced form  of hum anist reflection, of hum anism  
reflecting upon itself.
W hile hum anism  tried  to cheat its loneliness (trom per sa solitude, 
as Levinas caUs it), Jeffers recognizes the fact tha t cognition is always 
m an-based. If we tu rn  tow ards philosophy we will find th a t it  looks- 
a t consciousness and knowledge as a form  of loneliness:
[la connaissancel est par essence une relation avec ce qu’on égale et englobe, 
avec ce dont on suspend l ’altérité, avec ce qui devient immanent, parce 
que c’est à ma mesure et à mon échelle ... La connaissance est toujours une 
adéquation entre la pensée et ce qu’elle pense. Il y a dans la connaissance, 
en fin de compte, une impossibilité de sortir de soi...7
Thus, w hether inspecting his own subjectivity  (inside) or objectivity  of 
the ex ternal w orld man is unable to leave categories prepared  by h ’S 
own reflection. The telescopic vision of Je ffe rs  can concentrate °ither 
on m an’s body and mind
7 E. Levinas, Ethique et infini (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 61.
...Île saw clearly in his mind the littie
Adrenal glands perched on the red-brown kidneys, as if all his 
doomed tissues become transparent,
Pouring in these passions their violent secretion
Into his blood-stream, raising the tension unbearably. (SP, 367)
or on the cosmic phenom ena m easured in light years
Galaxy on galaxy, innumerable swirls of innumerable stars, en­
dured as it were forever and humanity 
Came into being, its two or three million years a moment, in 
a moment it w ill certainly cease out from being 
And galaxy on galaxy endure after that as it were forever. (SP, 365)
Man lives betw een inside and outside and form s his knowledge try ing 
to balance the two spheres, bu t this knowledge is always made to m an’s 
m easure. A t the beginning and end of knowledge there  is not only man 
but, firs t of all, m an’s loneliness. Je ffe rs’s conclusion in “Apology for 
Bad D ream s”
-Unmeasured power, incredible passion, enormous craft: no 
thought apparent but burns darkly 
Smothered with its own smoke in the human brain-vault: no 
thought outside... (SP, 177)
not only juxtaposes inside and outside bu t also deals w ith  thought in 
term s of light which, however, is fa r  from  dazzling brightness: it 
“sm ethers” and “burns dark ly”. I t  is also th is chiaroscuro of hum an 
thinking th a t enables m an to conceive of the universe as free of man. 
In the end it is a thoughtful act th a t brings us to a suspension of th ink ­
ing, and a m ovem ent from  the hum an to the pre-hum an is a road to the 
thoughtful invalidation of thinking. If there  is no “thought outside” 
then th inking m ust inevitably  be another nam e of loneliness. I t  takes 
a hum an subject w ithdraw n tow ards the utm ost lim its of his loneliness 
to see
The fountains of the boiling stars, the flowers on the foreland, 
the ever-returning roses of dawn. (SP, 177)
Levinas holds tha t
La connaissance la plus audacieuse et lointaine ne nous met pas en com­
munion avec le  véritablement autre; elle ne remplace pas la socialité; elle 
est encore et toujours une solitude.8
Thus, consciousness, detecting and denying a chance of reaching un ity  
w ith  the “faceless violence” of existence, is a form  of m inim al difference, 
of being aw are of w hat one could be but, by  the very  awareness of the 
fact, w hat one is not. The hum an is synonym ous w ith malaise. Je ffe rs’s 
reading of enthropy is a p a rt of his anthropology: stars try  to escape 
the disease of consciousness. Man is a sick anim al of the universe:
8 Ibidem, p. 62.
¡So, i  thought, the rilmoi*
Of human consciousness has gone abroad in the world,
The sane uninfected far-outer universes
Flee it in a panic of escape, as men flee the plague
Taking a city... (SP, 366)
Consciousness is view ed as a disease because it introduces a first fissure 
in the original un ity  which, hypothetically, n a tu re  was before the em er­
gence of a hum an individual. This again introduces a them e of desire:
...you itched for a woman, you had to fetch m e out of the 
happy hill of not-being. Pfah, to hug a woman 
And make this I. That’s the evil in the world, that letter. I-I. (SP,370)
La paradox logique de la fécondité, as Levinas calls it: by the logic of 
parenthood I create w hat is me and not me a t the same time. A t the 
very  h ea rt of sexual desire and fa therly  care there  lies a secret layer 
of the m inim al difference. W hat I recognize as m y own betrays m e at 
the m om ent of the u ltim ate pleasure: i generate w hat will no t only 
resem ble me b u t deny me. In the 17th episode of The Inhum anist the 
old m an does not recognize his own daughter, and w hen he eventually  
accepts her it is w ith fu ll aw areness th a t she comes to deny him:
He looked attentively and said:
“Your eyes, Sea-gull, have lamps in 'em. It’s not 
for love
Of your father’s old bones.” (DA, 62)
The sym ptom s of m inim al difference are traced everyw here. In the 
structu re  of hum an th inking (a division into inside and outside), in  the 
na tu re  of desire, by politics and social life (“The state is a blackm ailer... 
w ith  whom  we m ake our accomodations”, DA, 142). W hat aggravates 
the  situation is the claim  th a t consciousness posits its own ideals as 
models of tru th ; as a resu lt m an has lost sight of the  fact th a t by acco­
m odating m an-m ade tru th  as regulatory  he im posed a set of alien 
values upon phenom ena to ta lly  outside th e ir range. S im ilarly, K ierke­
gaard views the predicam ent of an “objective philosopher” as a problem  
of illusion and inauthenticity .
When an individual becomes a philosopher... he becomes a member of a com­
munity; and he assumes the community’s mode of existence. But if an indi­
vidual becomes so accustomed to the community’s mode of existence that 
he begins to think of its properties as his own; if he loses sight of the 
fact that his own existence is characterized by a sharply different set of 
properties, then he has begun to forget what it means to exist.9
9 R. H. Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1972), p. 143.
Jeffers diagnoses a sim ilar process of forgetfulness in his vision of man. 
The firs t stage of this forgetfulness is the denaturalization of man, the 
second — positing this fallacy and inauthentic ity  as true  and natural.
There is only one animal that hates himself. Truly the 
Sweating toad and poison-gorged pit-viper 
Are content with their nature. I’ll be a stone at the bot­
tom of the sea, or any bush on the mountain,
But not this ghost-ridden blood-and-bone thing, civil war 
on two legs and the stars’ contempt, this walking farce 
This ape, this — denatured ape, this — citizen —... (DA, 82)
Man is represented as not content w ith  his own nature , and thus the 
im agery is constistently  th a t of strife  and conflict: death  vs. life (man
is “ghost-ridden” nad “blood-and-bone” a t the same time), political divi-
sionism (“civil w a r”), cosmic discord (“s ta rs’ contem pt”), confrontation 
of the noble and ignoble lite ra ry  genres (tragedy perta ins only to the 
non-hum an: “This coast crying out for tragedy like all beautiful places”, 
SP, 175), w hereas m an is a “w alking farce”). The Inhum anist develops 
this them e of alienation as one of its m ain subjects. Man is not only 
divorced from  natu re  (i.e. na tu ra l phenom ena) but, firs t of all, is exiled 
from  the na tu re  (i.e. the essence) of being. By the very  insistence on the 
cen trality  of his tru th  m an locates him self on the m argins of existence.
...The yellow  puma, the flighty mourning- 
-dove and flecked hawk, yes, and the rattlesnake 
Are in the nature of things... (DA, 89)
The question which m ust be asked now is: w hat it m eans to be “in the 
na tu re  of th ings”? A p a r t of the answ er is suggested in the continuation 
of the same fragm ent: “th ings” are  “noble and beautifu l as the rocks 
and the grass”. Thus, the na tu re  of things specifies a kind of existence
that is qualified as “noble” and
“beautifu l”. To be estranged from  
the natu re  of things is to live on the 
m argins of beauty. But the term  
“beau ty” brings in the elem ent of 
aestheticism  which Jeffers is conscio­
usly try ing  to defy. The aesthetic- 
-laden term inology uncovers the 
ontological and ethical preoccupa­
tions. The aesthetics of landscape, 
so sem inal for Jeffers, is prim arily  
a revelation of his m etaphysical stance. In this he resem bles Heidegger 
who found a w ay out of the finitude of world precisely through the 
transcendence of the earth . As Joseph Sadzik puts it in his book on 
Heidegger’s aesthetics:
I am set here like a stone in ce­
ment... A natural lover of man­
kind... can meet many people and 
enjoy it, but for m e to see more 
than two or three in an evening 
would mean a month’s quarrel 
with the whole race.
— RJ to A. Bender, April 21, 
1927
Heidegger a écrit son èsthétiqué moins pour eiie-m ém e qu'en vue d'unè 
métaphysique. Nous pensons que son esthétique était le prétexte à une 
nouvelle thàses métaphysique.10
This m ethaphysical background is evident in the very  notion of the “th ing” 
which appears in Je ffe rs’s quotation. A “pum a”, “dove” or a “haw k” 
are not, strictly  speaking, things; they  would be, by m ost people, classi­
fied as “anim ate objects”. Still, they are referred  to as resting “in the 
na tu re  of th ings”. They are  “as noble and beautifu l as the rocks and 
the grass”. In this simile we encounter the same problem : a rock and 
a leaf of grass do not seem to belong to the same order of being, still 
they  are placed in the im m ediate v icinity  of each other.
M an’s tragedy appears to consist in his inability  to be a thing. This 
inability  is twofold: first, m an is divided in ternally , second — he dis­
tances him self from  other things. W hat is a t stake in Je ffe rs’s m eta­
physics is the regaining of the th ingly character of man. The problem  
is to understand  m an as a thing, to  divorce him  from  the in frastructu re  
of his cu lture devised concepts which lock him  outside na tu re  and the 
na tu re  of things, and to unconceal w hat Heidegger calls dingliche Unter- 
bau, the m aterial support scheme which m akes m an and his culture 
possible. I t  is no t a coincidence th a t Je ffe rs’s tex ts abound in physiological 
and anatom ical details emphasizing the m ateria lity  of m an’s being. The 
w ay tow ards this Unterbau  leads through a reth inking of the tem poral 
s truc tu re  of man.
...the grass being permanent and 
humanity only a poignant episode.
— RJ to H. Monroe, June 2, 1926
10 J. Sadzik, Esthétique de Martin Heidegger (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 
1963), p. 154.
8. Man & Time
Like Heidegger, Jeffers inscribes m an in the circle of time, and even 
the very  absence of tim e can be represented only in tem poral designa­
tions.
Yesterday morning enormous the moon hung 
low on the ocean...
Today
Black is the ocean, black and sulphur the sky...
...I honestly do not know which day is more beautiful.
I know that tomorrow or next year or in twenty years
I shall not see these things — and it does not m att«-, it 
does not hurt;
They w ill be here. (DA, 120)
Man opens the tem porality  of existence. I t is only a fte r the tem poral 
qualification “yesterday” and “today” th a t aesthetic problem s become pos­
sible (the day is “m ore beau tifu l”) and death is seen in the  hum an 
perspective. Things m atter or not only in tim e, bu t the m eaning m ea­
surable in  tim e is not the m eaning of time.
The past and p resent are a stage upon which w hat defies such distinc­
tions is shown: things “will still be h e re” when hum an presence has 
been “rubbed ou t”. This lets us see a double s truc tu re  of the hum an 
tim e: first, it organizes and classifies reality , second, like in Nietzsche’s 
critique of the notions like “tru th ”, “good”, or “evil” , tim e shows rea lity  
as constructed, i.e. becomes one of conceptual trap s of cognition. Time 
describes world, b u t earth rem ains closed to it. In such a situation 
cognition is severely lim ited, and  m an is locked in a fundam ental incer­
titude  (“I do not know ”) as his categories are all of a sudden revealed 
as hard ly  homological w ith  reality . If the beauty  of things “has m ore 
m eaning than  the whole hum an race” then m an’s indecision as to which 
phenom enon is “more beautifu l” becomes absurdly insignificant. “Hum a-
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82 n ity  is needless” (WPS, 9) because the am bitions of its tim e are shown 
to be ridiculous by the enduring presence of cosmos:
...but presently come the stars, and 
w e are too small.
Man’s world puffs up his mind, as a toad 
Puffs him self up; the billion light-years cause a serene 
and whole som e deflation. (BE, 71)
Hence, the accuracy and precision of hum an m ind needs to be liberated 
by a m editation upon the tem porality  d ifferen t from  m an’s.
What a pleasure it is to mix one’s mind with geological 
Time, or with astronomical relax it. (BE, 18)
The problem  seems to be, then, not so m uch to avoid tim e b u t to reth ink 
it. Jeffers clearly  realizes th a t the tem porality  of m an is radical, and 
even w hat “relaxes” hum an m ind is also subsum ed under the category 
of tim e: geological tim e or billion ligh t-years are also tem poral de­
signations are tem poral dream s of w hat defies tem porality. Time is the 
elem ent of language and m etaphor. If “cu ltu re’s outlived” then  it
...remains to invent the language 
to tell it. Match-ends of burnt experience 
Human enough to be understood,
Scraps and metaphors w ill serve. (WPS, 10)
Time rem ains, for Jeffers, a m etaphor beyond which we cannot go, and 
even in concepts originally  m eant to defy tim e, the tem poral lining 
of language inevitably shows.
—Words, theological words— eternal, infinite,— w e dream  
too much. (BE, 71)
Thus, the philosopher, like N ietzsche’s Einsiedler, is aw are tha t his 
thinking m ust be grounded in two reflections: on the provisional charac­
te r  of speech, and on the inexactitude of m an’s perception of time. 
If life, as Jeffers claims,
has no name — and that’s lucky, for names
Foul in the mouthing. The human race is bound to defile
Whatever they can reach or name, they’d shit on the 
morning star 
If they could reach. (DA, 57),
then, necessarily, the philosopher m ust ignore or see through the illu­
sion of m an-m ade qualifications of time. In the 31 episode of The In ­
hum anist the philosopher has a vision of two crowds heading in two
opposite directions.
...“We are going into 
the past, into the past, w e have no place
In the great age.” Therefore he turned to the others and 
said,
“Where are you going?” “Into the future with the dawn
on our faces. Come along with us.” “No”, he said. (DA, 84)
The philosopher does not seem to be concerned either w ith  the past or 
w ith  the fu ture . Speaking about the  past, I am  fixing an event as w hat 
came to pass then  and there. A past event is, thus, somehow owned 
by me, I ru le  it  from  a distance and call it  from  the p resen t m om ent 
bringing it to m y vicinity. The past also relies on m y pow er to visualize 
a past event in the presence, as the past is w hat I can bring to sight from
the domain w here hum an tim e does not m ake any sense. This am biguity
of the past is clearly  im plied in Heidegger’s term inology w here sich 
ereignet, “come to pass”, plays a significant role.
...Heidegger points to the fact that Ereignis, and with it necessarily sich 
ereignen , embodies the meanings of the two verbs, eignen (to be one’s own, 
to suit, to belong to), and the archaic eraugnen (to bring before the eyes, to 
bring to sight).1
W ith the fu tu re  I am  denied such luxuries. As Thomas Langan puts it,
Behind us there is the richness of a historical destiny. Ahead of us, there 
is simply Nothing.2
W hile past and present are associated w ith  light and knowledge, fu tu re  
m eans u ltim ately  blindness: if I see and thus own the past, I am owned 
by the fu tu re  which tu rn s out to be the domain of the pre-hum an. This 
is the problem  Jeffers discusses in “Their B eauty Has More M eaning”:
I know that tomorrow or next year or in twenty years
I shall not see these things — and it does not matter, it 
does not hurt;
They w ill be here... (DA, 120)
The u ltim ate blindness of death  which goes beyond the individualizing 
hum an experience (“I shall not see... and it does not h u r t”) is preceded 
by the anxiety  which is grounded in the basic indecision and indefinite­
ness of the fu tu re  (“tom orrow  or n ex t year or in tw enty  years”). I t  is 
th is anxiety  concerning the fu tu re  th a t brings about the aw areness of 
Being. W hen the line “they  will still be th ere” calls forth  the moon and 
the ocean, the sky and the earth , it  can do it only in the  language 
saturated  in a particu larly  intense w ay w ith  time. The fu tu re  w ithout 
man, i.e. the only possible fu tu re  (“hum anity  will be rubbed ou t”) is 
a proper revelation of tim e in its particu lar intensity. I am  heading
1 Translator’s note in M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology..., 
p. 38.
2 T. Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger. A Critical S tudy of an Existentialist 
Phenomenology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 214.
tow ard a w orld w ithout me, and a tru e  reflection on tem porality is 
alw ays rooted in absence, or in w hat Langan calls the Nothing.
The hum an language does not have a gram m atical category that 
could render w hat supersedes fu ture . A certain  fu tu re  is exhausted w ith 
m y death, another fu tu re  is term inated  by the decline of hum anity, 
and w hat is le ft is only w hat “is” and cannot be nam ed, som ething that 
is “like” (“W hich is like  beauty. It is like  nob ility”, DA, 56). Thus, things 
“will be” w hen I am  not, although m y absence invalidates tim e, things 
“will be” w hen m ankind devolves from  the stage of creation despite the 
fac t th a t it  is hum anity  th a t m akes both “is” and its gram m atical moda­
lities possible.
To be sure, it is not absolutely necessary that w e should be. There is the 
pure possibility that man might not be at all. A fta: all there was a time 
when man was not. But strictly speaking w e cannot say: There was a time 
w hen man was not. At all times man was and is and w ill be, because tim e 
produces itself only insofar as man is. There is no tim e when man was not, 
not because man was from all eternity and w ill be for all eternity but 
because tim e is not eternity and time fashions itself into a time only as 
a human, historical being-there.3
“They w ill still be th ere”. I t  is not so m uch the obviousness of the 
fu tu re  tense th a t draw s our a tten tion  here b u t a qu iet streng th  of
“still”. This pow er is, as we have said, “qu iet” because in it  resides
the adjectival m eaning of the same word, and it is w ith  this pensive
and consistent force th a t tim e rein­
scribes itself in the line. “S till” 
m eans “even th en ”, “even a t th a t 
tim e”, i.e. in our context “a t the 
tim e when there  is no tim e”. At 
such a m om ent things are  “still” , 
surprisingly  there  and surprisingly 
peaceful and undisturbed. We could 
rew rite  Je ffe rs’s line to the effect 
th a t  no t only things will still be 
there, b u t also th a t things will be 
there  (as) still. To experience earth  
is to become aw are of the  stillness 
of things. To do it implies under­
standing of things as satisfied w ith 
their nature , as residing in nature, 
unlike m an who has successfully 
“denatu red” himself. The stillness 
which lies a t the  h ea rt of Je ffe rs’s 
analysis is a peculiar form  of tem -
3 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to  M etaphysics, p. 71.
If anyone was ever bored... let him  
get five acres and grow a wood 
on them, and produce a stone 
house and tw ins and a book of 
verses... Somebody has a nice sto­
ry about passing along the road 
below here, on evening in 1921 or 
so. They looked up in the twilight 
and saw a stump of a tower, and 
m e on top rolling a stone into pla­
ce. They went to China, returned 
to America, went to Italy, retur­
ned. In 1924 they were here again 
and looked up from the sea-road 
in the tw ilight to the same stump 
of a tower... and m e on top care­
fully rolling a stone into place. They 
thought there was something be­
witched about my stones — but 
that is how it is w ith me.
— R j to A. Ficke, April 1929
poT-ality in which m ovem ent and future-orientedness (“Things w ill be”) is 
associated w ith  a certain  fix ity  (“They will still be”). In  th is we come 
to the very  kernel of tem porality: how to, recognizing the significance 
of time, transcend its lim itations, how to, in the  face of tem poral bon­
dage, dream  of timelessness. In  Heidegger’s term inology: is an atem poral 
experience thinkable w ithin the stru c tu re  of being. The answ er to these 
questions is stric tly  Nietzschean: Jeffers presents a vision of tim e based 
on circularity  and eternal re tu rn . In 31 episode of The Inhum anist the 
philosopher claims that
...time is a ring:
what’s future?
And when again you meet the beasts on this pleasant hill, 
the fox yaps in your faces, your harps are hushed, 
future is past —
I shall be there.” (DA, 85)
W hat is a t stake in the theory  of recurrence is th a t it offers a possibility 
to answ er a question of how to describe the w ay in w hich things are w hile 
they continually, although unobservedly, change and become. If Jeffers 
w ants to “tu rn  hum anity  outw ard from  its obsession in hum an ity” (DA, 
124), it is to make us aw are th a t the hum an history  is “only a hare- 
-brained episode in the life of the p lane t” (DA, 124), and thus hum an, 
linear tim e m ust lose its significance in the situation w here “gray  sto­
nes” “will survive civilization” (DA, 121). Like for Je ffe rs  whose fu tu re  
is already past for Nietzsche
...the moment must be at once present and past, as w ell as present and 
yet to come, in order for it to pass... The present would have to coexist 
with itself as past and future; it is the synthetic self-relation of present, 
past, and future that in turn grounds the relation between this moment and 
other moments.4
Nietzsche him self talks about it  in the th ird  p a rt  of Zarathustra  w here 
he, for the first time, unveils the thought of e ternal recurrence:
Muss nicht, was laufen kann von alien Dingen, schon einmal diesse 
Gasse gelaufen sein? Muss nicht, was geschehen kann von alien  
Dingen, schon einm al geschehn, getan, voriibergelaufen sein?
Denn, was laufen kann von alien Dingen: auch in dieser langen  
Gasse hinaus — muss es einmal noch laufen! —5
The re tu rn  is a doctrine which describes cosmological processes as w ell 
as,hum an history. In the early  poem “The Cycle” we read:
4 G. Deleuze, “A ctive and Reactive”, in The New Nietzsche; Contemporary 
Styles of Interpretation, p. 86.
8 F, Nietzsche, Also Sprach..., p. 174,
now all day long the steamers 
Smudge the opal’s rim; often a sea-plane troubles 
The seawind with its throbbing heart. These w ill increase, 
the others diminish; and later 
These w ill diminish; our Pacific have pastured 
The Mediterranean torch and passed it west across the 
fountains of the morning... (BSW, 110)
In a 1940 poem “B attle” the repetitiveness of tim e is seen as a rem edy 
against the disease of civilization;
It is all in the whirling circles of time.
If millions are born millions w ill die;
In bed or in battle is no great matter 
In the long orbits of time.
If England goes down and Germany up 
The stronger dog w ill still be on top,
All in the turning of time.
If civilization goes down — that 
Would be an event to contemplate.
It will not be in our time, alas, my dear,
It w ill not be in our time. (BAS, 131)
In W om en at Point Sur  recurrence is the m achinery of hum an passion 
and desire:
...The explosion, the pas­
sion, repeated 
Eternally: what if they rot after, you and they shall
return again. The bride and the bridegroom: the 
unions of fire
Like jewels on a closed neklace burn holes through ex­
tinction. (WPS, 103)
If the cosmic and physical descriptions of the e ternal re tu rn  seem to 
link Jeffers w ith  Nietzsche, there is a certain lacuna in Je ffe rs’s version 
of the concept which could be, according to Deleuze, qualified as a lack 
of ethical in terp reta tion  of this notion. In the final analysis, N ietzsche’s 
W iederkun ft transm utes itself into affirm ation of the ability  to will. 
As Deleuze puts it,
As an ethical thought, the Eternal Return is a new formulation of the 
practical synthesis: Whatever you will, w ill it in such a way that you also 
w ill its Eternal Return.6
Thus, ahum anism  of Nietzsche aims not so m uch against m an as such 
bu t against a certain  model of man. If the au thor of Zarathustra  speaks 
of the su rfe it of men (Überdruss am  M enschen) then it refers to the 
concept of m an th a t dom inated European cu lture for m any centuries
* G. Deleuze. “Active and Reactive”, in The N ew Nietzsche.,., p. 100,
and which Nietzsche him self describes as “little  m an” (der kleine
M enschy.
Jeffers is m uch more implacable in his critique of m an which is not 
lim ited to a cu lture created  model of m an but, firs t of all, refers to the 
physical and biólogical s truc tu re  of m an. Hence, if E ternal R eturn  
is a concept which enables Nietzsche to support strong will and praise 
the individual life by uniting being and becoming, fo r Je ffe rs  the circle 
of tim e is a final determ ination of the pain of existence and thus has 
no positive connotations a ttached  to it. In  short, there  is no possibility 
of an ethical reading of W iederkun ft in Je ffe rs’s worki w here it  perform s 
a function of a m ere m echanism  of renew al. In  Nietzsche E ternal Re­
tu rn  overcomes disgust, in Jeffers it strengthens it. Hence, w hile in 
Zarathustra  there  is a chapter called “The Convalescent” (Der Gene- 
sende), Jeffers, consistently rem ains in the circle of disease. The accep­
tance of life, am or fati, tu rn s  into a fundam ental critique and refusal 
of the individual hum an will and existence. The pow er to will and be­
come is transform ed into the tendency to not w ill and disappear.
To be ended and sleep, not to be renewed... (WPS, 104)
In “The Silent Shepherds” Jeffers would re tu rn  to the ancient lite ra tu re  
and as an answ er to the question “W hat’s the best life for a m an?” will say
:— Never to have been born, sings the chorus, and the 
next best . . . . . . .
Is to die young. (BE,. 47)
In W om en at Point Sur  Jeffers repeatedly  would speak of “the horror 
of b irth ” (146), “the m onstrous b irth -pangs” (130), and the aim  of Re­
verend B arclay’s attem pts is to achieve the state  of “the em bryo before 
conception” (135), and “to find out a w ay of getting unborn” (140). The 
only will is one tow ards not willing, the will to unwill:
“But I w ill be unborn and be. still in the darkness,
Unbirth, to lie  down with death, lie  with death... (WPS, 146)
If then we can endorse the critic’s . view  th a t for N ietzsche eternal 
re tu rn  “is a weapon th a t deals death  to w hat hates life, a weapon th a t 
slays w hat has m astered the w orld until; now ”8, Je ffe rs’s concept of life 
is based on the geological ra th e r  than  hum an foundations and thus 
makes it impossible to affirm  individual life of a hum an being which 
is shown as a disturbance of the stillness of .things. Thus, e ternal re tu rn  
or renew al engenders two reflections. F irst, th a t hum an life ought to
minimize itself, reduce its m anifestations to the domain closest to the
earth  (in the sense of this term  established in one of the form er 
chapters):
7 F. Nietzsche, Also Sprach..., p. 243.
8 L. Lampert, N ietzsche’s Teaching. An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zara­
thustra  (Yale University Press, 1986), p. 165,
What’s the best life  for a man? To ride in the wind. To 
ride horses and herd cattle 
In solitary places above the ocean on the beautiful moun­
tain, and come home hungry in the evening 
And eat and sleep. H e w ill live  in the w ild wind and 
quick rain, he w ill not ruin his eyes with reading,
Nor think too much. (BE, 47)
The o ther consideration would hold th a t “the n ex t age lives on not- 
-hum an beau ty” (BAS, 100) and thus would w ish to elim inate individual 
hum an life as fundam entally  incom patible and unable to  understand 
the “inhum an beauty  of th ings”. Even the very  concept of life seems 
to be inadequate in term s of e ternal re tu rn  and Jeffers e ither rendeders 
it as “i t” or “God”. If e ternal re tu rn  is a defence of life w hat it  defends 
is no t individual being bu t cosmic becoming w hich in Jeffers, unlike in 
Nietzsche, is no t to be grasped or experienced by  a “denatured” man.
W hat a m an can do is to try  to express a fu tu re  beyond fu ture, past 
and present, a fu tu re  which will no t belong to m en and hum an images 
of tem porality.
The future is a misted landscape, 
no man sees clearly... (BAS, 101)
To grasp the experience of tim elessness in tim e (as hum an being is 
inheren tly  tem poral in his structure) m ust necessarily im ply a reduction 
of the m an-m ade perceptions and categories of tim e, “burning off at 
least the  top layer of the tim e’s uncleanliness” (BAS, 102) and bears 
a strong resem blance to the phenom enon of Augenblick  prom inently 
p resen t in Heidegger’s Sein und. Zeit w here it functions as a h in t to­
w ards a fu tu re  transcending the lim itations of the standart tim e cate­
gories.
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free 
for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” 
by shattering itself against death — i.e., only an entity which, as futural, 
is equiprimordially in the process of having-been  [G ew esenheit] can... take 
over its own thrownness and be in the Augenblick  for “its tim e”. Only 
authentic temporality which is at the same tim e finite, makes possible some­
thing like fate, i.e. authentic historicality.9
F u tu ra lity  th a t Heidegger is talking about is m arked by  the openness 
tow ards death, th a t is to say by the readiness to accept a tim e which 
is not purely  hum an and for which the w ord “fu tu re” is only a con­
ventional denomination. In both Heidegger and Jeffers, unlike in Nietz­
sche, death  figures as a key term  in the analysis of tem porality . In 
“Their Beauty Has More M eaning” today and yesterday  are, paradox­
ically, the domain of ignorance (“I do not know  w hich day is more 
beautifu l”). Paradoxically, because the intellectual routine locates know -
9 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 437,
ledge precisely in the past and present tu rn ing  the fu tu re  into back­
w aters of uncertain ty  which functions as a m ortal enem y to a factual 
knowledge. But such knowledge is not authentic, as it m ercilessly lim its 
m an to his vision of the  world. If
the human sense 
Of beauty is our metaphor of their excellence, their divine 
nature (DA, 57),
then the hum an cognition rem ains locked in the insurm ountible rh e ­
toric of hum an language. W hat we defined previously as world is the 
realm  of factual knowledge, i.e. of the ido latry  of the past and present. 
W hat we see (now) is w hat we are prepared to see (by the past), hence 
death  is the only elem ent th a t can shatter the mock certain ty  of hum an 
knowledge w ith its dark, blind pow er w hich prevents us from  seeing.
“We get the picture” concerning something does not mean only that what 
is, is set before us, is represented to us..., but that what is stands before 
us... as a system... Where the world becomes picture what is, in its entirety, 
is juxtaposed as that for which man is prepared and which... he therefore 
intends to bring before himself... What is... is now taken in such a way that 
it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set-up by man, 
who represents and sets forth.10
Death signifies m an’s openness to darkness, blindness, and thus term i­
nates the concept of knowledge as vision or view of the world. By 
pondering his death  (“I shall not 
see these th ings”, DA, 120) m an can 
achieve, in the experience of Augen- 
blick, the sense of the there-ness 
of things, i.e. divorce them  from  
hum an perception. In this act “things 
will still be th ere” bu t also, through 
a particu larly  dense tim e structu re  
of th is uterance, “I am  still th e re”.
I can realize w hat I am by getting 
insight into w hat things w ill be 
when I am  not. Je ffe rs’s w ord for 
it is still (ness).
D eath is the entrance to the 
authentic knowledge of things. It 
eludes the play of desire and subjec­
tiv ity  by presenting itself as a pow er underly ing earth. Jeffers looks 
a t his deathbed
...a Chinese desire to be buried in 
my own place. You were quite mis­
taken — it wasn’t to be buried, 
but for the pleasure of dying there. 
When we made the house w e made 
a very sweet little panelled bed- 
-room quest room... with a little fi­
re-place, and the rocks and sea in 
the window, and wrote Spenser’s 
verses on a beam over the bed:
“Peace after war, port after stor- 
mie seas,
Ease after toil, death after life, 
do greatly please”. 
I announced then that I wanted 
the luxury of dying in that bed.
— RJ to A. Ficke, October 7, 
1929
w M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 129—130.
With neither dislike nor desire; rather with both, so equalled , 'iV-'
That they kill each other and a crystalline interest 
Remains alone. We are safe to finish what w e h ave to finish;
And then it w ill sound rather like music
When the patient daemon behind the screen of sea-rock and sky 
Thumps with his staff, and calls thrice: “Come, Jeffers.” (SP, 362)
D eath is sa tu rated  w ith  the fullness of time; it  is not so m uch an in te r­
ruption b u t fulfilm ent: “We are safe to finish w hat we have to fin ish” . 
Death, as p resen t in and constitutive of hum an thinking, is a m easure 
of tim e b u t no t for biological reasons (as the end of one’s time), bu t 
as the coming of tim e which appropriates me as its own. In death my 
being acquires “its tim e”, and tim e is absolved from  its hum an sins.
This purification of tim e (“burning off the top layer of tim e’s un ­
cleanliness”) is also evident in the fact th a t death  cancels or sublates 
desire and opens the disinterestedness of m an’s thinking. Such A ufhe-  
bung  purifies perception as it leaves us w ith  “a crystalline in te rest” 
in w hat “is” in its entirety , as Heidegger puts it, ra th e r than in. w hat 
we have prepared for ourselves. If death  is the m om ent when time 
stops belonging to me as a m ere category of perception, then it is a re­
flection upon th is m om ent th a t can bring m an to  au thentic ity  which 
consists in the aw areness tha t m y historical being participates in the 
tim elessness of becoming tha t Jeffers describes as “the great explosion” 
“th a t we w ere born from ” (BE, 3). This allows us to see the notions 
of kairos and Augenblick  as directly rela ted  w ith  Heidegger’s “authentic 
tem porality”.
Kairos means fulfilled time, the concrete historical moment of Vision (Augen- 
blick). and in the prophetic sense “time of fulfilm ent”, th e  breaking in of
the eternal into time. Kairos... is time in so far as tim e is fulfilled in it the
utterly meaningful, in so far as tim e is fate. To consider tim e as kairos 
means to consider it in the spirit of the prophets.11
W hen tim e is rethought as kairos it will reveal the m eaning of things 
(“Their beauty  has more m eaning”), and m an will necessarily have  to1 
accept this revelation as his fate (this beau ty  has m ore m eaning “than* 
the whole hum an race”). This fate reads: tim e will appropriate you, and 
w hat you are is w hat things will still be while you are absent. The
fate of m an is th a t fu tu re  which is no longer h is (“The fu tu re  is
a m isted landscape no m an sees c learly”).
Kairos in Jeffers, unlike in Tillich for example, is less theological 
and more historical. Kairos is not referred  to the m om ent of the ap­
pearing of C hrist who is shown as subjected to the m echanism  of tem po­
rality:
11 P. Tillich, Kairos II. Ideas for the Spiritual Situation of the Present, in 
M. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self..., p. 146. ¡.
...church and state 
Depend on more peculiarly impossible myths:
That all men are born free and equal: consider that!
And that a wandering Hebrew poet named Jesus 
Is the God of the universe. Consider that! (BE, 12)
Instead, kairos relates to these m om ents in w hich a m ajor social or 
individual tu rn ing  accurs transform ing our sense of time:
...at cyclic turns 
There is a change felt in the rhythm of events, as when an 
exhausted horse 
Falters and recovers, then the rhythm of the running hoof- 
beats is changed... (BAS, 101)
I t m eans that, unlike chronos which m easures m y tim e and tim e of 
things separately, kairos allows us to see th a t they  both are perpetuated  
by the “older fountain” (SP, 88). On the one hand, such an in terpreta tion  
brings us to, as Tillich suggested in his Interpretation of History, the 
recognition of the presence of e tern ity  in finite objects which recognition 
m ust take into consideration a dangerously dynam ic and disruptive cha­
rac ter of this event. In this way kairos, as Tillich emphasizes12, “shakes” 
the tim e ra th e r than, as Blake would hold it, is “in love w ith the pro­
ductions of tim e”. On the o ther hand, however, by recognizing “the 
older fountain” I become aw are of th ings’ tim e and m y tim e as tim ed, 
i.e. occurring precisely a t the moment, place and rhy thm  w here they 
are. Je ffe rs’s experience of tim e is, ideally, th a t of tim e as tim ing which 
implies a m ovem ent from  a purely  quan tita tive  to qualitative reading 
of time.
Chronos est l’aspect quantitative du temps, tandis que kairos souligne une 
qualite du temps, que 1’anglais traduit approximativement par timing.13
Such an in terpreta tion  of kairos and Augenblick  enables us to see bet­
te r  why, according to Jeffers, n a tu ra l phenom ena are “in the na tu re  
of th ings”, and it also helps us to 
understand th a t man is “denatu red ’ 
precisely because of the type of his 
reflection upon time. To be “in the 
na tu re  of th ings” calls for a rejec­
tion of the hum an system atization 
of tim e which now m ust be viewed 
as a collision of various aspects of 
tem porality  norm ally  segregated as 
“past, present, and fu tu re ”. It is this 
aw areness of m an’s position as a 
battleground of tim e th a t evokes
12 P. Tillich, Interpretation of History  (New York, 1936), p. 174.
13 C. J. Armbuster, La Vision de Paul Tillich, (Paris: Ambier, 1971), p. 253.
I wish to be cremated as cheaply, 
quickly and quietly as possible, no 
speech nor meeting nor music, no 
more coffin than may be necessary, 
no embalming, no flowers. A fune­
ral is only a sanitary measure. Put 
the ashes a few inches deep in the 
courtyard near our little daugh­
ter’s ashes — certainly no grave­
stone nor tablet.
— RJ to Una Jeffers, Easter 1938
Reverend B arclay’s desire to move outside the circle of renew al and 
live/die in the darkness “before conception”. S im ilarly  dram atic reading 
of Augenblick  is provided by Heidegger in his comm ents upon Nietzsche:
As Augenblick, w e determine that tim e in which future and past meet 
head-on, in  which they... get empowered and executed by man himself, 
since man stands in the place of this hitting together, indeed is this place 
himself.14
The same description of m an as a place w here tim e tries to find its own 
iden tity  and m an him self regains his being through absence (“W here 1? 
Not anyw here.”) and coming to term s w ith  fu tu re  (“This wom an cannot 
live m ore than  one y ea r”) and relived past (“Now she talks as if she 
w ere new ly b o m ”) inform s Je ffe rs’s “W here 1?”.
This woman cannot live more than one year.
Her growing death is hidden in a hopeless place,
Her death is like a child growing in her,
And she knows it, you see it shine in her face.
She looks at her own hands and thinks “In a year 
These w ill be burnt lik e rags in the crematory.
I shall not feel it. Where I? Where? Not anywhere.”
It is strange, it gives to her face a kind of glory.
Her mind used to be lazy and heavy her face,
Now she talks all in haste, looks young and lean  
And eager, her eyes glitter with eagerness,
As if she were newly born and had never seen 
The beauty of things, the terror, pain, joy, the song.
— Or is it better to live at ease, dully and long? (SP, 575)
Death figures so prom inently  in Je ffe rs’s reflection not because hum an
life span is lim ited, bu t because unless we m ake death present in our 
thinking we will be doomed to  the inauthentic  existence of “toys” and 
o ther “luxuries”. It is a dangerous path: to find “I ” I m ust ask “W here I?” 
to answ er “not anyw here”. My fate (“cannot live m ore than  one year”) 
opens the paradox of m an’s tim e which lies a t the root of freedom. 
Jeffers rejects suicide (“you know you will never untim ely  attem pt the 
tom b”, SP, 587) not on m oral basis b u t as a m ajor disloyalty and 
betrayal of tim e on m an’s part. M an’s freedom  is to let tim e m ature  till 
the m om ent when “m y tim e” becomes “its tim e” . The point from  which 
we see both the subjective and obejctive, w here we are locked betw een
m an as “I” and m an as “i t” is the m om ent of kairos:
Here the subject has no possibility of an absolute position... cannot move 
from out of the sphere of decision. On every side of its essence, [the subject] 
stands in the “between” (Zwiespalt).15
14 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. 50, (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1961), p, 356.
15 Quoted in M, Zimmerman, Eclipse of Self..., p. 146,
9. The Moment of Destruction
This betw eenness, however, is the domain of violence. The very  term  
Augenblick  a lready  presupposes a sudden m ovem ent present also in its 
F rench (clin d’oeil) and Polish (rzut oka) varieties. Sôren K ierkegaard 
notices tha t e te rn ity  is fa r from  pastoral quietness and has more to do 
w ith a violent intervention:
On trouve dans le Nouveau Testament une poétique description de l ’instant. 
Paul dit que le  monde passera “en atomo kai en ripe ophtalmon”. Il exprime 
aussi par là que l ’instant de la ruine exprim e en meme temps l ’eternite.1
“L ’instan t de la ru ine” as the opening of e te rn ity  is a constant m otif 
in Jeffers. The decay could be purely  personal (as in “The Bed by the 
W indow”), bu t frequen tly  the non-hum an tim e w here the edge of fu tu re  
receives a killing sharpness is of the cosmic character.
...these tall
Greentrees would become a moment’s torches and vanish, the 
oceans would explode into invisible steam,
the six miles
Hollows of the Pacific sea-bed might smoke for a moment. Then 
the earth would be like the pale proud moon,
Nothing but vitrified sand and rock would be le ft  on earth. (SP, 597)
The tem poral s truc tu re  of man is such th a t its m eaning is revealed only 
after the non- and pre-hum an have in tervened w ith  a penetrating  power. 
Man can be saved then not by avoiding this danger (because by  doing 
it he would rem ain bound by his inauthentic  tem porality), b u t by its 
direct experience. A sim ilar thought is again seminal in Heidegger who,
1 Quoted in A. Clair, Pseudonymie et paradoxe. La Pensée dialectique de  
Kierkegaard  (Paris: Librarie philosophique J. Vrin, 1976), p. 110.
in his essay on die Kehre, displays w ith  full force the m eaning of danger
for the hum an. He approaches the subject via a reference to a Hölderlin
poem:
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also.
If now we think these words still more essentially than the 
poet sang them... they say: where the danger is as the danger, 
there the saving power is already thriving also. The latter 
does not appear incidentally. The selfsame danger is, when it is 
as the danger, the saving power. The danger is the saving power, 
inasmuch as it brings the saving power out of its — the danger’s- 
concealed essence...2
The danger th a t Heidegger and Jeffers are talking about is, on the one 
hand, a common experience of everyday life. “To be sure, men are a t ail 
tim es oppressed by dangers and exigencies” says the philosopher in the 
early  p a rt of the essay. In the 1930s dangers w ere also tangible for the 
California poet:
...He read: “Spain battle. Rebels kill captives. City 
bombed. Reds kill hostages. Prepare 
For war Stalin warns troops.” (SP, 582)
Yet it is not these dangers th a t constitute a real th rea t, and in the  same 
poem Jeffers ridicules a philosophy which tries to see the w orld as 
com prehensible in term s of politics, society, history. There m ust be 
a danger m ore significant, more deadly and difficult to trace than 
th rea ts  coming from  these directions.
The w ay tow ards a definition of this superior peril is through 
a critique of culture. We have already  seen how Jeffers accuses m an 
of alienation and “denaturedness” and defines man as a being which 
constructs a complicated edifice of cu lture to forget its rootedness in the 
“rich, unplanned life on e a rth ” (SP, 596). This forgetfulness occasioned 
the in terest in “toys” and “luxuries” and falsified the  fundam ental 
question from  “w hat is life?” to “how to ad ju st to the economics of 
the  new  abundance?” In o ther words, Je ffe rs’s philosophy aims a t resto r­
ing the significance of Seinsfrage  which Heidegger posited as the main 
purpose of his philosophy.
To philosophize is to ask “Why are there essents rather than nothing?” 
Really to ask the question signifies: a daring attempt to fathom this un­
fathomable question by dislocating what it summons us to ask, to push 
our questioning to the very end. Where such an attempt occurs there is 
philosophy.®
The necessity of questioning is precisely w hat has been discarded by 
the society. The m ain line of the developm ent of the hum an seems to
2 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 42.
3 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 6—7.
lead from  the questioning individual to the unquestioning, indifferent 
masses of followers. Not to question is never to be aw akened and ever 
dependent upon w hatever is served and offered, i.e. to live the inauthentic 
existence. This is a hallm ark  of the h istory  of the hum an time:
The proletariat for your Messiah, the poor and many are to 
seize power and make the world new.
They cannot even conduct a strike without cunning leaders... (SP, 592)
The questioning is not perform ed in the nam e of the individual against 
the mass; w hat is a t stake in Je ffe rs’s insistence upon questioning is 
th a t it can m ake us a lert to the betrayal inheren t in m an and, thus, will 
tu rn  us carefully  and concernfully tow ards things. If the w orld of non- 
-questioning m ay be called as “superhum an”, questioning brings us back 
towards the non-hum an.
Nietzsche or Jesus, hermit, martyr, starved prophet,
Were you honest w hile you lived? You are not now.
You have found your following and it corrupts you; all 
greatness
Involves betrayal, of the people by a man
Or of a man by the people. Better to have stood
Forever alone. Better been mute as a fish,
Or an old stone on the mountain, where no man comes... (BAS, 127)
I t is the non-questioning of ideology coupled w ith  m an’s alienation from  
“th ings” th a t p revents m an from  recognizing his own essence. If, through 
kairos, m an can be situated  again among things, regain “la convenance
par rapport a la situation”4, th is experience m ust rem ain devoid of any
social uses. If for Tillich kairos could also spell certain  hope associated 
w ith an ideology (like in the Germ an socialist revolution of 1918), Je f­
fers im placably bares h istory  as a series of coups, a story  of group 
terrorism  exercised upon an individual:
How many turn back towards dream and magic, how many children
Run home to Mother Church, Father State,
To find in their arms the delicious warmth and folding of 
souls.
The age weakens and settles home toward old ways.
An age of renascent faith: Christ said, Marx wrote, Hitler says,
And though it seems absurd w e believe.
Sad children, yes. It is lonely to be adult, you need a father. (SP, 593)
There are no social uses of kairos and, like N ietzsche’s “O verm an”, Je f­
fers’s m an “does not have instrum ental value for the m aintenance of 
the society: he is valuable in him self because he embodies the state
4 E. Przywara quoted in C. J. Armbuster, La Vision de Paul Tillich, p. 266.
of being for which all of us long... and society is censured in so far 
as it  insists on conform ity.”5
The danger underly ing all specific th rea ts  of h istory  is a dom inating 
tendency to take ideology for tru th , conform ity for v irtue, w hat we 
are in our “denatu red” state  for w hat we are. Not to be able to overcome 
the logical thought, i.e. not to be able to break  w ith  anthropocentrism  
and anthropom orphism :
...Qu’il parle de l ’etre, de Dieu ou de l’Esprit, l ’homme en parle toujours 
á partir et en vue de sod; la pensée “logique” est inséparable ďun antropo­
centrisme d’autant plus dangereux qu’il se masque sous des apparences 
plus élevées.6
W hat needs to be done is to recognize the danger for w hat it is, to 
penetrate  through the mask, to get insight into “th ings” and rem ain in 
relationship w ith  them . W ithout such operations m an will rem ain forget­
fu l of Being and will be pleased and satisfied w ith  “toys: motors, m u- 
sic-boxes, paper, fine clothes, leisure, diversion” (SP, 569).
...finally it became clear to m e that the misdirection of speculative philo­
sophy and its... justification for reducing faith to the status of a relative 
moment could not be anything accidental, but must be rooted deeply in 
the entire tendency of the age. It must... be rooted in the fact that on 
account of our vastly increased knowledge, men had forgotten what it 
means to exist.7
The paradox of knowledge is grounded in the fact th a t it  operates 
faultlessly  along com pletely false lines. In  the sam e w ay as K ierkegaard’s 
speculative philosophy produces w rong resu lts using strictly  correct 
logical operations Je ffe rs’s science is a trium ph of efficiency over tru th ­
fulness.
The mathematicians and physics men
Have their mythology; they work alongside the truth,
Never touching it; their equations are false 
But the things work. (BE, 11)
We can see now th a t the danger has two m ain aspects: one instructs 
us th a t we are forgetful of existence, the  o ther points to the  causes 
m aintaining th a t the struc tu re  of hum an knowledge is flaw ed and sti­
m ulates the tendency tow ards forgetting “w hat it  m eans to ex ist”. The 
danger is thus intensified by a recent grow th of science and technology 
b u t is by no m eans occasioned by it. One of the steady points of Je f­
fers’s philosophy is th a t the danger is cosubstantial w ith  man, and all
5 W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. 222.
6 P. M. Pouget, Heidegger, ou le retour a la voix  silencieuse, (Lausanne: L’Age 
d’Homme, 1975), p. 45.
7 S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. Swenson and 
W. Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), p. 216.
the developm ents are only superficial m odifications of the same scheme. 
Hence, in the “Original S in” which opens w ith  the Sw iftian m isanthropic 
presentation of m an as
The man-brained and man-handed ground-ape physically 
The most repulsive of all hot-blooded animals (DA, 145),
he guides us through a cruel scene of prim al m am m oth hun ting  to 
generalize
These are the people.
This is human dawn. As for me, I would rather
Be a worm in a w ild apple than a son of man.
But w e are what w e are, and w e might remember 
Not to hate any person, for all are vicious;
And not to be astonished at any evil, all are deserved;
And not fear death; it is the only way to  be cleansed.
Hum an denaturedness is not a resu lt of the punishm ent for the prim al
transgression, bu t it is the original sin itself. This sta tem ent has its
obvious and im portant consequences. I t  erases the m yth  of the original 
happiness, a story  of the Golden Age, so valid for the tradition of 
W estern thinking. At this point we en ter an im portan t circle of argu­
ments: if m an’s alienation is due to his inability  to see through the 
pretences of cu lture and reach tow ards “th ings”, then m an is ineradi- 
cably im m ersed in his fau lty  condition as he will never be able, despite 
his philosophical claims, to disperse the clouds of ignorance surrounding 
his alienation. In  short, m an is alienated because he “cannot see” , and 
he cannot see as he is alienated. Thus, the danger —  the heart of which 
is th a t we m ay not be able to bring to light its significance —  is not 
an ad junct to m an’s being, bu t it form s the very  essence of man. The 
tragedy of man is th a t he cannot see its “n a tu re” otherw ise as only 
already scattered, dissem inated, already  “denatured”.
The flam boyancy of the industria l society is only a spectacular m a­
nifestation of a more centrally  ontological problem: m an is not a “she­
pherd of Being”, as Heidegger would like him  to be, because he cannot 
gather and protect the flock being basically unable to preserve his own 
integrity. If life is hidden and has to be revealed, if tru th  is m easured by 
the category of aletheia, then, in Jeffers, such a concept is m ade im ­
possible by the very  fact th a t from  the very  beginning m an has been 
cut off from  the sources of his 
existence, and now he tries to 
hide this fact from  himself. Thus 
m an’s denaturedness is the history 
of man m asking and hiding the 
fact tha t the tru th  of his natu re  
has already been hidden from  him.
This seems to be the heart of
The story grows rather intimately 
from the rock of this coast. Someone 
said to me lately that it is not pos­
sible to be quite sane here, many 
others feel a hostility of the region 
to common human life.
— RJ to D. Friede, April 24, 1926
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the danger we have been try ing  to define. Like in Heidegger, man is 
presented as an actor in the dram a of disguising:
...men are at all times and in all places exceedingly oppressed by dangers 
and exigencies. But the danger, namely Being itself endangering itself in 
the truth of its coming to presence, remains veiled and disguised. This 
disguising is what is most dangerous in the danger.8
Je ffe rs’s texts would also sym pathetically  hear its own thoughts in 
H eidegger’s belief th a t m an is not “helplessly delivered over to techno­
logy”9 because it is through the cooperation of man and technology that 
“the coming to presence of technology will be surm ounted in a way 
th a t restores it onto its yet concealed tru th ”10. But they  will agree on 
these points for characteristically  divergent reasons.
For Jeffers technology, a spectacular m anifestation of m an’s alie­
nation, is basically lim ited either to en terta inm ent or domination.
...What is noble in us, to kindle 
The imagination of a future age? We shall seem a race of cheap 
Fausts, vulgar magicians.
What men have w e to show them? but invention and appliances. (SP, 610) 
...spear and war-axes, horses and sabres, gaunt battle-elephants 
With towered backs; they became catapults and siege-guns, high-
-tilted howitzers, long tractors, armored and turreted;
They became battleships and destroyers, and great fleets of war­
planes... all the proud instruments 
Of man imposing his w ill upon weaker men... (SP, 590)
In both senses, e ither as adornm ent or th rea t of political suppresion, 
technology betrays the same forgetfulness of Being. In the first case 
because it operates in the sphere rem oved from  the hiddenness of ex ist­
ence, deals w ith a façade, and hence becomes “not life bu t am usem ents” 
(SP, 610); second, it forgets Being because it occasions the dom ination 
of the mass over the individual which, already denatured, now becomes 
doubly alienated from  his essence. F irst estrangem ent is existential, 
since as a m an I cannot face the aenigma and thus m ask it w ith  a p re­
tence of knowledge; the other alienation is imposed by economy
and politics — instead of seeing m yself as a gleaner of food in the
presence of the tearing power, “faceless violence” , of Being, I am dome­
sticated in m y inauthenticity  which is now given a public, political and 
social dimension. I am no longer nourished by the sea and meadows 
bu t by
...powerful bureaucracies 
[which] apportioned food for labor and amusement... (SP, 592)
There is, however, a state of balance or “cooperation” betw een m an and 
technology:
8 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 37.
9 Ibidem, p. 37.
10 Ibidem, p. 39.
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essence of technology... man’s essence must first open itself to the essence
of technology... However, in order that man in his essence may become atten­
tive to the essence of technology... modern man must first of all find his 
way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence.11
The “restorative surm outing” (verw unden ) is not so m uch a question
of getting rid  of technology as of getting  over it. On the same page
of his essay Heidegger speaks of verw unden  as sim ilar to “w hat happens 
when... one gets over grief or pain .” W hen I overcome the grief of 
technology I stop perceiving it as painful or dangerous and find a te rr i­
to ry  w here both m yself and technology can belong. This is the sphere 
of w hat Jeffers calls “stillness”.
I t can be achieved, however, only afte r I know how to w ithdraw  to 
m y essence, to uncover “the full b read th  of space” called “m e”. It is here 
th a t the problem  begins. If we believe w ith  Jeffers th a t m an is radically 
denatured  how is he supposed then to regain his essence? Is it possible 
to re institu te  som ething th a t we have never had access to? The answ er 
is both yes and no. No, if by being re tu rned  to the space of m y essence 
we m ean reinstitu tion of the original unity , the plenitude of the G ar­
den. Heidegger to a large ex ten t supports such a project and D errida 
righ tly  describes Heidegger’s philosophy as “nostalgie heideggerienne”12.
But, paradoxically, the answ er could also be positive, if we con­
centrated  less on the predicate w hich im plies a w ithdraw al to the m y­
thic p lenitude (“m an must... find his w ay back”) and m ore on the term  
of “coming to presence” (Wesen). This term inological hinge reveals a sig­
nificant am biguity: it is usually  transla ted  as “essence” or as “coming 
to presence” which im plies th a t w hat is can reveal its na tu re  only 
by becoming present. In another essay Heidegger explains this point 
referring  to phrases the “essence of the house” and the “essence of the 
s ta te”, and he instructs us not to tre a t them  as generic types but 
ra th e r as
...the ways in which house and state hold sway, adminster themselves, 
develop and decay...13
This implies th a t the notion of essence is to be understood as a certain 
mode of acceptance, a certain am or fati. This affirm ation is not of the 
Nietzschean type which sees in am or fati a description of the extatic 
greatness of man:
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: That one wants 
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not
11 Ibidem, p. 39.
12 J. Derrida, Positions, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1972), pp. 16—20, 69—75.
See also J. Derrida, Of Grammatology,  pp. 18—25.
13 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology,  p. 30.
XOO merely bears what is necessary, still less conceal it — all idealism is men­
daciousness in the face of what is necessary — but love it.14
If Jeffers could still endorse Nietzsche’s instruction concerning resig­
nation about things, then he would radically oppose the philosopher’s 
call to love “w hat is necessary” . Je ffe rs  places the stress precisely on 
acceptance as pu tting  up w ith  (not rejoicing in), and hence w hat in 
Nietzsche becomes “joyful wisdom ” acquires in Jeffers the character 
of endurance.
Endurance is the ability  to support, to carry  upw ard, i.e. to reveal 
and here we can still see the traces of Nietzsche’s postulate asking 
us not to conceal things. Thus Jeffers speaks of
...the stone
Endurance that is waiting millions of years to carry 
A corner of the house... (SP, 83)
But, first of all, endurance is a corrective m easure which ought to bring 
us to a m ore ju st estim ate of life as “the ancient w ound” (BE, 10). 
If the endurance of a stone reveals and brings to presence the essence 
of things as support, hum an endurance is a reaction to the obliteration 
of the pow er to support, the obliteration which is referred  to as “life”. 
Endurance is a stra tegy  which, on the one hand, makes up for the fact 
th a t we are not “balanced and n eu tra l” like a stone, and on the other 
hand it is the only w ay of studying m an th a t can bring him  closer 
to his essence.
Endurance is a stra tegy  which, on the one hand, m akes up for the fact 
th a t we are not “balanced and n eu tra l” like a stone, and on the other 
hand it is the only way of studying m an that can bring him  closer 
to his essence.
He [God] would be balanced and neutral 
As a rock on the shore, but the red sunset ■— waves 
Of life’s passions fling over him. He endures them,
We endure ours. (BE, 10)
Endurance, in short, is w hat enables us to rela te  being and not-being, 
to bear being (we are very  far from  N ietzsche’s postulate to love life’s 
events) as alw ays related  to and disturbing not-being. This is voiced 
adequately by the monologue of the Hanged God in A t the Birth of 
an Age:
If I were quiet and emptied m yself of pain 
breaking these bonds,
Healing these wounds: without strain there is nothing. Without 
pressure, without conditions, without pain,
Is peace; that’s nothing, not-being; the pure night, the perfect 
freedom, the black crystal. I have chosen
14 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo trans. W. Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1969), p. 258.
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mind and the anguished nerves, experience and extasy.
I am the nerve, I am the agony,
I am the endurance. I torture myself 
To discover myself... (SP, 559)
We can be re tu rned  to our 
essence as not to w hat was 
originally united before the 
division (there is no prelap- 
sarian paradise in Jeffers 
for whom  even God exists 
already in the divided uni­
verse flawed by “passions of 
life”), bu t as to a constant 
tension betw een being and 
not-being. Man is denatured
also because technology does not open his eyes unto the proble­
m atic of not-being. Technology which has previously been shown 
as a m ere ornam ent or a sheer will to pow er now, through its 
destructive potential, transcends the lim its of civilization and forces 
us to live in the vicinity of “not-being”. Having presented his vision 
of “The G reat Explosion” as the beginning of “new universes” Jeffers 
draw s a parallel betw een the destructiveness of cosmic processes and 
the hum an tendency tow ards dem olishm ent seeing in both onto- 
logically fundam ental fascination w ith the not-being:
No wonder w e are so fascinated with 
fire-works
And our huge bombs: it is a kind of homesickness perhaps 
for the howling fire-blast that we were born 
from. (BE, 3)
If Jeffers claims tha t
I am not well civilized, really alien here: trust me not.
I can understand the guns and the airplanes,
The other conveniencies leave me cold. (SP, 569),
it is because technology of w ar, as old as hum anity  itself, brings to life 
the imm ediacy and urgency of not-being. If we w ant to understand 
technology we have to unconceal its destructive edge which can in itiate  
a m editation upon the “older fountain” of not-being and also to rething 
the character of reasons and ends involved in the technological activity.
Thus, like Heidegger, Jeffers would endorse a view th a t civilization 
cannot be exhausted by a definition which sees it in purely  instrum ental 
categories. Man is the only anim al th a t m akes tools, the only being who 
“have hands, not paw s” (DJ, 128), and thus the “only anim al tha t tu rns
So I feel like a stretched Titan, with one 
foot in the ocean and one in the high 
mountains. I feel miserable... and am writ­
ing nonsense to cover it up. Nothing w ill 
ever make up for what we have lost. My 
business at present is to make verses in 
the morning and to add a stone or two to 
the new house-wall... the tasks Una would 
have wanted me to attend to if she were 
here.
— RJ to F. Clapp, January 18, 1951
102 m eans to an end” (DJ, 123). The point is th a t the means one the ex­
tension and a p a rt of the same inauthenticity  which m akes a characte­
ristic feature  of the hum an condition. If man, because of his denaturedness 
and consciousness which Jeffers presents as the “great w ound” , is
...the eventual hell of life, the animal 
Toward which all evolution toiled and was damned 
From the beginning. (DA, 33)
then the m eans-ends scheme belongs to the same paradigm  of dam nation. 
In other words, the ability  to tu rn  m eans to ends is certain ly  a correct 
statem ent of m an’s relationship w ith  technology bu t the correctness 
of such a sta tem ent does not have anything to do w ith  tru th  (“... the 
m erely correct is not ye t the tru e ”15). If the logic of science secures 
only the operative order of artificially  m ade things, then it would be 
a m istake to take if for tru th .
...Science and mathematics 
Run parallel to reality, they symbolize it, they squint at it,
They never touch it: consider what an explosion
Run parallel to reality, they symbolize it, they squint at it,
Would rock the bones of men into little white fragments 
and unsky the world 
If any mind should for a moment touch truth. (BE, 48)
The ends w orked out by science “running parallel to rea lity” m ust 
inevitably  be false (although “correct” in the generally accepted scheme 
of the world):
“What end? Oh, but what end?”
It cried under his mind, “Increase the city? subdue the 
earth? Breed slaves and cattle, and one’s own 
Off-shots, fed and secure? Ah, fruitful-fruitless 
Generations forever and ever...” (DJ, 122)
The illusiveness of ends is m atched by the unaw areness of reasons. To 
understand  technology, for Jeffers, m eans to uncover its annihilating 
power, b u t also to question the very  categories which, like those of 
cause and effect, are seminal for the developm ent of technological th ink ­
ing and dem onstrate their corrupted character. Technology holds sway 
over men and thus rem ains ununderstood because it m istifies and veils 
its own foundations. To surm ount technology would m ean to analyse 
its basic concepts and only such an analysis would open the w ay towards 
a true  knowledge. For the tim e being, however,
...they have a new breed of men 
...Obedient, intelligent, trained technicians
like trained seals, tell them to do something 
And they can do it. But never ask them their reasons,
For they know nothing. They would break up into neo- 
Christian jargon like Einstein. (BE, 28)
15 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 6.
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points a t two im portant aspects. F irst is the total subjugation of the 
earth  subdued and brought under m an’s control. The earth  is now 
“worn and weak w ith  too m uch hum anity” (SP, 483). As a resu lt of such 
an attitude the earth  is shown as to tally  orderable and through this 
orderability  it acquires the sta tus of the “standing reserve”, Heidegger’s 
Bestand, which m eans th a t “th ings” lose their “inhum an beau ty” and 
cease to be objects. As H eidegger’s critic notices:” Bestand  contrasts 
w ith  Gegenstand  (object; th a t which stand over against). Objects indeed 
lose their characters as objects w hen they are  caught up in the “stan ­
ding reserve” ”16.
The other aspect illum inates hum an history. The transform ation of 
a paw into a hand had an ex traord inary  effect of starting  man upon 
a w ay tow ards the hum anized vision of his own future. Man saw sud­
denly that, by producing tools and using them  to achieve specific re­
sults, he could create categories of his fate. Thus man became the origin­
ator of history  w hich is, in his understanding, the ability to gather 
objects of the ex ternal w orld which have the ir own and unfathom able 
fate  and subject them  to not only a m echanical dom ination of techno­
logy but, first of all, to the spiritual dom ination of man. Hence, objects 
thus gathered stop being objects and become once again the “standing 
reserve”, as they  are exhausted now in the categories of the hum an 
destiny. H istory is a gathering of things which lose their sta tus of 
objects and become dom inated by the hum an fate. In o ther words, 
history  is a form  of hum an im perialism  and an anthropocentric fallacy.
King Pentheus from  “The H um anist’s T ragedy” faced by the raging pas­
sion of the bacchantes and considering the ends of hum an activities 
specifies the perpetuation of the hum an history  as a central problem  
of life.
Had I forgotten a moment the end 
Of being? To increase the power, collectedness and dignity 
of man. (DJ, 124)
The way tow ards understanding technology leads through the aw areness 
tha t the real is never “touched” and, w hat is more, th a t it is covered 
up by hum an history. To com prehend technology is to grasp the im­
perialism  of hum an fate. M artin Heidegger approaches this problem  
in his “Question Concerning Technology” :
The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way that revealing 
through which the real everywhere... becomes standing reserve. “To start 
upon a way” means “to send” in our ordinary language. We shall call that 
sending-that-gathers (versammelde Schicken) which first starts man upon 
a way of revealing, destining (Geschick). It is from out of this destining that 
the essence of all history is determined.17
16 Ibidem, p. 17.
17 Ibidem, p. 24.
104 We could read Je ffe rs’s apocalyptic visions not as escapist or even 
fashist, bu t as basically ontological accusation of technology which is 
charged w ith the inability  to reaw aken m an to see his essence. The 
war, so frequen tly  exhorted in Je ffe rs’s texts, is less a physical conflict 
and m ore an appeal to bring to light the contrast betw een world which 
sees everything as a p a rt  of the hum an fate and earth  th a t inscribes 
th a t fate into the scheme of the “rich, unplanned life”. Such a reading 
im plies a shift from  history (where tim e has necessarily a hum an di­
mension) to geology (i.e. to a tim e outside the hum an scale). Hence 
Jeffe rs’s “inhum anism ” is a critique of a certain m isin terpretation of 
technology which centering upon the m ajor evolutional move from  a paw 
to a hand trea ted  it as a signal for a privileged position of m an and the 
authorisation to tu rn  everything into “standing reserve” . In o ther words, 
the destructive potential of m odern technology serves the ontological 
purpose: by hovering on the edge of apocalypse it could bring about 
the aw areness of w hat IS by pointing to w hat IS not. This implies the 
cancelling of the sta tus or “standing reserve” which man imposed upon 
on objects and him self by forgetting his nature. This could not have 
been prevented. The evolution of the inanim ate natu re  towards conscio­
usness dictated this particu lar and unfortunate  move. W hat can and 
should be removed, however, is a sanction of prio rity  and distinction 
th a t this purely  biological phenomenon has acquired in the hum an hi­
story. Man can be “in natu re  w ith th ings” again only when he ceases 
to be, b u t while alive he ought to m inimalize his presence. W hat is 
needed is the awareness of the provisionality of m an in term s of geo­
logical time. D enatured by evolution, “dam ned from  the beginning”, and 
protectively veiled in his non -tru th  by culture, philosophy and civili­
zation man w rites h istory of earth  as his own, composes a history  of 
earth  as a story of world. It is precisely a m ovem ent from  history  to 
geology th a t will be a purifying experience.
Before the first man 
Here were the stones, the ocean, the cypresses,
And the pallid region in the stone-rough dome of fog where 
the moon 
Falls on the west. Here is reality.
The other is a spectral episode: after the inquisitive animal’s 
Amusements are quiet: the dark glory. (DJ, 129)
Man, who has been swept into instrum enta lity  and became an in stru ­
m ent himself, can become aware of his position as “standing reserve”, 
and can thus initiate the process of rediscovering his essence only 
having rethought and repositioned death.
Pure action would make a good life, let it be sharp- 
Set between the throat and the knife.
A man who knows death by heart 
Is the man for that life. (SP, 562)
The apparatus of destruction, “our m eans and m astery  of w arfare” (SP, 105 
610), has the power to aw aken the sense of danger necessary for the 
aw areness of one’s inauthenticity . As Jeffers m aintains in the same poem
In pleasant peace and security
How suddenly the soul in man begins to die.
In Je ffe rs’s claim  that he can understand “the guns and airp lanes” we 
can hear the voice of the danger th a t m ust speak to man, if m an is to 
see his denaturedness. We hear the same thunderous voice in Heidegger 
who believed th a t although technology
...threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed single way 
of revealing... it is precisely in this extreme danger that the innermost 
indestructible belongingness of man within granting may come to life, 
provided that we... begin to pay heed to the coming to presence of techno­
logy.18
Technology can be surm ounted if we allow for its “coming to presence” , 
i.e. when we disperse the cloud of illusion which w ants us to place 
technological and scientific developm ent as an integral part of the m yth 
of hum an domination and centrality .
In “The H um anist’s T ragedy” Jeffers sketches a picture of a king- 
-philosopher who, suddenly exposed to the pressure of passion, tries 
to rationalize hum an lot. According to the tradition of Greek rationalism  
he extols man as “the only self-com m anding anim al” and supports his 
view w ith  the critique of the Bacchantes whom he charges w ith the 
forgetfulness of “all the dignity of m an”. P en theus’s vision of life shows 
it as “the slight collectible pleasure, surplas to pa in” (DJ, 123), and 
it is the adjective “collectible” th a t a ttrac ts our attention. Not only 
is culture described by a form  of “collecting” but also by its purpose 
which is to “increase the power, collectedness and dignity of m an”.
Man him self figures in P en theus’s scheme of thought as “a more col­
lected and dignified c rea tu re” (DJ, 124).
The raging choir of the Bacchantes m om entarily weakens his belief 
in the “collectedness of m an” and Pentheus reproaches him self for ha­
ving forgotten “the end of being”. This m ovem ent from  power to w eak­
ness and back to the power of self-control is a gesture which itself 
belongs to the m echanism s of collectedness carefully  sheltered by m e­
mory.
Then recollecting all his dignity as 
human being, a king and a Greek,
He heard with hostile ears the hoarse and beastlike choir 
of the worshippers... (DJ, 124)
18 Ibidem, p. 32.
106 We see then tha t the “collectedness of m an” is not of a perm anent and 
enduring character, th a t it can suffer from  m om entary lapses and that, 
in the final analysis, it is revealed as a mem orized behaviour, a m yth 
a t the disposal of the archives of hum an consciousness. W hen reading
“Point Jo e” we noticed tha t gath ­
ering and gleaning against the 
tearing pow er of the earth  was 
also a kind of collectedness. But, 
significantly enough, in the earlier 
poem Jeffers speaks prim arily  of 
nourishm ent, of collecting w hat 
has not been m echanically pro­
duced by man b u t w hat has been 
left by the earth  for the hum an use. In o ther words, in th a t collectedness 
there  is no im m inent danger of challenging na tu re  to yield its goods 
and m aterials. Like in Heidegger’s analysis of technology, collectedness 
of “Point Joe” is close to the traditional art, techne, husbandry ra ther 
than  to the challenging power of the sophisticated civilization of the 
machine.
...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The 
earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral 
deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order 
appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take 
care of and to maintain.19
The collectedness of P en theus’s philosophy has little  to do w ith hum ility  
of gleaning. It is no longer to be understood in term s of cultivation, bu t 
instead it becomes a m etaphorical field of power. The rhetoric of the 
tex t is ocertly th a t of m astery  and domination. P entheus collects and 
re-collects “dignity”, royal power, “hard  selfm astery” , and the very 
phrase in which dignity is always qualified as belonging to “hum an 
being, a king and a G reek” (in itself a significant combination of 
anthropocentrism , nationalism  and political oppresion) is repeated three 
tim es in the poem. The collectedness prom oted by Pentheus if of a pu ­
rely  cerebral character, it is an ideology imposed upon a living organism. 
The king is a collector, th a t is to say someone who gathers objects not 
for their essences but for their value which has been extraneously 
established. The collectedness of Pentheus’s philosophy is a collectedness 
not so m uch of essences but of a front, of w hat we can look (appreciati­
vely) at, a collectedness which does not allow any room for establishing 
a relationship w ith w hat “is-not”, w ith “not-being”. It is the collectedness 
of the hum an herm etic closure (has not Pentheus spoken about “housing”
My theory... is that poetry should be 
a blending of fire and earth, should 
be made of solid and immediate things, 
of the earth earthy, which are set on 
fire by human passion.
— RJ to Una Kuster, December 21, 
1912
19 Ibidem, p. 14.
his emotions). In An Introduction to M etaphysics  Heidegger speaks of 107 
gathering in the context of appearing (Scheinen). In his definition
Appearing means first: that which gathers itself, which brings-itseli-to- 
-stand in its togetherness and so stands. But second it means: that which, 
already standing-there, presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance 
to be looked at.20
I t is distinctly the la tte r  type of collectedness th a t Pentheus speaks of 
in his philosophical discourse on the self-gatheredness of the hum an 
which is m anifest in the k ing’s incessant emphasis upon his kingship and 
national identity. Man, in his false collectedness, is a victim  to his own 
theorizing which presents him  as a self-supporting, self-sufficient being 
w ith  no need of connectedness w ith  Being. H um anity thrives upon fic­
tions, and the philosophy of hum anism  finds it u ltim ate critique in the 
a ttack  on the central notion of hum an dignity.
A lion has dignity,
So has a hawk; even a barnyard bull or common whipped 
horse has a kind of grace: but these 
Peeled apes teetering on their back legs,
Male and female,
Snickering with little shames, pleasure and wisecracks,
Or howling terror: and two billion of them  
As for that, no. And take notice, their minds are so ludicrous 
As their bodies and societies. Human dignity? How about 
it, Hake? (DA, 32)
I t  is understandable tha t a chief postulate of Je ffe rs’s philosophy would 
be to try  to find an opening in the closed shell of the false hum an 
collectedness. Thus, the Bacchantes rejoice:
O sisters, w e have found an opening,
We have hewn in the stone and mortar 
A wild strait gateway,
Slit eyes in the mask, sisters,
Entered the mountain. (DJ, 124)
Hence, hum anity  is seen as a “m ould” from  which Being has to break:
Humanity is the mould to break away from, the crust to break
through, the coal to break into fire, the atom to be split (SP, 149),
or a “doll” which is bu t another nam e for the mask m entioned in “The 
H um anist’s T ragedy”. A tu rn  from  man tow ards things, from  world 
tow ard earth, from  disserved “m ade” life tow ards Being in its en tirety  
becomes an im perative of Je ffe rs’s thought.
Turn outward, love things, not men, turn right away from humanity,
Let that doll lie. Consider if you like how the lilies grow,
Lean 0:1 the silent rock until you feel its divinity,
Make your veins cold, look at the silent stars, let your eyes 
Climb the great ladder out of the pit of yourself and men. (SP, 574)
A call outw ard so fundam entally  present in O restes’s philosophy in The  
T ow er Beyond Tragedy  is then a call tow ards a collectedness which 
is not hum an. To go outw ard, to be outw ard directed, is to leave the 
obsession w ith  the hum an, to “slit eyes in the m ask”.
We have builded us a little house on the sea-cliff 
here; it is just a year since w e came to live here in 
it. A delightful place w e think, cormorants on the 
sea-rocks in front of us, and pelicans drifting over­
head; a most graceful hill-range to the south across 
a neck of water; — it is a promontory, with water 
on three sides of us. The house and garage and 
walls are gray granite-sea-boulders, like the natural 
outcrop of the hill.
— RJ to L. Stookey, August 21, 1920
10. The Dark Glory
The act of “turn ing  outw ard” is steeped in cruelty  predicated by 
verbs like “hew ”, “slit” and “e n te r”. As Jeffers pu ts it, a “wild stra it 
gatew ay” is “hew n” “in the stone and m o rta r”. The call for the escape 
from  the false collectedness in which a hum an being is neutralized seems 
evident now, w hat rem ains is the question of the utensil. W hy “m orta r”, 
a tool associated both w ith culinary  and alchemical skills and also, 
through its homonym, w ith  stones and the a rt of building? The purpose 
of this instrum ent is to reveal w hat is hidden and, not an unim portant 
factor, to tu rn  something into a m ore easily assim ilable ingredient. 
By crashing a substance in a m ortar we m ake it reveal its concealed 
qualities as nourishm ent or its secret powers to combine w ith other 
substances to create a more pow erful m ix ture till it, u ltim ately, leads 
us to the lapis philosophorum. We m ay pu t some seeds of pepper in 
a m ortar to get a more distinct aroma; we m ay also subject some 
sulphur to the beating of a pestle to pulverize it, and then add to other 
substances and hence turn  it into a p a rt of the transform ational ope­
ration. In both cases we reveal, for culinary  or philosophical purposes, 
w hat has been previously hidden and unapproachable to others. The 
use of a m ortar is of a m ost prim eval character: a substance is con­
fronted w ith  the rough surfaces which w ear of layers of less essential 
m aterials to unconceal w hat has been long hidden. In terestingly  enough 
both these features — unconcealm ent of the essence and prim eval h a rd ­
ness of im plem ents — are evoked again in one of Je ffe rs’s most signifi­
cant poems. The last section of “Apology for Bad D ream s” opens w ith 
the same alchem ical-culinary overtone:
He brays humanity in a mortar to bring the savor
From the bruised root.. (SP, 176)
110 Here the allusion to the essence liberating acivity is even more sub­
stantial: in its resu lt the root, a hidden p a rt of a being norm ally not 
associated w ith  savour, lets its smell into the open. As we can see, to 
find the opening is necessarily a violent and rough operation, and although 
God claims tha t “contem plation w ill do i t” (DJ, 125), this contem plative 
seems to be less available to men. And even if it were, its effects would 
not be essentially different: w hether by simple hewing or tim e consu­
ming w earing out the objective is to produce a fissure in the shell, 
to “thin our hum an ity”.
The question to ask would be: w hat happens in the process of pro­
ducing an opening (either by hewing or thinning by m editation)? We 
have already said th a t in this w ay we are getting to the revelation of 
the essence whose “savor” is now let into the open. In the fourth  
section of “Apology for Bad D ream s” the spirit (the essence in both 
philosophical and alchemical sense) “flies out and stands naked” and 
is taken “in the naked ecstasy” (SP, 176). The liberation of sp irit comes 
as an effect of a long processing involving washing, calcination and 
deform ation. All these m easure are of a d istinctly  purifying nature; 
cleansening by w ater and fire is completed by an estrangem ent from  
a conventional form. To open the shell of hum anity  is to de-form  
it, i.e. not to see it as distorted but as de-nuded of its form  that man 
has prepared for himself. To de-form  then is, like to de-tract, a mode 
of taking away from  man w hat he him self has falsely added to his 
being, and w hat has been m istakenly considered since as the essence 
of hum anity. To de-form  signifies going beyond the routine m easures 
of perception, perceiving m ore than  we have ourselves allowed to perce­
ive, to see a rock, for example,
...as if I were
Seeing rock for the first time. As if I were seeing through the 
flam e-lit surface into the real and bodily 
And living rock. (SP, 605)
The final resu lt of the de-form ation — m an bared of his m an-created 
form  -— will necessarily be shown as participating  in a larger will to 
power, i.e. cosmic life, rather, than  a being which tried  to perpetuate 
his own willing and impose it upon the ex ternal reality . The experience 
of de-form ation is bound to be shocking as it inscribes man back to the 
area from  w here he has perm anently  attem pted  to alienate himself. 
The hum an bereft of its conventional form  is “horrib le to itself” (SP, 
176):
...the atom 
is broken, the power that massed it 
Cries to the power that moves the stars, “I have come home to 
m yself, behold me.
I bruised m yself in the flint mortar and burnt me
In the red shell, I tortured myself, I flew  forth,
Stood naked of m yself and broke me in fragments,
And here am I moving the stars that are me. (SP, 176)
The self-annihilating edge of this passage is unquestionable, bu t there 
is also, paradoxically, a strong sense of security  in these lines. By cra­
shing the form  of the hum an, by opening a fissure, m an revindicated 
his righ t to his own place. He not only comes home but, first of all, 
comes home to “him self”. This security  has nothing to do w ith  a trivial 
sense of at-hom eness w here the same routines of form  are prom ulgated. 
The security  in question has been made possible precisely by uprooting 
w hat has always been considered as the source of certainty: in tegrity , 
m an’s separateness and identity , protective sheltering of the home. The 
rhetoric again speaks w ith  violent verbs: “bru ise”, “bu rn ”, “to rtu re” . 
This could also function as a philosophical explanation of an insistent 
emphasis in Je ffe rs’s life placed on the necessity of building one’s own 
house ra th e r than living in a construction erected by somebody else. 
The homecoming of man can be effectuated only w hen m an’s reliability  
on civilization is reduced to the barest m inim um , and even m an-m ade 
constructions evolve tow ards natu ra l 
forms. The security  of my being is 
now no more a security  of a calculat­
ing th inking w ith which I approach 
the phenom ena and facts of existen­
ce, bu t it originates from  the security 
of Being which is, on the one hand, 
the power tha t “moves the s ta rs”, 
but it also resides in the skills of 
hands. I can achieve tru e  security  
only “suis m anibus” which stresses 
a t the same tim e independence of 
m an “bared of him self” and also 
experiential character of the relationship betw een man and Being. M an’s 
security  and certain ty  is founded upon the certain ty  of Being which 
is the essence of things.
If Je ffe rs  emphasizes the instrum entality  and handiness which seem 
to characterize the w ay tow ards security, he does it in opposition to the 
overrating inteliectualisation and rationalization which are compromised 
as stem m ing from  their very  antitheses.
The fire threw up figures 
And symbols meanwhile, racial myths formed and dissolved in 
it, the phantom rulers of humanity 
That without being are yet more real than what they are born of, 
and without shape, shape that which makes them... (SP, 153)
„Pro Christi et ecclesia” reminds 
m e of the Latin w e had just cut in 
marble to set in the parapet of the 
granite tower I’m building here •— 
RJ suis manibus m e turrem fal- 
conis fecit ■— w e call it the Hawk’s 
Tower for the sake of a sparrow- 
-hawk that has used to perch daily 
on my scaffolding, so w e have 
hawk-gargoyles and a key-stone 
with a hawk carved on it.
— RJ to G. Stirling, 1924
112 Je ffe rs’s postulate of finding the opening compromises the history of m an’s 
rationalism  as of the “phantom ” character, the m aster scheme to plot 
against uncertain ty  and superstition tu rn s out to be bred by the darkest 
forces of “racial m yths”. W hat Jeffers dem onstrates in his philosophy 
of m an is tha t unless m an “tu rns ou tw ard” tow ards the security of 
things, he will rem ain subject to a double ontological uncertain ty . On 
the one hand, m an is the m aker of history, of things which are, bu t 
a t the same tim e all the history  m aking is upheld by “phantom s”. If 
history is real, it is so to the ex ten t to which it is recognized as 
a figm ent of imagination. Thus Jeffers would agree w ith Heidegger 
in emphasizing the unknown as the driving force of becoming and in 
radically reducing, and eventually  compromising, the belief that man 
has m astered the reality.
There is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that 
comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered 
insecure. What is, is never of our making or even merely the product of 
our minds, as it might all too easy seem.1
Jeffers claims tha t even things which are of “our m aking” (states, chur­
ches, heroes) have not been m astered by man, bu t are subject to the 
phantom  ru le of shadows. History is unquestionable as dynasties can be 
traced back to tim es imm em orial and gods have died thousands of de­
aths, bu t it is precisely this purely  factual existence of historical facts 
which we grasp w ith  our calculating th inking tha t betrays its lack 
of any relationship w ith  the sphere of Being. The logic of W estern 
h istory is directed tow ards the oblivion of w hat IS, and hence towards 
the dom ination of the hum an history over the only history  tha t reveals 
the power of Being — the history of things, geological form ations, the 
history  of earth. Jeffers can hold tha t the forms of W estern history  are 
real although, a t the same time, w ithout Being; W estern h istory is 
a ghost of history, forgetful about its own mechanisms.
The nerves and the flesh go by shadowlike, the limbs and the lives 
shadowlike, these shadows remain, these shadows 
To whom temples, to whom churches, to whom labors ar.d wars, 
visions and dreams are dedicated:
Out of the fire in the small round stone that black moss covered, 
a crucified man writhed up in anguish... (SP, 153)
The fire of Being reveals “racial”, i.e. particu lar, scattered m yths in 
their claim  to a general validity. Like in Plato, man is locked in a cave 
(“the hum an b ra in -vau lt”, SP, 177) and doomed to life among shadows, 
bu t unlike in P lato and like in Nietzsche, m an is cut off from  the 
sphere of the u ltim ate values which throughout the hum an history 
have been considered as form ative and decisive and which are now
dem onstrated to be a form  of rhetoric. Hence, God in Je ffe rs’s vision 
is first of all man made (“a crucified m an”) and, consequently, has to 
give up his claim to universality. God belongs now to the periphery  
of Being.
And nobody sees good or evil but out of a brain a hundred cen­
turies quieted, some desert 
Prophet’s, a man humped like a camel, gone mad between the 
mud-walled village and the mountain sepulchres. (SP, 202)
If the suprasensory world tu rn s  out to be a product of “phantom s”, it 
inevitably loses its pow er to bestow life and becomes unreal despite the 
m ateria lity  and reality  of all the evidences to the contrary  (churches, 
cults, etc.).
That which formerly conditioned and determined the essence of man in the 
manner of purpose and norm has lost its unconditional and immediate, above 
all its ubiquituously and infallibly operative power of effective action. The 
suprasensory world of purposes and norms no longer quickens and supports 
life. That world has itself become lifeless, dead... The suprasensory ground... 
has become unreal.2
H um anity, in its closure w ithin cerebral phantasm s, produces various 
versions of death disguised as life which, on the one hand, prevents 
m an from  grasping the phenomenon of death and its  significance for 
existence and, on the other hand, seals him  in a shell of unreality .
If this is the case then we are beginning to see more clearly w hy 
the opening was so im portant for Je ffe rs’s ontology: it is only through 
frac tu ring  “the hum an v au lt” tha t m an can come to the knowledge 
of w hat IS. We have already observed tha t Je ffe rs’s therapy  is based 
on a simple instruction — “tu rn  ou tw ard”. The move is tow ards things 
which are given ontological p riority  over man. A Poem  speaks of
The inhuman nobility of things, the ecstatic beauty, the inveter­
ate steadfastness. (SP, 595)
The nobility of things reaches beyond the scope of life and anim ate 
nature:
Nobler than man or bear my sea-mountains 
Pillar the cloud-sky... (DA, 140)
In o ther words, while life is characterized by the intense power to 
regenerate, persevere and enhance which is nothing else but Je ffe rs’s 
rendition of the Nietzschean “will to pow er”, the perfection of Being does 
not need life as its m anifestation. Je ffe rs’s philosophy goes beyong the 
grounds of Lebensphilosophie  and evolves towards Seinsphilosophie.
8 T h e  D a r k  G l o r y
It is not likely they can destroy all life: the planet is 
capacious. Life would surely grow up again 
From grubs in the soil, or the newt and toad level, and be 
beautiful again. (DA, 148)
N evertheless the vision is completed by a fu rth e r move beyond Leben  
tow ards Sein
But if life  even
Had perished utterly, Oh perfect loveliness of earth and heaven. (SP, 596)
W hy are na tu ra l objects, which Jeffers calls “th ings”, constantly  called 
upon in the philosophical context? F irst of all because they  betray  
the weakness of hum an will and dem onstrate its narrow  range and 
destructive bend (“The will is the co rrup ter”, DA, 34). Second, things 
exist in m utual relatedness which gives in effect the phenomenon which 
we described in this essay as earth  and the secret of which lies in the 
m utual m irroring.
This mirroring does not portray a likeness. The mirroring, lighten­
ing each of the four [earth, sky divinities, mortals], appropriates 
their own presencing into simple belonging to one another.3
In “C ontinent’s End” this is given a nuptial m etaphor:
At the equinox when the earth was veiled in a late rain, wreathed 
with wet poppies, waiting spring,
The ocean swelled for a far storm and beat its boundary, the 
ground-swell shook the beds of granite. (SP, 87)
The solid ground is w reathed w ith  w ater in the accom paniam ent of the 
tu rbu len t air which announces a storm, while the ocean thickens its 
accum ulated power. But there  is no change of power which would
rem ain unrelated  to o ther elem ents. Not only does the force reverbera te
in the a ir in its preparedness for the storm, but also it hides under­
ground shaking the very  foundations of things. No sooner can we appre­
ciate a landscape than we realize the continuity  of its production which 
is never finished. Earth  is always in the offing, it is “beds of gran ite” 
swollen w ith  violent power and “w aiting spring” .
Thus, in keeping w ith  the m atrim onial m etaphor, Jeffers can refer 
to the ocean as to the “m other”. He adm its th a t life is “her child” but, 
at the same time, he recognizes the fact th a t there is something tha t 
outgrows it, something “older and harder than  life”. We can link this 
m ysterious “som ething” w ith  Je ffe rs’s steady belief th a t “even if life 
perished u tte r ly ” earth  and heaven would reta in  their perfect “love­
liness”. This “loveliness” seems to be conditioned by “som ething” that 
is “older than life”. In “Continent’s End” Jeffers points out that
Before there was any water there were tides of fire, both our 
tones flow from the older fountain. (SP, 88)
A clearly H eraclitean overtone which positions fire  as the arche of being 115 
here doubles the power of the m etaphor: if earth  is incessant production 
then, necessarily, it also had to be somehow “produced”. It is this looking 
out for som ething from  which earth  “stands-out” th a t constitutes its 
characteristic features. W hile m an is deprived of any contact w ith  the 
“older fountain”, things still preserve it. The pow er of the thing is to 
rem ind man of the denaturedness which results from  the forgetfulness 
of Being. It is clear th a t Jeffers can now justifiedly  describe m an’s 
tim e as the tim e of the “inquisitive anim als’s am usem ents” (SP, 265), 
while the tim e of the thing is qualified as tha t of the “grave, earnest” 
being. The call of the “older fountain” reverberates among the toys and 
am usem ents and brings m an to the edge of attentiveness and earnestness. 
Third, the concept of the th ing and the careful attention which things 
dem and from  m an is associated w ith  the notion of peace. To begin with, 
the peace in question is d ifferent from  the hum an peace and also cannot 
be autom atically  associated w ith stability  and immobility. Jeffers flatly  
states th a t the grave and earnest thing is “not passive” (SP, 606). 
Juxtaposing the hum an and pre-hum an peace he will w rite  in “Hooded 
N ight” previously bringing to our attention the dychotom y of the hum an 
and geo-onto-logical time:
I see the heavy granite bodies of the rocks of the headland,
That were ancient before Egypt had pyramids,
Bulk on the gray of the sky, and beyond them the jets of young 
trees
I planted the year of the Versailles peace.
But here is the final, unridiculous peace. (SP, 265)
The peace in which things reveal their character is not a passive repose 
but an active support. It is out of the thingly peace of a rock th a t 
a m ountain stands out, and a stubborn persistence of the thing makes 
it unm easurable in term s of hum an time.
...the energies
That are its atoms w ill still be bearing the whole mountain 
above: packed 
and I, many centuries ago,
Felt its intense reality with love and wonder, this lonely rock. (SP, 606)
The sem antic am biguity of the verb to “bear” which signifies both 
the act of supporting and giving b irth  is particu larly  illum inating in our 
discussion. The thing in peace bears, i.e. supports and gives b irth . Thus 
Jeffers can say in an early  poem th a t by collecting rocks he is
...heaping the bones of the old mother 
To build us a hold against the host of the air. (SP, 82)
The power of the things is be­
yond comparison not because it 
defies being set against man made 
technologies, bu t because Being 
(“dark peace”) does not tolerate 
comparing. The thing, a sea for 
instance, which is revealed in its 
thingly character can be described 
only by a tautological reference.
The sleeping power of the ocean, no more beastlike than manlike,
Not to be compared; itself and itself. (SP, 265)
The thing unconcealed as “itself and itse lf” is more than  a m ere tau to ­
logy. It is not ju st “itse lf” bu t “itself and itse lf” which signals the re­
petition of the Same, a recu rren t m ovem ent of incessant self-reference.
This existence, which, while moving, must always move in the same way, 
returning to the same starting point, is circularly determined because it 
draws its m otive force not from some transcendent scheme for life, but from 
out its own proper willing, which is always the same.4
The power of the sea, i.e. the force of the thing revealed in peace, 
is not to be compared as it is engulfed in darkness which brings every­
thing into im m ediate nearness. In the darkness w hen “all the lights 
of the shore have died”, “no stars dance in heaven”, and “no ship’s 
light glances” the th ing “moves in the d a rk ” (SP, 265). As we have said 
before Jeffers is m ore a Seins- than Lebensphilosoph; it m eans tha t 
he believes in the un in te rrup ted  production and self-production of forms 
thus stopping short the postulate of the static Same w here all things 
would be harm oniously united. His definition of the thing as the “dark 
peace” gets as close a t it is possible on the ground of Je ffe rs’s thought 
to the area of the Same. This sphere, however, is not only far from  
eternal statis  bu t ju st the opposite it implies a constant self-production, 
self-creation of the thing which has to detach itself from  its own form  
to rem ain itself. Things repeatedly  create them selves, and are not the 
effects of a singular fiat, I t is only natu ra l than  tim e m atters differently  
in this kind of thinking since, as Heidegger claims in his comments upon 
Nietzsche:
For this thinking, history is not the succession of eras, but 
a unique nearness of the Same...5
The thing is “itself and itse lf” as it is lonely in peace and darkness, 
and yet precisely because of this belonging it is accompanied by other 
things. The rock in “Oh, Lovely Rock” is referred  to as “lonely”, bu t
My life was badly shaken last year 
by my dear w ife’s death — I haven’t 
been able to w rite a line of verse since 
then (if it matters!) — and the only 
way to become normal again w ill be 
to stay at home as quietly as possible 
and feel the hills and the sea.
— RJ to K. Schapiro, April 1951
4 T. Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger..., p. 188.
5 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning..., p. 57.
still it extends tow ards the m ountain it supports. In its loneliness it 
bears the m ountain which, in turn , in its loneliness is gathered in a chain 
of m ountains to form  a range. It is this aw kw ard loneliness (itself) 
pervaded w ith a strong sense of belonging tha t is described by Jeffers 
as “itself and itse lf”. To use the Nietzschean term inology we could 
say tha t the thing is the domain of ewige W iederkunft des Gleichens.
The thing resides in the Same w here all o ther entities reside but, 
since they cannot be seen in the dark, they  can only be in tu ited , “fe lt”, 
and through this in tu ited  partnersh ip  the th ing confirms itself. It is 
“itself” (as a separate thing) and one more “itse lf” as reflected in and by 
o ther entities from  which it is d ifferent bu t which it supports. This 
version of the Same seems to be only a more m etaphysical reading 
of Je ffe rs’s “older fountain” of a m ysterious “som ething” which is “older 
than  life” .
It [the Same] holds sway in the primal relatings of Being and what is,
and of Being and man. Thus, the Same is that very difference, that sepa­
rating between (Unter-schied.), out of which Being and what is endure as
present in their differentiating, which is an indissoluble relating.6
The point would be to en ter back “the prim al re la ting’” which in the 
poetic diction of Jeffers would produce a postulate to be “born out of 
the rock and the air, not of a w om an” (SP, 574). The fundam ental step, 
however, involves the act of “breaking prison of yourself” (DJ, 125) 
but the task is far from  simple. For the Bacchantes a crack in the hum an 
shell let madness in, bu t in this context the opening is certain ly  a reve­
lation, bu t it does not have any healing qualities. For someone who, 
like Pentheus of the Inhum anist, assumes the  stance of a detached
observer, it is a diagnostic procedure bereft of any curatory  power. 
In the face of the opening, m an becomes aw are of his fragm ented
personality:
No man has ever known himself nor sur­
passed him self until he has killed 
Half of himself. (DA, 103)
The story of king Pentheus is of double im portance here. F irst, because 
in th is narra tive  of one’s m other’s m adness reason is left orphaned and 
for ever m otherless. Second, because it brings us in this w ay back to 
the motive of the “older fountain” which has to be found in order to 
replace the hum an m other. Man has to be born out of the rock, not 
out of the woman. This is precisely w hat paralyzes P entheus who from  
a hiding w atches the ravings of the Dionyssian priestesses led by his 
m other:
6 Ibidem, p. 57.
118 His own mother Agave singing. Endure a little. If one
could understand their fountain 
of mandness. Her shame tomorrow: not punishment
enough: prison in the house. “O sisters, w e have found 
an opening.”
What opening? (DJ, 124)
Pen theus’s endurance keeps him  hopelessly locked in his sta tus of 
“a hum an being, a king and a G reek”. He w ants to bear w ith  pain not 
to be reconciled w ith it, bu t to break it and reinscribe w hat he calls 
“m adness” in the realm  of lim iting reason. He speaks of “punishm ent” 
and “sham e”, while the Bacchantes claim  to have found the “opening” 
he w ants to exercise his power to detain them  in a prison-house. The 
priestesses do not look beyond the p resent moment, the king cannot 
speak of his power in categories o ther than  perpetuation and enhance­
m ent: the hum an “tom orrow ” is of a m anifestly  repressive na tu re  w ith 
regard  to the God’s “now ”.
But the m adness which breaks open the hum an collectedness (“How 
should one caught in the stone of his own person dare tell/the  people 
anything b u t relative to th a t?”, SP, 202) does not seem to be a legitim ate 
countersuggestion to P en theus’s reason. It lets the light into the “prison 
of yourself” but, contrary  to God’s promise, it does not allow us to 
“en ter the na tu re  of th ings”. W hen pu t into practice, m adness turns 
out to be no more than  another version of blind repressionism . Agave, 
inspired by the light of the opening, will kill her own son not in the 
act of A braham ’s sacrificial resignation, bu t in the ignorant myopia 
of superstition.
She leading eagerly,
Full of the courage that the God had taught them, rushed 
on her son not kpown, and the others raging 
Joined her... (DJ, 125)
Thus, instead of leading to the real, essential endurance, the opening 
is no more than a parody of w hat it was to replace; madness repeats 
the faults of reason and false hum an collectedness is restored by w hat 
prom ised to overthrow  it. God is a deceiver and ensnares m an in the 
ne t of his theological propaganda: a prom ised experience of enlighten­
m ent finishes in a scene of slaughter com m itted by a crowd in the name 
of false courage m otivated by God (“the courage th a t God has taught 
them ”). The end of “The H um anist’s T ragedy” tu rns into a critique of 
politics well known from  other tex ts of Jeffers:
Wagging their hoary heads, glaring through 
their bright spectacles,
The old gentlemen shout for war, w hile youth,
Amazed, unwilling, submissive, watches them. This is not 
normal
But really ominous. (DA. 155)
The opening of the Bacchantes is one of the pseudodoctrines advanced 
tow ards mass illusion and deception. It leaves m an betrayed both by 
reason and madness. As the Inhum anist pu ts it succinctly
...that’s
the condition of being human: to betray reason 
And deny instinct. (DA, 98)
Nevertheless, th a t does not invalidate the problem atic of the opening. 
The followers of Dionyssios declared 
To-day in the forest
We are fire and have found an opening. (DJ, 124) '
This quotation links the opening w ith  the im agery of light: we are 
brought into the open once we become fire. In “Roan S tallion” hum anity  
is referred  to as “the atom  to be 
sp lit” and “the coal to break into 
f ire” (SP, 149). It becomes clearer 
now th a t the true  opening, if pos­
sible a t all, would have to be such 
a breaking of the “hum an m ould” 
which first — releases fierce energy 
and, second, transform s us into fire, 
i.e. relates us again to the arche 
of the H eraclitean allusions in such 
Jeffe rs’s phrases as “tides of fire” or “the older fountain”. Let us define 
the opening as a place w here the hum an form  is cracked (man is de-for- 
med), the fire of the “older fountain” revealed, and the th ingly natu re  
of m an announced. In other words, the opening not only lets the light 
in, bu t also allows it to radiate out. The opening is then a certain shining.
Like Heidegger, Je ffe rs  can say th a t “the Open brings beings to 
shine and ring ou t”7 and th a t “the being comes into steadiness of its 
shining8 and this constitutes the pow er th a t Jeffers h in ted  at in his 
images of atom  splitting. The thing unconcealed in its shining is the 
source of unim aginable energy which is the pow er of Being. California’s 
rendition of the Im m aculate Conception makes it explicitly evident:
...only the shining and the power. The power, the terror, 
the burning fire covered her over...
...She was so good and lovely, she
was the mother of the little Jesus. (SP, 148)
Sim ilarly, M ary in Dear Judas speaks of her son as of “the shining th a t 
came forth  from  betw een m y th ighs” (DJ, 12), and a m ysterious God 
of ecstasy in “The H um anist’s T ragedy” has “the shining head and the 
blond shoulders” (DJ, 125).
We had a decent rain this month 
and warm spring weather, so that 
the country is ablaze with flowers 
and green grass and very fragrant. 
I wish you were here. We hope 
eagerly to see you. Yours always, 
Robinson Jeffers.
— RJ to A. Ficke, April 19, 1930
7 M. Heidegger, Poetry..., p. 72.
8 Ibidem, p. 36.
120 Yet there is more to shining than glow and glimmer. Sometimes it is 
precisely this in terp reta tion  of shining th a t tu rns it into a false glow, 
sickly and seductive ligh t of the city. In “The Purse-Seine” lum inosity is 
th a t of a deadly glamour:
Lately I was looking from a night mountain-top 
On a wide city, the colored splendor, galaxies of light: how 
could I help but recall the seine-net 
Gathering the luminous fish? (SP, 588)
No wonder then tha t when Jesus is lured into the trap  of the city which 
“shines by itself in the m orning clearness” (DJ, 14) Judas penetrates 
through the veil of luminosity:
I dread the shining like the shining of 
paradise. (DJ, 14)
Although shining m ust inevitably be associated w ith light, it is far from  
being m ere lum inosity. It is the “dark glory” (SP, 265) described fu rther 
in an early  poem “N ight” :
Over the dark mountain, over the dark pinewood,
Down the long dark valley along the shrunken river,
Returns the splendor without rays, the shining of shadow,
Peace-bringer, the matrix of all shining and quieter of shining.
The son-lovers have a blond favorite,
A father of lights and noises, wars, weeping and laughter,
Hot labor, lust and delight and the other blemishes. Quietness 
Flows from her deeper fountain; and he w ill die; and she is 
immortal. (SP, 158)
The tex t deals w ith two kinds of shining: one which is m easured by 
light, and the o ther which is its source and defies being qualified as 
m ere iridiscence. This essential shining, the shining of the essence of 
things, is referred  to as “the m atrix  of all shining” and the “deeper 
fountain” . The division is m atched by the gender qualifications: 
if a traditional set of male roles involved providing for the fam ily and 
surrounding it w ith  sheltering w alls of a building, then a “wide c ity”, 
a synonim  of civilization as a place of dispatching goods would definitely 
be a male domain. The shining of the city  and the glam our of civili­
zation will be, as Jeffers puts it in W om en at Point Sur, “outlived” 
(WPS, 10) by the fem ale shining sedim ented in “quietness” .
If hum anity  is a m ould from  which we should break away then the 
true  shining, “the shining of shadow”, the “dark glory”, reveals the 
realm  w here the reality  of our existence takes its origin. The false 
“mould is crashed and rem oved to be replaced by the original m int 
which gives b irth  to a new  man. The sem antics of the noun “m atrix ” 
harm oniously emphasizes both aspects: a m atrix  is a m ould “into which 
hot m etal in a soft or liquid condition is poured” (OED), bu t in the
very word we can also hear the sound of “m ater”, the “quietness of the 121 
womb and the egg, the prim al and the la tte r  silences” (SP, 159). Shining 
is the first contour of being as it emerges from  the opening, as it leaves 
the mould, as it is born from  betw een the thighs of the woman.
W hat tu rns shining into the “dark pow er” is its constant retrogres­
sive force of reaching back tow ards the “older fountain” which also 
makes shining a poetic description of the m inim um  pow er of difference 
w ith which the Same can be revealed to m an through its eternal recu r­
rence. The shining in question in th a t of a “shadow ”, i.e. it signals 
other, invisible presences which are m ore original and which the shadow 
is a repetition of. Thus, shining m ust necessary reject m an-m ade models 
of being as useless and responsible for the denaturedess of man.
While men moulding themselves to the anthill have choked
Their natures until their souls die in them;
They have sold themselves for toys and protection... (SP, 259)
Inevitably, shining m ust bring about a change of moulds, as it is the
aw areness of the th ingly natu re  of man.
It is only to form in stone the mould of some ideal humanity 
that might be worthy to be
Under that lightning. (SP, 193)
If shining is the reem ergence of the forgotten residue of the prehum an 
in m an it is no t surprising th a t it is the earth , not the man, th a t shines.
M an’s involvem ent in glam our is reduced to a false glim m er of the m ind 
like N atalia’s who, in the estim ate of her husband, is “high-bred, shining 
w ith mind, m y ideal queen” (WPS, 125). “Men don’t shine, God does”
(BAS, 27) is Je ffe rs’s succinct form ula.
All the three notions (shining, God, and earth) have already been put 
in conjunction by early  Greek philosophy which looked at earth  as 
a god b u t referred  to it as Hestia (hearth). Hence in a passage from  
A natolius (3rd century  A. D.) we read;
Pythagoreans said that at the centre of the four elements there lies a fiery 
monadic cube... they say that the unitary substance is situated in the middle 
like a hearth and maintains the same position on account of its even balance. 
Euripides, too, like the disciple of Anaxagoras which he had become, 
refers to the earth in these terms; ‘Wise mortals deem thee hearth’.9
The power of shining is only peripherally  available to words. Jeffers 
transform s the “prim al silences” of his early  poem in the silence of death 
which “is no evil” (SP, 160), and in W om en at Point Sur  the silence of 
the tongue is m ade synonymous w ith  the dark shining of the thing.
In XII chapter which significantly introduces some confusion as to
9 In W. К. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy,  vol. 1, (Cambridge, 1967), 
pp. 292—293.
1 2 2  w eather the tex t speaks of the noum enal experience of the Reverend 
B arclay or the scrip tural sensation of the w rite  who, in his power 
of a m inor demiurg, calls “glass puppets” and m ake them  vocal we read:
But my tongue is stone how could I speak of him? My blood 
in my veins is seawater how could it catch fire?
The rock shining dark rays and the rounded
Crystal the ocean his beam of blackness and silence
Edged with azure, bordered with voices;
There is nothing but shines though it shine darkness. (WPS, 72)
To recapitulate: shining is the coming to the Open of the essence which 
is not sim ply revealed once and for all bu t preserves its secrets in the 
repetitive process of self-form ation and coming to stand. That is why 
shining is qualified as “dark ”, or as the “shining of shadow” : it makes 
beings visible (like a child which “shines” from  betw een its m other’s 
thighs) but, a t the same time, it is grounding them  in the secret presences 
of the “m atrix ” or “older fountain”.
These aspects of shining bring us close to Heidegger’s analysis of 
appearing in his Introduction to Metaphysics.  The philosopher develops 
there  a convincing theory of a double m eaning of appearing (Scheinen) 
which runs parallel to Je ffe rs’s division of shining into the glim mer 
of culture (“the dragging whirlpools of London, the screaming haste 
of New Y ork”, SP, 613) and the “dark glory” of Being. Toward the end 
of his tex t Heidegger form ulates a principal difference between two 
kinds of appearing:
...appearing in the first and authentic sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in 
togetherness involves space, which it first conquers; as it stands there, it 
creates space for itself... Appearing in the second sense emerges frorn an 
already finished space; it is situated in the rigid measures of this space, 
and we see it by looking toward it. The vision makes the thing. Now the 
vision becomes decisive, instead of the thing itself.10
Shining is far from  being a pureiy  visual phenomenon; on the contrary, 
its visual substance is created by the pow er to discover w hat has not 
been seen before. Jeffers renders this pow er by speaking of inspecting 
a rock and seeing it “as if for the first tim e” (SP, 605). As Heidegger’s 
rhetoric is steeped in violence, and the force of shining does not m ildly 
inscribe itself in the ready made space but “w renches” it from  w hat 
has not been before (“the older foun ta in”), “conquers” and appropriates 
it and, hence necessarily stays in a close relationship w ith  it, so Je ffe rs’s 
descriptions of na tu ra l phenom ena (things) also expose their violent 
character:
Cataracts of rock 
Rain down the mountain from cliff to cliff and torment the 
stream-bed... the laurels are wounded,
Redwoods go down with their earth and lie  thwart the gorge.
I hear the torrent boulders battering each other... (SP, 609)
In both Heidegger and Jeffe rs  shining/appearing is a m atte r of ultim ate 
violence, of breaking the “rigid m easures of this space” for the philo­
sopher, and of breaking the “hum an m ould” for the poet. The dom estica­
ted lustre  of the m ind of which Jeffers speaks in The W om en at Point 
S u r  m ust be questioned in the nam e of the wild, incom prehensible and 
always dangerous shining of Being through the opening of the thing. 
This also implies tha t we m ust constantly probe into things viewing 
them  as m ore than a m ere stage in the hum an cognition.
Is science... nothing but a fabrication of man that has been elevated to this 
dominance in such a way so as to allow us to assume that one day it can 
also be demolished again by the w ill of man? Or does a greater destiny 
rule here? Is there, ruling in science, still something other than a mere 
wanting to know on the part of man? Thus it is, in fact, Something other 
reigns.11
“Som ething other reigns”. Since, despite his immense veneration for 
poetry, Heidegger claims th a t the source speaks in the speechless voice, 
since, a fter Jeffers, our tongue tu rn s to stone in the face of th is “some­
th ing  o th er”, th is force will have to rem ain nameless. W hat is to be done 
is to approxim ate this “som ething” through various concepts one of which 
is a concept of God.
In a rare  m om ent of sanity Reverend Barclay experiences, “in the 
solid da rk ”, a dark  n ight of his soul in which he learns th a t
There is one power, you may call it God to the vulgar,
Exists from eternity into eternity, all the protean phenomena, 
all forms, all faces of things,
And all the negligible lightnings of consciousness, 
are made of that power... (WSP, 100)
Shining is the only nam e we can give to the pow er which “exists from  
e te rn ity  into e te rn ity ” “outside communication, no t touchable” (WPS, 
100), the power which is “older than life” and which rem ains concealed 
(“This o ther conceals itself from  us...” continues Heidegger in his ana­
lysis). No wonder, then, tha t it  is thought of less in term s of light which 
is a characteristic m etaphor of the hum an rational thinking but, rather, 
in term s of w hat rem ains hidden to the light, i.e. in term s of darkness. 
Heidegger encounters this problem  in his essay on “The Age of the 
W orld P ic tu re” :
1 2 4  Everyday opinion sees in the shadow only the lack of light, if not light’s
complete denial. In truth, however, the shadow is a manifest, though impene­
trable, testimony to the concealed emitting of light. In keeping with this 
concept of shadow, w e experience the incalculable as that which, withdrawn 
from representation, is nevertheless manifest in whatever is, pointing to 
Being, which remains concealed.12
This quotation helps us to understand Jeffe rs’s phrases which propound 
the theory of “dark glory” and “the shining of shadow ”. The shadow 
shines because, by refering to Being, it allows us to see the opening and 
brings us to its light; nevertheless it sim ultaneously rem ains a shadow 
because it can only point at, and never name, Being. The shadow is not 
an opposition of light bu t only its m odality. Only through the shadow, 
through appearance (i.e. contours, shapes, figures) can the “tides of fire  
of the older fountain” m ake them selves m anifest.
Gaston Bachelard can justly  quote Auguste Rodin in his apotheosis 
of fire
Toute chose n’est que la lim ite de la flamme à laquelle elle 
doit son existence.13
Thus, the n ight is not a sheer effacem ent, but just the opposite —• it 
brings beings to their proper form  by de-form ing them , by surrounding 
them  w ith  shadow. Of this night which is a m odality of shining we can 
say w hat A ndre M alraux said about Georges La Tour’s a r t  of light 
w hich does not separate bu t links and relates:
La lumière des caravagesque tend d’abord à séparer leur per­
sonnages de obscurité; mais ce n’est pas l ’obscurité que peint 
Latour: c’est la nuit. La nuit étendue sur la terre, la forme 
séculaire du mystère pacifie.14
The sense of the silenced m ystery  which defines night in reference 
to light corresponds to fire and the role it played for the Greek philo­
sophers.
In an tiqu ity  the foundation of f ire ’s luminiscence was looked for 
in a dark  pow er hidden in its center. For the Pythagoreans fire is sepa­
rated  from  shining which constitutes an additional elem ent of fire ’s 
“dark glory” deposited in it by the air. Hence, Pythagoras claimed tha t 
fire (pyr)  is
...a dark heat-stuff, w hile the shining is due to the air set 
in the vehement vibrations by the heat of the dark p y r ,15
12 Ibidem, p. 154.
13 G. Bachelard, La p sych an a lyse  du feu  (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 94.
14 A. Malraux, L es v o ix  du silence  (Paris, 1951), p. 388.
15 F.M. Cleve, The G ian ts of P resocra tic  G reek  P hilosophy  vol. 1, (the Hague: 
Martinus Nijhof, 1973), p. 39.
Shining is a m anifestation, an appearing of fire whose power resides 125 
in darkness. There is no shining w ithout darkness from  which lum inis­
cence could grow. The Greek philosophy m eant by fire “something not 
only hot, bu t also shining”16, and from  this point only a short and 
logical step needs to be taken to state tha t for H eraclitus — the philo­
sopher in whose thought fire acquires a particu larly  strong articulation 
— fire is not restricted  to flam es but becomes p y r  aeizoon — the body 
of Logos.
Pyr aeizoon •— the primordial and ultimate power that is 
neither shining in the glow, haptomenon, nor extinguished  
in coldness, but life-warm, invisible ether.17
As if in the wake of H eraclitus in Je ffe rs’s “N ight” the seascape is follo­
wed by a com m entary:
O passionately at peace when will that tide draw shoreward?
Truly the spouting fountains of light, Antares, Arcturus,
Tire of their flow, they sing one song but they think silence.
The striding winter giant Orion shines, and dreams darkness.
And life, the flicker of men and moths and the wolf on the hill,
Though furious for continuance, passionately feeding, passionately 
Remaking itself upon its mates, remembers deep inward 
The calm monther, the quietness of the womb and the egg,
The primal and the latter silences... (SP, 159)
There are two varieties of fire in this passage. F irst is a cosmic fire
of stars (Antares, A rcturus, Orion) accompanied in an earlier fragm ent
by the “lam p in my tow er” and “fretfu lness of cities”. The other fire, 
far from  the ostentatiousness of the form er which was the “fountains 
of ligh t”, is bu t a “flicker”, it flashes and dies. The cosmic fire is parallel 
to H eraclitus’s p y r  haptomenon  which referred  to the glowing of stars 
and earth ly  fires. Both stars and hum an fire, however, lcok back to­
w ards another flame, another splendour represented by the ocean, the 
“deep, dark-shining Pacific”. Not only is shadow central in this fire, 
bu t it is accompanied by another in teresting feature. The tex t instructs 
us tha t the ocean “leans on the land feeling his cold streng th  to the 
utm ost m argins” (SP, 159). This shining is not only “d ark ”, bu t it is 
also “cold”, and in this paradoxical composition it gets even closer to 
the natu re  of p yr  aeizoon, the H eraclitean nam e for Logos. One of the 
possible tiansform ations of fire in H eraclitus’s philosophy was pyr  
aposbennymenon  — the celestial e ther “in the process of changing into 
its  fu rther dark  and cold transform ations: the air, the ocean, and the 
e a rth ”18.
16 Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 39.
17 Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 44.
18 Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 45.
1 26  As M artin Heidegger dem onstrates in his analyses of presocratic 
philosophers this paradoxical na tu re  of celestial e ther links it w ith  
thinking itself. According to Heidegger,
To think is surely a peculiar affair. The word of thinkers has no authority. 
The word of thinkers knows no authors, in the sense of writers... it is 
without charm... Just the same, thinking changes the world. It changes 
it in the ever darker depth of a riddle, depths which as they grow darker 
offer promise of a greater brightness.19
Thus in terp re ted  fire ceases to be sim ply an elem ent which acquires, 
the dom inating position over competing elem ents, bu t it is a m etaphorical 
nam ing of the power which precedens and foregrounds all the elements. 
Fire preserves the abiiity to hide and reveal, it insists on the precision 
of contour and necessary erasure of all contours. Fire is the way in 
which voiceless determ ination of language can co m e 'to  pass. It is the 
“unlim ited (apeiron) which is both principle (arche) and elem ent (sto- 
icheion) of the things tha t ex ist”, as Simplicius puts it in the first known 
fragm ent of Greek philosophy20.
B ut the center of fire understood as arche, natu re  and essence of 
Being, is also cold. The coldness is not only a physical quality, bu t also 
a description of m an’s overcoming psychological dichotomies on behalf 
of ontological authenticity . Cold is not only the center, but, first of all, 
it is a hidden center. Jeffers refers to it as the concealed in terior of fire 
(“purgatory  fires w ere hot although they  alw ays had a heart something 
like ice”, SP, 72), the “w hite of f ire” (SP, 139), a residue of essence m ore 
in ternal than  the soul itself (“That ice w it in the soul”, SP, 75), the 
power tha t strips things of their everyday usefulness and brings to the 
open their ontological sta tus (“The ice core of th ings”, SP, 49).
N ature is hidden and needs to be unconcealed. “N ature is fond of hiding 
itse lf”, this thought taken from  H eraclitus’s code is also an apt descrip­
tion of Je ffe rs’s ontology provided we assume, afte r Cleve, th a t nature  
in this fragm ent m eans “true  essence”, also “the stuff a thing is made 
of, therefore here: Logos and P y r  Aeizoon”21. Cold, the w hite of fire, 
is then the essence which is unconcealed, bu t by the very  fact of being 
lit and brought to the open it becomes hidden again.
In Je ffe rs’s w ritings cold and ice are  in conjunction w ith peace 
which overcomes dichotomies and regresses tow ards the prim al relating.
19 M. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, trans. D. Krell and F. Capuzzi (New  
York: Harper, 1975), p. 78.
20 In J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers vol. 1, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 29.
21 F. M. Cleve, The Giants..., vol. 1, p. 97.
Peace now, though purgatory fires were hot 
They always had a heart something like ice 
That coldly peered and wondered, suffering not 
Nor pleased in any park, nor paradise 
Of slightly swelling breasts and beautiful arms 
And throat engorged with very carnal blood.
It coldly peered and wondered... (BSW, 69)
Although the peace in the passage is a m ere w orldly cessation of hosti­
lities (the peace trea ty  signed at Compiegne in Novem ber 1918), its 
“h ea rt” contains the cold tru th  of the inner peace. Even the hot fires 
of politics and history comprise, although are oblivious of, the cold of 
the essence which, so far qualified as “dark” now m ust be completed 
by an im portant modification — the peace is no longer dark  but also 
“cold” .
Peace to the world in tim e or in a year,
In the inner world I have touched the instant peace. (BSW, 70)
Thus, the “instant peace” of the cold and dark essence is not to be 
actualized in time. This is in accordance w ith  the instruction which we 
hear in another text: “to disfigure tim e as tim elessness” (SP, 195). The 
disfigurem ent in question is more than a m ere negative gesture of erasing 
time. In the adjective “in stan t” we hear several meanings. F irst of ail, 
it describes a phenomenon which overcomes tim e by coming to pass 
“a t once”, i.e. both suddenly (here we are rem inded of the principle of 
seeing “as if for the first tim e”) and m om entarily (this could help to 
explain Je ffe rs’s reluctun t acceptation of h istory which is no m ore tha t 
“the old whirligig, the old runaround, the old up-and-down... the haggard 
w hore’s tra il; the rouged-up, disease-blown and lipsticked queen”, (DA, 
39).
But “in stan t” rem em bers also the aspect of urgency. Som ething that 
is “u rgen t” calls for our im m ediate action, cannot be relegated and 
postponed to some “other tim e”, bu t m ust be a ttended  to “im m ediately” . 
An “u rgen t” thing, and each thing once its th ingly character has been 
revealed is “u rg en t”, defies tim e as it m akes us concentrate exclusively 
on itself, and its only tim e is “now ”. W hat can be put off till some 
“other tim e” is not urgent, and thus is a t the m ercy of time. The thing 
calls and dem ands our attention and is persisten t in m aking this dem and 
upon us. Hence the “instant peace” is not a kind of peace which we 
make, bu t a peace which claims us from  the very  essence of the thing, 
i.e. from  Being. In such an understanding of the adjective “in stan t” 
peace rem ains in conjunction w ith  ice and cold. The “instan t peace” 
reveals the soul as
...a flawless crystal coldly clear,
A cold w hite mansion that he yields in lease  
To tenant dreams and tyrants from the brain 
And riotous burnings of the lovelier flesh. (BSW, 70)
A rethinking of hum an tim e is, however, only one step tow ards the 
“cold crysta l” It m ust be completed by a re in terp reta tion  of hum an 
history as a m ere projection of m an’s psyche: it is the “ty ran ts  from  the 
b ra in ” which call for a “tribal... anthropoid God... a ridiculous pro­
jection of hum an fears, needs, dreams, justice and love-dust” (DA, 53). 
If this step is taken then we will be able to get to the “ice-core of th ings” 
(SP, 49) which, necessarily, involves going beyond standard  ethical con­
cepts tow ards the ethics of indifference. In “The Truce and Peace” 
we read:
That ice within the soul, the admonisher 
of Madness when w e’re wildest, the unwinking eye  
That measures all things with indifferent stare,
Choosing far stars to check near objects by
Being so tranguil seems the presence of death,
Being so central seems the essence of life. (BSW, 79)
A m ajor substitution has been effected in these lines, a replacem ent 
which, together w ith  N ietzsche’s angry astonishm ent a t the im pertinence 
which allows m an to place him self together w ith  the world by means 
of an innocently looking w ord “and”, attacks the vital and venerable 
tradition of hum anism. Jeffei's seems to be thinking along the Nietz- 
schean lines:
Die ganze Attitüde “Mensch gegen Welt”, der Mensch als “W eltverneindes” 
Princip, der Mensch als Werthmaass der Dinge, als Welten-Richter, der 
zuletzt das Dasein selbst auf seine Wagschalen legt und zu leicht befindet 
— die ungeheuerliche Abgeschmacktheit dieser Attitüde ist uns als solche 
zum Bewusstsein gekommen and verleidet — wir lachen schon, wen wir 
“Mensch und Welt” neben einander gestellt finden, getrennt durch die su­
blime Anmaassung des Wörtchens “und”!22
For Jeffers, as for Nietzsche, the world is fundam entally  “ungottlich, 
unm oralisch, unm enschlich”23, and the poet shuns the dillem m a of ni­
hilism  th a t so preoccupied the philosopher by rediscovering the ‘ice 
w ithin the soul”. Je ffe rs’s philosophy of things is in this respect a varie ty  
of N ietzsche’s “transvaluation of all values” , as it reverses the usual 
order and holds th a t it is the thing which is the m easure of all men. 
This certainly questions the order of fam iliarity  w ith which we have
22 F. Nietzsche, Fröhliche Wissenschaft  (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1921), p. 279—280.
23 Ibidem, p. 279.
Encountered the w orld so far: w hat 
has been “throw n to  the surface of 
th ings” (SP, 188) now m ust be vie­
wed from  the perspective of Being.
B ut if such is the  n a tu re  of the 
“instan t peace” then why, if it 
brings us back to the prim al re la­
ting, is it qualified in a hesitan t 
and ten tative way? W hy th is  most 
uncertain  of a ll predicates, “seem ”?
The answ er is suggested by the fol­
lowing lines:
Is it perhaps that death and life  make truce 
In neutral zone w hile their old feud beyond 
Fired the towered city?
The “ice w ith in  the soul” seems to be the essence because as originating 
in  the realm  beyond all distinctions (like the m ost fundam ental dicho­
tom y betw een life and death) it cannot be predicated w ith  any verb 
th a t entails a very  decisive mode of being “th is” or “th a t”. Because all 
w ords referring  to the sphere of Being b lu r it  im m ediately, obfuscate 
i t  and render defensless thus, in the final analysis, Being is not open 
to the predicate “is” but only to m uch m ore ten tative “seem s”. As we 
have seen, Jeffers continues Nietzschean m istrust of w ords w hich are 
considered as “superstitions” and therefore  m arked w ith  the stigm a 
of false belief and m isinterpretation.
I see you are superstitious... you believe in words.
But words are like women: they are made to lie  with... (DA, 71)
If we w ant to speak about Being, about the th ingly  n a tu re  of man, we 
have to speak ten tatively  and circum spectively as if questioning our own 
answers, no t only because “questioning is the  piety of thought”24, bu t 
because by questioning our answ ers we bring  to the open the lim itations 
of language. Circum spection is still m ore necessary to see through w hat 
Jeffers describes as the “false earnestness of passionate life” (CM, 43) 
which extends from  the realm  of p riva te  desire to the domain of d ra­
m atic historical processes involving nations and continents. The point 
of Je ffe rs’s philosophy is to bring us to  realize th a t the  quiet indifference 
of Being underlies the hysteria  of history. Even at the tim es of frenzy 
there  is the “unw inking eye th a t m easures all things w ith  indifferent 
s ta re” (BSW, 79).
Thus, the essence of m an gives itself only to  a paradoxical form ulation
as the  “w hite of fire” : the w hite signifies both the  in tensity  of a flam e,
There is an old woman here in 
Carmel — eighty years old and 
swollen with dropsy — who has 
lived most of her life in wild pla­
ces hereabout. Once her husband 
captured a fawn w hile she was 
nursing a baby. She had an un­
comfortable excess of milk; the 
fawn shared with the child and 
both grew up happily, muzzling the 
same breasts.
— RJ to E. Bishop, July 31,
1917
S The Dark Glory
its highest tension and density, b u t also — as a colour of ice and snow
—  it suggests the very  opposite of fire. W hile the flam e bum s and is
—  at least potentially  —  destructive, the w hite of fire  refers to the 
ind ifferen t essence, to the sphere w here the pre-hum an shows itself 
to be the cornerstone upon which m an constructs “certain  fictions called 
good and evil” (SP, 480). As Charles K ahn puts it in his new  translation 
of H eraclitus’s fragm ents:
...there must be som e distinction between celestial fire or light, as the  
highest destiny of the soul, and terrestrial flam e here below. They are both 
forms of fire, but the status of the fiery element in our immediate vicinity  
is ambivalent, since it may (like wrath and hybris) manifest itself in 
a raging, destructive conflagration.25
The celestial fire  w hich is the destiny of the soul is w hat in Je ffe rs’s 
questioning of m an is signified by the  pow er th a t chooses “far stars 
to  check near objects by”. This detachm ent is no t m erely spatial but, 
firs t of all, it a lerts m an to the dangers of desire and excitem ent: grave 
earnestness of the thing (see “Oh. This Lovely Rock”) is far d ifferent 
from  the “false earnestness of passionate life” subjected to criticism  in 
Cawdor and m any o ther poems of the Californian poet. The celestial 
pow er which, in the Heideggerian w ay, destins m an is a “neu tra l zone” 
w here “life and death  are  sister and b ro ther and lovers” (BSW, 79). 
I t  is the sphere which defies the fundam ental taboo concerning incest 
(a constant m otive in Je ffe rs’s long narra tive  poems) thus dram atically  
redifining the s tructu re  of hum an desire and turn ing  into the sphere 
of “eternal living” (SP, 76) of the “life inhum an and cold” (SP, 465) 
w here m an is
...superior to death and fortune, unmoved by success 
or failure. Pity can make him weep still,
Or pain convulse him, but not to the center, and he can conquer 
them... (SP, 584)
The neu tra l zone of the “w hite of f ire” m arks not only the end of hum an 
superiority  and transcends norm s and taboos of the  society, bu t it  also 
erases the basic sex differences in the act of relocating the sex division 
to a m uch la te r ontological phase. In  the early  long poem The Coast- 
-Range Christ the ligh t of dawn embodying divine presence is shown as
neither man nor woman,
H e was higher and lovelier than the pine tops, and human 
and not human.
He was shining out of the east before the star that kills 
the night,
Like a walking tower on the ridge between the hilltops, a 
tower of light. (BSW, 56)
25 Ch. Kahn, The A rt and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge, 1979), p. 250.
The “ice w ithin the áoul*’ is the essence of m an as the thing, bu t it 131 
also, like H eraclitus’s fire, has a cosmic and geological significance. Ice 
is the im m ediate predecessor of life of each specific organism  which stood 
out from  the  in-d ifferen t form ation of ice. In  The Tow er beyond Tragedy  
Cassandra sees the dram a of the hum an life as surrounded by ice:
...the column of the ice that was before on one side
flanks it,
The column of the ice to come closes it up on the other. (SP, 115)
The fire of Being is d ifferent from  the terrestria l fire in th a t its  func­
tion is less to bum  and heat and m ore to shine and gleam. This certain ly  
enhances the sense of distance: shining is life giving only w hen a com­
fortable distance has been secured. Too pow erful ligh t w ill dazzle instead 
of bringing an object to its contour and form. A lready the Pythagoreans 
insisted on the  coldness of the cosmic fire:
Lustre and light in themselves are cold. If, therefore, the air movement 
away from a fire is transmitted over a great distance, a remote object can 
shine and sparkle without being hot.26
Sim ilarly, Heidegger in the sem inar he gave w ith  Eugen F ink on H erac­
litus persistently  emphasizes th a t fire  is not a m ere burning and m ainly 
is more than  ju st a source of heat. Life only superficially  can be 
explained aw ay as w arm th; ontologically, as Being, life ought to be 
described by shining and shim m ering which distances ourselves radically 
from  it. Only from  a distance can the proxim ity  of Being be recognized 
and acknowledged. Heidegger endorses the view  th a t fire  as the pyr  
aeizoon has deposited its pow er in brightness ra th e r  than  in burning.
...dans le  pyr aeizoon c’est surtout le  moment de la splendeour (Schein) qui 
est important.27
It is through the shining pow er of fire  th a t things are brought to stand 
as things, and Fink correctly rem arks th a t fire is w hat brings to appear­
ance (das zum  Vor schein Bring ende) w hich concept is not only etym o- 
logically related  to splendour, brilliance or shining.
Sim ilarly, Gaston Bachelard presents fire  in term s of its originary 
pow er to draw  phenom ena to the sphere of our eyesight (“le feu est 
le prem ier facteur du phénom ène”28) w here
Le premier phénomène, c’est non seulement le  phénomène de feu contemplé, 
en une heure visive, dans sa vie et dans son éclat, c’est le  phénomène par 
le  feu. Le phénomène par le feu est le  plus sensible de tous...29
26 F. M. Cleve, The Ginats..., vol. 2, p. 475.
2,7 M. Heidegger, E. Fink, Séminaire du sem estre d ’hiver 1966—67, trans.
J. Launay et P. Levy (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), p. 86.
28 G. Bachelard, La psychanalyse..., p. 95.
29 Ibidem, p. 96.
In  his comments upon H eraclitus’s sta tem ent th a t “A wisest and best 
psyche is a dry  lu stre” K ahn notices th a t the original Greek lexis is 
v e ry  capacious. W hat is rendered as a “lu stre” is as a m atte r of fact 
no t lim iting to the burning activ ity  of fire  bu t refers to a gleam  of 
ligh t w hich in a Greek w ord auge
...is used for the rays of the sun, the flesh of lightning, the glare of fire, 
the sheen of gold or brass, or even the rays or brilliance of the eyes.30
Also Jeffers, having considered the “ice w ith in  soul” as the stellar 
shim m ering (“s ta r  by star/W in ter Orion pursues the Pleiades/In pale 
and huge parade”, SP, 75) tu rn s  tow ards the ophtalmological m etaphor. 
The neu tra l zone of Being which calls for our attention, the “instan t 
peace”, is the “eyes of flaw less diam ond” :
...Surely for a strange use 
He sphered that eye of flawless diamond.
It does not serve him but with line and rod
Measures him, how indeed should God serve God? (SP, 75)
God is defined in Je ffe rs’s philosophy as the shining of Being, the 
“ice-core of th ings”, and since “cold” is w hat unconceals the thingly 
character of m an then  God m anifests itself in m an in his essence as 
the thing. Hence, the alienated m an try ing  to rem ove his own ines­
sentia lity  m ust tu rn  tow ard things. This is w hat the tourist unconsciously 
looks for:
These tourists...
Pilgrims from civilization, anxiously seeking beauty, religion, 
poetry; pilgrims for the vacuum.
People from cities, anxious to be human again. (SP, 363)
All the objectives of “tourists”, here specified as “beauty, religion, poetry”, 
are  actualized in God who is a descriptive term  for the “neu tra l zone”,
,o r the “w hite of f ire”. God in Je ffe rs’s vision belongs to the realm  of
the pre-hum an, and thus the question of God’s existence is, like for 
Nietzsche, “pas une th6odicee, m ains une cosmodic6e”31.
Yourself, if you had not encountered and loved 
Our unkindly all but inhuman God,
Who is very beautiful and too secure to want worshippers,
And includes ideed the sheep with the wolves...
H e includes the flaming stars and pitiable flesh,
And what w e call things and what w e call nothing.
H e is very beautiful. (SP, 458)
God, who is the in-d ifferen t power, can hard ly  be a p a tr ia rc h a l. figure 
of Christianity. “Jew -beak is dead” (WPS, 17) is Je ffe rs’s rephrasing of
30 Ch. Kahn, The A rt and Thought..., p. 246.
31 G. Deleuze, Nietzsche et philosophie (Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1962, 
p. 29.
Nietzsche’s statem ent of the death  of God in the 125 aphorism  of The  
Joyfu l W isdom. God is no t so m uch physas, a fa the r and procreator, 
bu t physis —  the pow er to grow, “the em erging and arising, the spon­
taneous unfolding th a t lingers”32. If life originally grows and emerges, 
then the standard , anthropoid v e r­
sion of G od-creator who in a unique 
gesture form s things as ready m ade 
m ust appear to Jeffers as tinged by 
a .m ajor heresy: the heresy of in -, 
authenticity . Since Jeffers begins 
w ith the sta tem ent th a t “life grows, 
life is not m ade”, to w ind up in the 
self-perpetuation of Being which 
always regresses tow ards the original 
source w ithout ever reaching it (life 
“grows from  w hat grew  before”,
DA, 166), then God loses his personal 
characteristics to become “very  bea­
utiful, bu t hard ly  a friend of hum a­
n ity ” (SP, 459), “the original w orld- 
-m aking pow er”33. In a dram atic 
gesture the Christian soteriology is relegated to the sta tus of one of the 
possible reading of history, no t the scenarion b u t only a ten tative scrip t 
of the sto ry  of Being (“W hen the anim als C hrist was rum ored to have
died for drew  in..., W PS, 9), and God’s action tu rn s  out to be to ta lly
self-referential (“God is a great poet: /  W hom can he praise b u t him self?”, 
BE, 51).
How are we to understand, then, the “eye” which appears, in the  
iconographical agreem ent w ith  tradition, as a synonym  of God’s presence 
in man? Some instruction as to th is m atte r comes from  ano ther tex t 
in which Jeffers, referring  to the ocean, regresses tow ards w hat preceded 
the life of an individual being:
...but there is in me 
Older and harder than life and more impartial, the eye that 
watched before there was an ocean. (SP, 87)
The “older eye” is im partial and in-different, b u t also alien to any 
form al, ritualistic organization of cult. As we have learn t before, God 
does not need w orshippers, i.e. it cannot be subject to a stric t and rigidly 
regulated hierarchy  in which God is served to the believers. This serving 
has a double quality. F irst, God is served as an object of veneration; 
second, and m ore im portantly , it is dispensed to people by a separate
32 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 51.
33 Ibidem, p. 52.
When w e were in Galway... w e  
went out to the Aran Islands in 
a small steamer... When w e landed  
w e got into a jaunting car and 
drove 6 miles at a hard trot... to 
Dun Aengus, a great prehistoric 
fortress on a high sea-cliff. Awe- 
-inspiring place, protected on one 
side by the three hundred foot 
cliff, and from the other hand by 
the three crescents of high stone 
walls... Nobody has any idea who 
built the place or why... The islands 
are all bare and wind-swept, wild  
rock, hardly any soil.
— UJ to U. Schoonover, January
11, 1938
134 group claiming a priviliged position w ith  regard  to God. Heidegger’s 
com m ents upon the difference betw een C hristian ity  and Christian dom34 
and his e rra ta  to the m eaning of Logos assum ed in the New Testam ent 
follow basically the same line of criticism  which the philosopher p re­
sents concisely in A n Introduction to M etaphysics: the New Testam ent 
God is a m ediator and an “anthropoid” in term ediary  betw een God and 
people.
...logos in the New Testament does not, as in  Heraclitus, mean the being 
of the essent, the gathering together of the conflicting; it means one 
[Heidegger’s emphasis] particular essent, namely the son of God. And 
specifically it refers to him in the role of mediator between God and men. 
This New Testament notion of the logos is that of the Jewish philosophy 
of religion developed by Philo whose doctrine of creation attributes to the 
logo? the function of m esites, the mediator.35
W hat Heidegger calls the “gathering together of the conflicting” is the 
“neu tra l zone” or the “ice-core of th ings” of the poet. The eye combines 
dichotomies and is the core of man:
And death and life within that Eye combine,
Within that only untorturable nerve 
Of those that make a man, within that shrine 
Which there is nothing ever can profane... (SP, (5)
The eye is, in a hidden cen trality  of its position, the eye of a vision, not 
a m ere eyesight; the eye looks but does not look at. Together w ith  its 
previously established qualifications (the eye as God and the thingly 
essence of man) the sim plest definition of Je ffe rs’s eye would read: 
the  eye is th a t which is. In Heidegger we encounter a sim ilar visionary 
optics:
That which is does not come into being at all through the fact that man 
first looks upon it... Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by that 
which is...36
The eye is m y essence, something which cannot be dispensed w ith  and 
which, although forgotten and even cu ltured  away, still originally resides 
in man. Thus, it is understandable th a t the eye is synonym ous w ith 
God and the sta te  of balance w here controversies are overcome: “this 
Eye, th is God, th is Peace” , as Je ffe rs’s tex t describes it (SP, 75).
It is a t th is m om ent when the phonetics brings an in teresting insight 
to our in terp reta tion  of Je ffe rs’s philosophy. The “eye” is not only close 
accoustically to the “ice” which, as we have seen, is the core of things, 
bu t is also a homophone of the first person singular pronoun. The cold
31 See M. Heidegger, T he Q uestion  Concerning..., p. 62—65.
35 M. Heidegger, A n  'In trodu ction  to M etaphysics, p. 113,
36 M. Heidegger, T he Q uestion  Concerning..., p. 131.
eye th a t looks w ith  in-difference and im partiality , for w hich good and 13S 
evil are “certain fictions”, is the essential I:
I found this wisdom on the wonderful road,
The essential Me cannot be given away, . '
The single Eye, God cased in blood-shot clay. (SP, 76) ' ' i -
We notice th a t w hat constitutes m an (“the essential Me”) is w hat dissolves 
him  in his th ingly nature. Man is the product of the Eye to the  ex ten t 
to which he is rem oved as a there substance to be seen. Looking a t  ari 
object w ill not do as a m eans to perceive it; w hat is necessary is a pene­
tra tive  glance to reveal its “core of ice”. Michel de C erteau in an essay 
on Nicolas de Cusa m akes a useful distinction betw een “gazing” * and 
“seeing” concluding th a t
The experience of the gaze is a surprise without an object. The gaze of the  
other excludes the possession of an image. It deprives of sight... to perceive 
an object is thus to defend oneself against one’s capacity for looking...®7'
The visionary optics defies m ere seeing, and m an can be re tu rned  to 
his essence only if he defends him self against the repeatib ility  of the 
image m istakenly taken for the thing. God’s gazing is th a t of the 
“eyes like blue ice” (DJ, 122), and w hat Je ffe rs  calls a “w onderful road” 
to wisdom is gazing to see “as if it w ere fo r the firs t tim e”, before the 
object degenerates “into a prototype to be copied and im m itated”38. The 
eye signifies — via its transform ations from  shining, shim m ering and 
cold brightness of gazing —  “the  original em ergence and standing of 
energies, the phainesthai, or appearance in the g rea t sense of a w orld, 
epiphany” which, through a false earnestness of culture, m an will tu m - 
to a m ere “visibility of things th a t are a lready-there  and can be pointed 
out. The eye the vision, which originally  projected the p ro ject into the 
potency, becomes a m ere looking over or gaping a t”39. As we can see, 
the eye, opening, fire, cold, shining and peace 
belong to the same philosophical paradigm . But 
the eye stands in opposition to a m ere eye sight, 
shining is m ore than lighting, peace is not 
a w ordly truce, and cold resides a t the core 
of fire. Also the opening is 'n o t a simple break 
in the continuum . W hen the  w orshippers of 
Dionyssius sing of the opening the tex t im m e­
diately senses the am biguity of th is notion and asks carefully  “W hat 
opening?” (DJ, 124). An identical interrogations is to be found in Heideg­
ger who, speaking of aletheia  —  the  Greek w ord for tru th , precedes 
his analysis w ith  an im portan t question: “W here does the opening come
37 M. de Certeau, “The Gaze. Nicolas of Cusa”, in Diacritics (Fall 1987), p. 18,
58 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to M etaphysics, p. 52.
39 Ibidem, p. 52,
My w ife is as mad 
about rocks as I am,, 
fortunately, or rather 
I as she.
— RJ to M. van  
Doren, March 14, 1930
tM  from  and how is i t  given?”40. The opening is not a m ere negation of 
closure; ra ther, i t  is an in terp lay  o f the two. P entheus and  Agave 
do not contradict each o ther but, like N ietzsche’s Apollo and Dionyssius, 
they  resolve the contradiction. According to Deleuze Dionyssius and 
Apollo
ne s ’opposent pas comme les terms d’une contradiction, mais plutôt comme 
deux façon antithétique de la résoudre...41
As Dionyssius is objectified only  in the Appolonian form  of the dram a, 
so the  opening, a  sudden appearing of the thing, is possible only 
through a  carefu l observation of appearances, of closed outlines, of the 
closure. Thus, both closure and opening can be approached as theo­
retical issues, while P entheus and Agave take them  as h ints for decisive 
action. W hen we say “theoretical”, we refer to the old Greek sense 
of “theory” in which, as Heidegger has rem inded us, we hear both 
then, i.e. w hat shows itself ex ternally , appearance, and horaö describing 
the action of looking a t som ething w ith  attention. Hence,
...theörein is thean horan, to look attentively on the outward appearance 
wherein what presences becomes visible and, through such sight-seeing — 
to linger with it (verweilen).42
The opening and closure are  “theoretical” problem s because they  deal 
less w ith  actual action and com m ittm ent and more w ith  a tten tive look­
ing a t som ething th a t necessarily has to be veiled over, recognized but 
concealed, open and closed to ou r eyes. Je ffe rs’s life, detached from  
action and productiv ity  which was by the m odem  epoch distorted  as 
—  to use N ietzsche’s words —  m ere haste (unanständigen und schw itz­
enden Eilfetigkeit) aim ing a t  careless finishing th ings (fertig  machen)**, 
w as a life w here the opening and closure w ere under a constant and 
w atchful observation. I t was a bios theôrëtikos
...the way of life  of the beholder, the one who looks upon the pure shining- 
-forth of that which presences.44
’The opening and closure are the two edges from  betw een which we can
spe shining. N either Pentheus nor Agave can see it dedicated, as they
are, to the firm  establishing of one o r the  o ther, w hereas both  concepts
rem ain bound not as an a lternative b u t as a conjunction. B ut shining 
again needs darkness because, as we have said so m any tim es after 
Jeffers, true  shining is “dark  glory”. Even shining is no t the u ltim ate
40 M. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”, in 
M. Heidegger, On Being and Time, frans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), p. 73.
41 G. Deleuze, Nietzsche et..., p. 13.
42 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning..., p. 183.
42 F. Nietzsche, M orgenrothe (Stuttgart: Korner, 1921), p. 202.
44 M, Heidegger, The Question Concerning..., p. 164.
stage of the retrogressive m ovem ent as Jeffers knew  it, since he was 
constantly  stressing the need and obligation to try  to discover the still 
“older fountain”. The in terp lay  of the opening and closure is an endless 
series and absolutizing one of the two, like privileging ligh t over dark­
ness, is a serious philosophical m istake of which Heidegger accused P lato
{Plato] regarded understanding as “seeing” and realized that “seeing” re­
quires light, [but] he failed to grasp that light in turn needs the opening
in order to illum inate entities and thus let them show themselves in their 
being.45
And if, as in a strangely  old-fashioned w ay Jeffers believed, “a poet 
is one who listens to na tu re  and his own h e a rt” (BE, 35), w hat rem ains
for him  to do is “a little  longer w rite, and see w hat comes forth  from
a dead hand” (BE, 65).
Did you ever hear of the great (and beautiful) Hindu- 
-Buddhist temple of Angkor that stands in the deep 
jungle in Cambodia, and no one knows where the 
people who built it have gone to nor where they 
came from? An enormous affair of sandstone, and 
the architecture as if it cam e from another planet. 
Someone has given us a little stone head of a w all- 
-carving from there, and I cemented it into the 
tower the other day. Someone else has given us 
a stone from the great pyramid, and one from the 
Chinese wall. Then there is a cuneiform tablet in 
the tower from Babylonia, from a tem ple of Ishtar. 
Imagine us gathering old stones in Italy or Ireland. 
It should be an amusing pilgrimage. Love from  
us both to you and Bio. Yours always, Robinson 
Jeffers.
— RJ to B. de Casseres, November 10, 1927
45 H. Wolz, Plato and Heidegger. In Search of Selfhood (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 1981), p. 13.
V
11. The Sense of En-DING
What" follows death is the scene of m ourning and consolation. Je f­
fers him self would endorse Jean  Jacques Rousseau’s view  concerning 
‘'p rim itive” (i.e. “tru e ”) men who contended to accept N atu re’s law and
died without anyone noticing that they seased to exist, and almost without 
noticing it them selves.1
Still there  is m ourning and consolation undertaken  on behalf of all of 
us, since m an cannot live w ith  an unm ourned death. In the obituary 
published in Queens Q uarterly  Louis Dudek referred  to Robinson Je f­
fers as to a “radical revisionist” placing him  in the company of Blake, 
W hitm an, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Cummings, Pound, Lawrence, Gide, and 
Camus2. This book did not purport to study, not even to suggest, the 
relationships betw een Jeffers and o ther poets or philosophers, never­
theless D udek’s phrase seems to adequately describe the outcome of our 
analysis.
Je ffe rs’s radicalism  lies in his tu rn ing  away from  the hum anist tra ­
dition which has led arts  and philosophy to a false position w here hum an 
thinking rem ains unrelated  to its essential elem ent. A nthropocentric 
hum anism  spells thus the end of th inking and the beginning of a mo­
dern m arket of public opinion dem anding ever-new  “-ism s”. As M artin 
H eidegger puts it:
Thinking comes to an end when it slips out of its element.3
1 J. J. Rousseau, Oeuvres..., vol. 3, p. 137; English translation in R. Grimsley, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, p. 29.
2 L. Dudek, “Art, Entertainment and Religion”, Queens Quarterly, LXX, 
(Autumn 1963).
3 M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. D. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 
1977), p. 196.
I t is w ith  this slippage th a t Je ffe rs  is concerned and it is through the 
m editation upon landscape and tim e th a t he tries to bring  hum an 
th inking  back to its elem ent. W hat is this elem ent and w here shall 
w e look fo r it, seem to be m ost u rgen t questions asked in th is essay. 
The elem ent of thinking is, for Jeffers, revealed in the non-hum an and 
prehum an. In o ther words, to regain the vision we m ust w ithdraw  from  
exclusively hum an categories, as it  is precisely these categories th a t 
tu rn  hum anism  into in-hum anism , i.e. in the stance w here m an is de­
prived of his essence and exists w ithout any relationship w ith  w hat 
m akes his life possible. Thus, even m ourning and consolation w ill not 
rem ain hum an, if they  are to perform  th e ir san itary  function:
There
is no consolation in humanity —
Only the acts and glory of unhuman 
nature or immortal God
Can ever give our hearts peace. (H, 16)
L ater on in the same book Jeffers will am plify the same point:
As for us:
We must uncenter our minds from ourselves;
We must unhumanize our views a little, and become confident
As the rock and ocean that w e were made from. (H, 97)
“U ncentering” and “unhum anizing” are necessary steps on the w ay 
tow ards reclaim ing of the elem ent of thinking.
The vision of th inking m ust then be a re-vision of the already deter­
m ined in terpreta tions and readings of history, litera tu re , philosophy, and 
politics. This task is to be carried out by uncovering w hat M artin Heideg­
ger calls dingliche Unterbau, the m aterial scheme of m an’s existence (we 
have ju st seen how Jeffers presents m an as made of rock and ocean). 
I t is a popular m istake to th ink of Je ffe rs  as an antihum an philosopher, 
“righ t wing nationalist, the lunatic fringe, and the m ost arden t Roose­
velt h a te r”4, bu t this erro r has accompanied the poet since the beginning 
of his lite ra ry  career. An early  review  in Bookman  speaks of Je ffe rs’ 
“m isanthropy equalled only by Jonathan  Sw ift”5, and a 1963 obituary 
continues along the same line m odifying m isanthropy by love:
He was the closest America has yet produced to that other great Nay- 
-Sayer, Jonathan Swift. But, like Swift, he hated profoundly because he 
loved profoundly.6
4 R. J. Brigham, “Bitter and Skillful Treatise in Verse”, in Post-Dispatch  
[St. Louis] (August 1, 1948).
5 E. Eisenberg, “A Not So Celestial Choir”, in Bookman, 66 (Sept. 1927)
6 Ch. Angoff, “Three Towering Figures: Reflections upon the Passing of Ro­
bert Frost, Robinson Jeffers, William Carlos W illiams”, in Literary R eview  (Sum­
mer 1963).
140. One of the purposes of th is book has been to argue tha t Je ffe rs’s stance 
is less a question of tem peram ental love or ha tred  and m orę a result 
of an evolution of certain  philosophy which can be broadly described 
as ahum anism . Its  h e a rt lies in the Nietzschean perspectivism  of re­
flection and the alm ost phenomenological insistence on the thing and 
its “thingly charac te r”, ding-liche Unterbau. The form er construes hi­
sto ry  as W iederkunft, the Nietzschean stam m ering effort to verbalize 
the difference betw een to “be” and to “become” .
W illiam Nolte com paring Jeffe rs  and T. S. Eliot claims th a t “Eliot’s 
philosophy rings hollow w hen you realize tha t his view of man extends 
back only to the b irth  of C h rist”; unlike Eliot, Je ffe rs  finds, the “eternal 
flow ” and since he
...possessed a learning in both the sciences and classics which makes Eliot’s 
narrow scholastic training seem paltry by comparison, saw the Christian 
era as a little more than a moment in man’s descent from the primordial 
past.7
B ut w hat is a t stake here is ne ither “scholastic trairiing” nor “learning 
in classics”, bu t the tragic and fundam ental conviction which we encounter 
in  Je ffe rs’s poetry  of m an’s  deprivation of the  comforts of tran s­
cendental reassurance. Jeffersian  philosophy is an extension of the 
Nietzschean philosophical m etaphors of flight and abyss (Abgrund), and 
Jeffe rs’ Vision of h istory  is, like Nietzsche’s, deprived of any priviliged 
m om ents th a t could function as provisional centers. Thus, in Hunger- 
fie ld  we read:
God-if-there-is-a-God is neutral... (H, 15),
and God, no longer a dispenser of certain ty  and shelter as he him self 
is a p a rt  of a conditional clause, like a Heidegger-Hölderlin deity, is 
a “violent one” in the presence of which m an is
...cast out of the ‘homely’, i.e. customary, familiar, secure.
The unhomely prevents us from making ourselves at home and -
therein it is overpowering.8
This originary violence of being is w hat Je ffe rs  is try ing  to recapture 
in his philosophy of thing. Q uestioning as superficial Patrick  B ridgw ater’s 
view that
Nietzsche was a far less ‘measurable’ influence on his Jeffers’ work than 
Schopenhauer and Spengler... it seems true to say that what w e find in 
Jeffers’ work are not so much echoes of Nietzsche, as occassional parallels
7 W. Nolte, “Robinson Jeffers as Didactic Poet”, in Virginia Q uarterly Review. 
42 (Spring 1966).
8 M. Heidegger, An Introduction to  M etaphysics, p. 127.
with some of Nietzsche’s — mainiy incidental ideas; basically his view  
of life is totally different from Nietzsche’s9,
we m ust concede th a t it is the Greeks th a t seem to p resent the a lte r­
native for the m odem  philosophical predicam ent. The analysis of thing 
as “dark shining” or p y r  aeizoon clearly indicates Je ffe rs’s affin ity  w ith  
the presocratics, the fascination he unknow ingly shared w ith  M artin 
Heidegger. The anonymous early  review er of Je ffe rs’s work does not 
exaggerate when he/she claims tha t the poet “stem s from  the G reeks”10.
It is through the reth inking  of m an’s th ingly  character, through the 
en- (like in “en tru s t”) DING (if we m ay allow some space for the 
in terlingual pun) and not through political or ideological m anouvers 
th a t the “opening in the hum an husk” Jeffers is talking about in “The 
H um anist T ragedy” is to be found, and ahum anism , i.e. the a ttitude of 
un-Kumanized m an is to be created.
9 P. Bridgwater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony (Leicester University Press 1972), 
p. 161. ■
10 Anon., “Robinson Jeffers: Bard”, in Magazine of Sigma Chi, 50 (May—June 
1931). .
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Miscellanea
Time & Texts
1887 — Jan. 10 born in Pittsburgh, Penn.
1899—1902 — travels and education in Europe
1912 — Flagons and A pp les
1913 — Marriage to Una Kuster
1914 — Move to Carmel. Death of infant daughter
1916 — Twin sons Garth and Donnan born
1924 — T am ar and O th er P oem s
1925 — Roan Sta llion
1927 — T he W om en a t P oin t Sur
1928 — C aw dor and O th er P oem s
1929 — D ear Judas and O ther Poem s. Travel to Great Britain and Ireland
1931 — D escen t to  th e  D ead
1932 — T hurso’s Landing and O ther P oem s
1933 — G ive  Y our H eart to  th e  H aw ks and O ther P oem s
1935 — S o ls tice  and O th er P oem s
1937 — Such C ounsels Y ou  G ave M e and O th er P oem s
1941 — B e A n g ry  a t th e  Sun
1947 — Oct. 4 Dear Judas opens in New York 
Oct. 20 Medea opens in New York
1948 — The D ouble A x e  and O ther P oem s
1950 — Sept. 1, death of Una Jeffers
1954 — H ungerfield  and O ther P oem s
1962 — Jan. 21, death of Robinson Jeffers
1963 — T he B eginning and the End
10 T£s  Dark Glory
W o rd s &  Critics
“He th a t comes reveren tly  shall hear the singing of the M orning S tar 
th a t before was only given to W illiam Blake in his m adness to a ttend .”
H. F. C. “Passionate Music”. 
Columbia Varsity, 9 (October
1927)
“I  find in h im  th e 1 tragic te rro r of Aeschylus, the divine m elancholy and 
rem ote spiritual pathos of Chopin, the im aginative insanity  of Blake, 
the lurid  grandeur of Coleridge, the hallucinant chiaroscuro of De Quin- 
cey, the satanic joy in the hideous of Baudelaire, the psychoanalytical 
topsy turvyism  of Dostoievsky, the beautiful m orbidity of d ’Annunzio, 
the horro r love of Dante, the eariness and incestuous m otives of W ag­
ner, and above all and beyond all, the defian t and aurealed  wickedness 
of N ietzsche’s A ntichrist and Superm an.”
Benjamin De Casseres, The 
Superman in America (Seat­
tle: University of Washington 
Bookstore, 1929)
“Colossal, indelible symphonies of a m ad Dante...”
Anon, review in English Jour­
nal, 19 (Sept. 1930)
“The emergence of Jeffers, and tha t he is hailed as a m ajor poet and 
prophet, is a severe com m entary upon W hitm an’s dream  of Am erica...”
Anon, review in Magazine of 
Sigma Chi, 50 (May—June
1931)
“In  the pantheism , there  is a comparison w ith  W. C. Bryant. In the 
realm  of horro r Jeffers fa r  surpasses Poe... in his probing into the 
darker secrets of the m ind Jeffers is to be compared w ith O’Neill. ... As 
to their use of free verse Jeffers shows m uch greater skill than W hitman. 
His philosophy resem bles M elville and Hardy. I t m ay be an exaggeration 
to say th a t the g reatest poetic event in Am erica in the 1920s is the 
arrival of Robinson Jeffers...”
Ray M. Lawless, “Robinson 
Jeffers — Poet”, Present Day 
American Literature, 
4 (March 1931)
“...it is obvious th a t he tow ers above all his California predecessors. The 147 
in tensity  of his feeling for the Carm el shore-line does not require 
em phasis.”
C. McWilliams, “The Writers 
o f California”, Bookman, 72 
.(Dec. 1930)
“The play [Dear Judas] ran  one week in Ogunquit, Maine, was w ith ­
draw n under pro test from  Catholic a tto rney  F. S. Sullivan as ‘offensive, 
dangerous and should not be perform ed as it  w ould surely  damage the 
faith  of the people...’.
The Boston city censor “explained th a t the showing of the play here 
would violate the beliefs of m any Bostonians in God and m ight even 
create trouble by stirring  up religious feeling’.”
Anon., “Acting Mayor J. B.
Hynes of Boston Bans ‘Dear 
Judas’, Play based on Jeffers’ 
Poem”, Times  (New York) 
(August 14, 1947)
“Robinson Jeffers has done an excellent adaptation of the Euripedes 
original, and his verse is pithy, terse, vivid, and illum inating w ithout 
extianeous elaboration...”
W. Beyer, “The State of the 
Theatre: New Blood”, School 
and Society,  67 (Febr. 28,1948)
“...son im agination transpose sur le plan m odern des m otifs eschyléens 
dans une langue forte et imagée comme celle de la poesie grecque et 
où le paysage californien... fourn it aux sombres dram es de Jeffers un
décor idéal.”
M. Breton, Anthologie de la 
Poesie Américaine Contempo­
raine (Paris: Les Editions De- 
noel, 1948)
“America has produced three great poets in the century  which has seen 
lier rise to greatness — Eliot, Frost, and Jeffers.”
J. Squires, The Loyalties of 
Robinson Jeffers (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press,
1956)
“H enry Miller, E. E. Cummings, and Robinson Jeffers w ere perhaps the 
three outstanding individualists of the period.”
J. Salzman, Y ears of Protest:
A Collection of American Wri­
tings of the 1930’s (New York,
1967)
“No other bard of his time, o ther than  Yeats, approached the power and 
the glory, the streng th  and the tenderness, or the prophetic vision of 
Jeffers.”
L. Powell, “California Classics 
Reread: Give Your Herat to 
the Hawks”, W estways, 60 
(Nov. 1968)
“Shelley and Robinson Jeffe rs  question the m ost cherished values of 
civilization: authority , law, and divine providence.”
R. Brophy, “Tamar, The Cenci 
and Incest”, in Am erican Li­
terature, 42 (May 1970)
Stones & Trees
“I p lanted 100 eucalyptuses th is week, and 100 cypresses”
— RJ to Benjamin De Casse-
res, Sept. 26, 1925
“You have been very  kind and I should like to have answ ered more 
¡promptly; I w ork indoors in the m orning and lay  stones and p lan t 
trees  in the afternoon, expecting alw ays to w rite  le tte rs  a t night; comes 
n igh t and one of m y little  trees could w rite  a more in telligent letter. 
I ’m  sorry .”
— RJ to Harriet Monroe, Ju­
ne 2, 1926
I think that one may contribute (ever so slightly) to 
the beauty of things by making one’s own life  and 
environment beautiful... This includes moral beauty, 
one of the qualities of humanity, though it seems not 
to appear elsewhere in the universe. But I would 
have each person realize that his contribution is not 
important, its success not really a matter for exulta­
tion nor its failure for mourning; the beauty of 
things is sufficient without him.
— Robinson Jeffers to Sister Mary James Power,
October 1 1934
MROCZNA CHWAŁA
ROBINSON JEFFERS I JEGO FILOZOFIA ZIEMI, CZASU I RZECZY
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Książka podejmuje próbę przedstawienia filozofii zmarłego w  1962 roku kali­
fornijskiego poety Robinsona. Jeffersa. Zaprezentowany jest on jako pisarz kali­
fornijski Ca nie amerykański), bowiem jego życie — a przede wszystkim jego myśl 
— wyrastają ze swoistej filozofii pejzażu, jego przemian geologicznych, a tak*e 
z uważnej i troskliwej obserwacji przedmiotów udostępniających się człowiekowi 
w  tymże krajobrazie. Radykalizm myśli Jeffersa polega na dramatycznej krytyce 
tradycji filozoficznego humanizmu, któremu poeta zarzuca (mvśl ukazana w  ni­
niejszej pracy w  świetle koncepcji Martina Heideggera) pozbawienie człowieka 
należnego mu miejsca w  porządku świata. Jeffersa, podobnie jak wcześniej Nietz­
schego a równolegle Heideggera, interesuje kwestia wyalienowania ludzkiego m yś­
lenia, które nie pozostaje już w  żadnym związku z autentycznym Byciem. Próbę 
rekonstrukcji owego właściwego żywiołu myślenia podejmuje Jeffers za pośred­
nictwem medytacji nad pejzażem, którego zasadniczym powołaniem jest postawienie 
człowieka w  obliczu tego co nie-człowiecze i przed-człowiecze (nonhuman i pre- 
human) po to, by doprowadzić do zdekonstruowania tradycji przyznającej czło­
wiekowi uprzywilejowane (a więc fałszywe) miejsca w  planie natury. Mamy zatem 
do czynienia z dwoma procesami: jeden to przesunięcie ciężaru myśli z człowieka 
na bycie-w -św iecie (uncentering), drugi zaś wiedzie ku pozbawieniu myśli jej 
sztucznego humanistycznego nalotu (unhumanizing). Taki obraz myślenia musi 
skierować poetę ku reinterpretacji historii, literatury, filozofii i polityki; zadanie 
to zostaje podjęte przez odsłonięcie tego, co Heidegger nazywa dingliche Unterbau, 
a co można oddać jako “materialną podstawę ludzkiej egzystencji”. A więc nowa 
filozofia człowieka musi być nową filozofią przedmiotu.
Jednym z głównych zamierzeń pracy jest wskazanie, iż poglądy Jeffersa nie 
są wynikiem  chwilowych stanów emocjonalnych, lecz przeciwnie — stanowią 
ogniwo w  długiej ewolucji pewnego myślenia filozoficznego, które zostaje tu okres-
lone jako ahumanizm. Jego istota zdaje się spoczywać w  Nietzscheańskiej re­
fleksji nad perspektywistycznym charakterem ludzkiego poznania oraz historią 
jako Wiecznym Powrotem (Wiederkunft), a także w  fenomenologicznej analizie 
przedmiotowej podstawy ludzkiego bytu. Jeffers podejmuje więc tak istotne wątki 
i metafory obecne w  pismach Nietzschego, jak ‘otchłań’, teologia ‘śmierci Boga’ 
czy pierwotne okrucieństwo stanowiące warunek jednostkowych bytów (tę myśl 
dzieli poeta z Heideggerem i jego analizami zawartymi w e Wstępie do metafizyki). 
Do niemieckiego filozofa zbliża też Jeffersa koncepcja “mrocznej chwały” czy 
“mrocznego światła” (dar}c shining) prowadząca z kolei wprost do antycznych 
antecedensów filozoficznych, zwłaszcza zaś do filozofii presokratejskiej.
Тадеуш Славек
МРАЧНАЯ ХВАЛА  
РОБИНЗОН ДЖЕФФЕРС И ЕГО ФИЛОСОФИЯ ЗЕМЛИ,
ВРЕМЕНИ И ПРЕДМЕТА
I
Р е з ю м е
В своей книге автор знакомит читателя с философией умершего в 1962 г. 
калифорнийского поэта Робинзона Джефферса, представленного как кали­
форнийский писатель (а не американский), так как его жизнь, а прежде всего 
его мысль берут начало из своеобразной философии пейзажа, его геологи­
ческих преобразований, а также из внимательного и заботливого наблюдения 
за предметами, открывающимися человеку в этом ж е пейзаже. Радикализм 
мысли Джефферсона состоит в драматической критике традиции философского 
гуманизма, который поэт упрекает (мысль освещена в настоящей работе через 
концепцию Мартина Хейдеггера) в лишении человека надлежащего ему места 
в мировом порядке. Джефф ерса, подобно как и ранее Ницше, а одновременно 
Хейдеггера, интересует вопрос отчуждения человеческого мышления, которое 
уж е не остается ни в какой связи с действительным Бытием. Реконструировать 
эту действительно стихию мышления Д ж еф ф ерс пытается при помощи меди­
тации о пейзаже, главным призванием которого является поставить человека 
перед лицом того, что не-человеческое и до-человеческое (nonhuman и pre­
human) с целью довести до деконструкции традиции, признающей человеку 
привилегированные (т. е. фальшивые) места в плане природы. Таким образом, 
мы имеем дело с двумя процессами: один — это перемещение тяжести мысли 
с человека на бытие-в-мире (uncentering), второй ж е — это очищение мысли 
от ее искуственного гуманистического налета (ungumanizing). Такой образ мы­
шления должен направить поэта к реинтерпретации истории, литературы, 
философии и политики путем открытия того, что Хейдеггер называет dingliche 
Unterbau, а что можно выразить как “материальная основа человеческого 
существования”. Таким образом, новая философия человека должна быть 
новой философией предмета.
Одним из основных заданий настоящей работы является указание, что 
взгляды Д ж ефф ерса — это не результат временного эмоционального состо­
яния, а наоборот — они составляют звено в длительной эволюции философского 
мышления, определенного здесь как агуманизм. Думается, что его суть заклю­
чается в ничшеанском размышлении о герспективичном характепе челове­
ческого познания и истории как Вечном Возвращении (Wiederkunft), а также
в феноменологическом анализе предметной основы человеческого быта. Таким 
образом, Д ж ефф ерс рассматривает такие важные мотивы и метафоры, имею­
щиеся в произведениях Ницше, как ‘бездна’, теология ‘смерти Бога’ или же 
первичная жестокость, составляющая условие единичных бытов (эту мысль 
поэт разделяет с Хейдеггером и его анализами, содержащимися во Введении 
в метафизику. С немецким философом сближает Джефферсона также кон­
цепция “мрачной хвалы” или ж е “мрачного света” (dark shining), ведущая, 
в свою очередь, прямо к античным предшествующим философским событиям, 
а особенно к пресократовской философии.
Robinson Jeffers and H is Philosophy of Earth , T im e and Things
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